Apart from the fact that the demarcations on. the map which accompanied Herr Hitler's last note to Mr. Neville Chamberlain, for transmission to the Czechoslovak Government have not been. made public, and show at the written details demand more than was at first apparent, the divergence of opinion between Herr Hitler and the British and French Governments concerns chiefly the manner in which the Sudeten regions, which Prague has agreed to hand over, should be surrendered. The map, it is true, apparently lays claims to more territory than ever before, seems to have been inspired by strategic rather than ethnological motives, and is for that reason all the more objectionable to the Czechoslovak Government. It is to be feared that the strenuous endeavours of Mr. Chamberlain to prevent war, and the concessions which he has persuaded the Czechoslovak Government to make nas led to an enlargement of Herr Hitler's demands, and it was inevitable that Prague laving gone as far as it dared, has had to reject this latest Note as "absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable." There can, therefore, be no doubt as to the manner of rejection and the added fact that on this point there zan no longer be a compromise. The techaique of Herr Hitler all along has been to ase the system of progressively higher de-hands each time a concession has been obsained, with the result that he has now dis-: overed just how: much the market will bear. it will bear no more, and the issue is now eft entirely in Herr Hitlers hands as to hether there shall be peace or war. War li come if on or after October 1 he com-nonces moving German troops across. the Czechoslovak border. That decision is his, ind his alone, and he must not only abide but be responsible for the consequences, whatever they may be.
But there is still a way open. Great Bri-ain and France having persuaded Czechoslovakia to make the concession she has, rave a double responsibility, the first is the orgtection of Czechoslovakia against.any agmesion arising out of these extraneous de-hands, and the second is the responsibility o Germany to see that Czechoslovakia will honour the undertakings to which she has committed herself. There can be no am-ignify about Mr. Chamberlain's announcenent in this respect:—
"Speaxing for the British Government, we regard ourselves as morally responsible for seeing that the promises are carried out fairly and fully, and we are prepared to undertake that they shall be so carried out with all reasonable promptitude provided the German Government will agree to a settlement of the terms of transfer and conditions of transfer by discussion and not by force."
There can be no clearer statement of the British Government's position. It assumes, n fact, the position of guarantor for the fulfilment of the concessions which have >en obtained from Prague, and creates a double commitment which in such times as these must impress the world with the ernestness of the British Government's de-ire to save Europe from the catastrophe which threatens it. It is, fo quote the Prime Miniser's own words again, "incredible that the peoples of Europe, who do not want war with me another should be plunged into a bloody struggle over a question on which agreement las already been largely obtained." That is he crux of the whole situation—"over a question on which agreement has already seen largely obtained," an agreement the "execution of which Britain is morally responible to see carried out. It is all very well or Herr Hitler to answer President Roosevelt that he must decline the responsibility or war. Up to a point he obtained every-hing he asked for, and it is these new demands which have thrown the whole matter jack into the melting pot.
There is something of comfort to be found n the fact that uncompromising as Herr Hitler's speech in Berlin was, it has not bolted and barred the door against further conversations; if, as is suggested in an uncon-ürmed report by Havas there is a possibility of Herr Hitler agreeing to postpone the German occupation of the Sudetenland for a further fifteen days, the fulfilment of that possibility may make all the difference between peace and war. It would render the task of finally settling this problem by negotiation all the easier, and even at this late hour there is no real reason why such a settlement should not be reached. Should it not be, then Germany must reckon with the alignment of forces against her of Great Britain, France, and Russia, and things being as they are today Herr Hitler in embarking on war would start a gamble completely out of comparison with that upon which Germany started in 1914. That is a fact which German military men have recognized all along. It is: true that with regard to certain other of Herr Hitler's ventures he disregarded their advice with success to his own views, but there is no guarantee that, because his commander's prognostications have proved wrong twice, the third time will show the same result. Hence the significance of the statement issued by the London Foreign Office. Great Britain will honour her obligations to France. Russia will do likewise if Germany attacks Czechoslovakia, and they will do it with all the cleaner conscience because it peradventure of a doubt that there are still a few countries in the world who recognize the moral obligation of the pledged word. It may very well be that Herr Hitler will follow up his demands "to the last hour of act." Even then he will still have succeeded for short of a successful war he would have obtained all he said he originally wanted, by peaceful albeit somewhat stormy methods. He may still secure a striking diplomatic victory, somewhat diminished, it is true by the rejection of his last-minute demands. That is a small matter compared with the general dimensions of what he has already obtained, and if he is a wise man he will now hold sis his hand.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.