IHE first of two articles dealing with Germany's strength, culled from the "Financial News" of May 2 and 3.
The object of these articles is to discover how strong Germany's war potential actually is. The following deals with food supplies, oil and iron ore resources. he concluding article which will appear in these columns shortly, will deal with her resources for war.
The Nazis' successes have all been timber, rubber, coal achieved by threat <of war. Before each new acquisition of territory, there has been an impressive display of armed force. The Nazi propaganda machine has belched forth alternately threats and boasts of the might oí Germany's strength—and the Opposition, potential and actual, has been terrorised into submission. In the conquest of Austria, of the Sude-fenland and of Czecho-Slovakia, the same technique has been employed. And there is every reason to believe that it will be used again in the near ent observers unimpressed by the actual strength displayed. The standard of equipment and even the technical organization of the troop movements have been not nearly as impressive as the speed and energy and organizational power of the Gestapo in rounding up potential opponents of the new regime. Military observers, in fact, thave been surprised that the much-vaunted German military machine has mot been stronger.
"Conquest by Threat"
Ever since this technique of conquest by threat began to be employed, indeed, a considerable section of public opinion has taken the view that the bluff should be called and that the threats should be resisted, confident that in the actual event tpe Nazis would not take the risk of a. plunge into war. Obviously as the Nazi strength grows, this bluff-calling becomes increasingly dangerous. But it is eminently necessary to consider whether Germany could, in fact, afford to go to war with any of success. On the answer to this question, indeed, depends the whole of British policy. If Germany "actually cannot hope for success, then it is very difficult to believe that the policy of united resistance could lead to war. Wild and irrational though the Nazi leaders may be, they will hardly plunge the world into war if they have no reasonable hope of winning it. It is uncertain, indeed, whether even the purged Reichswehr would follow them in such an enterprise. The object of these articles, therefore, is to discover how strong Germany's war potential actually is. The secrecy which shrouds the facts of the Nazi regime, and the many uncertainties about the nature of 1939 war requirements make correct computation impossible. But we can point to a great many facts about which secrecy cannot possibly be maintained.
There is little doubt, even in German military circles, about the disadvantages dram which Germany would suffer during a long war—that is, a war which lasted more than, say, a year. Even in the most favourable circumstances for Germany, in. which Italy and Spain were her allies and Russia and America were malevolent neutrals, and in which there was no effective opposition on the Eastern front, the difficulties which the German armed forces would encounter "would be great indeed. There are four major requirements for sucoessful war making. They are—not necessarily in order of importance—the ability to keep army and civil population tolerably well fed, the supply of industrial raw materials, the capacity to produce armaments, and the supply of reserve man-power. In none of these departments is the German achievement so impressive that it need terrify us.
We need hardly emphasize the fact that Germany's food supply is inadequate. Germany is to the extent of about 80 per cent. self-sufficient in food supply, and her position has not been substantially improved by the acquisition of Czecho-Slovakia. By lavish subsidies and by the full use of the propaganda machine, the Government has exerted the maximum effort to increase agricultural production. But there is a steady migration of workers from the land, and there is ample evidence in the Nazi Press itself of the overwork of those who are on the land and their inability to increase production. The grain position appears at the moment. to be reasonably favourable. Last years harvest—according to the official returns—was sufficient to cover Greater Germany's demand. The meat position is barely satisfactory, and there is the now customary extreme lack of dairy products and fats. Here, no progress at all is being made. In peace-time Germany's food resources are sufficient to enable her to carry on. In war-time, production would be likely to tall, and at the same time more consumption would te required—tor soldiers eat more than workmen. By an intensification of rationing, by commandeering food supplies from Eastern Europe, and Ly maintaining some imports from the neutral countries under threat of making war on them, Germany would be able in war-time to maintain some sort of food supply. But there would Be no margin at all for further restriction. Compared with the position in the World War, when rationing of bread, meat and fat was not even introduced until 1916, and when food shortage caused the collapse two years later, the position is particularly unsound.
War Materia! Inadequacies The inadequacy of Germany's domestic production of necessary war materials is well known. There are seven important groups of industrial materials of which an almost inexhaustible supply is needed for the successful prosecution of war. These sre oil, iron ore, non-ferrous metals, and textile fibres. Unless these can be produced at home, imported for cash, or commandeered, it is extremely difficult to carry on a war. In only two out of seven of these groups—coal and timber—is Germany self-sufficient. Let us consider, for example, the oil position. In peace-time, Greater Germany probably consumes about 6% million tons of oil and petrol. In war-time, the civil consumption would be drastically reduced, but the Army, Air Force and Navy would swallow up enough, according to some German sources, to require total supplies of 15-20 million tons. The current domestic production is rather less than 2% million tons. This output could be increased in time of war, at a tremendous cost in coal, labour and capital investment—four tons of coal are required to make one tone of petrol It is difficult, however, to see how home oil production could exceed 4 million tons, leaving at least 8 millions, and perhaps as much as 16 millions to be provided otherwise. The Rumanian supply could, under German contro}, probably be expanded to as much as 7-8 million tons. Indeed, in one year it might produce more. But at the present time Germany's imports from Rumania are small. Special transport facilities would have to be provided. Moreover, Rumanian cil does not provide the qualities which are required for aeroplanes. Again, Germany's allies—especially Italy—would require oil, and Rumania is the only main European supplier. In other words, without Rumanian oil it is dificult to see how Germany can hope to solve her oil problem, and even with it the problem would not be solved.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.