At a minimum calculation maintenance of a force of this size on a war basis in North China will cost the Japanese government Y.35 per month per man, and about double that per officer. Estimated at the lower figure, Japan's expeditionary force cannot cost less than Y.1,925,000 a month. This estimate does not take into account the cost of transportation, ammunition, billeting, and ihe re-equipment of reservists who ave been called. up 1o put the divisions on to a war basis, Nor does it reckon the cost to the Japanes government of the men who were due to have been returned to civilian life this month and who have.been kept on in the service on account of the northern crisis. As can be seen, the total cost will be enormous, for results which are, to say the least, of doubtful benefit.
The same cannot be said of the Chinese. The strength of a Chinese division is not so easily estimated, owing to the irregular, formations which are still adopted, in spite of the Central Government's best efforts to put the army on a modern footing. The Chinese can, however, move along Chinese government railways and, owing to the recent requisitioning law, need not cost much to feed The divisions have not been brought up to a war basis, having been kept at full strength all the time. And the additional expenditure is almost nothing. In this the Chinese have a financial advantage. That is about all, according to competent military observers, since the Japanese are far better trained and equipped, better fed, and better led, and in a battle of man to man should prove easily superior,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.