That alternative was complete extinction as a force within the State. The Army extremists, had they been able to have their way, would have Installed an outright pro-Fascist mil-Wary regime and set about the strangulation of the Minseito and the Solyukal and the lesser political parties now in existence. In. their place, the military extremists would have created a strong Rightist party which would be us" subservient. to them as is the Nazi party to Adolf tier in Germany and the Commun-t party to it Central Executive Committee in Soviet Russia. This attempt thas been defeated, so. that despite its seeming negative character victory of a distinct sort has perched fon the bannore of the regular par= ties, "The political parties are in a very much stronger position in the Japa nese State to-day than they were a fortnight ago, despite the fact that they have n'a single representative "the Government In' fact, their refusal to furnish Cabinet Ministers to Premier Hayashi's "bureaucratic Government under the conditions imposed has still further strengthen ed them with the general public, The astounding manner in which all Japan save one section of the Army rallied to General Ugaki when hie was named to form a Government showed unmistakeably that the Japanese people to-day are anti-military and thata return to party government could be accomplished were it not for the frm grip through Im. perial Ordinances and in other ways that the military has on affairs in Japan, There can be no disputing, even by the War Office, that a dissolution of the House of Itepresentatives and the calling of a General Election at this time would return a Lower, House even' more strongly antimilitary than the present one. This one reason why the Army is expected to yield in its heretofore Adamant stand for dissolution, but there are others as well.
"Moreover, the Seiyukai and the! Minseito (ihe latler "under various names), which have divided the Japanese political field between them for many. years past, see the threat accession to power by the Shakhal Talshuto (Japan's version of a. Labour party) greatly diminished. The astonishing popular vote registered by this party in the General Election of February 20, 1936, was recognized to be in large part a vote of protest: against the Impotence and seemingly cowardly inaction of the old line parties.
'The revival of those parties since then, and particularly the spectacular attack made on the War' Minister and the Army by Mr, Kunimatsu Hamada of the Seiyukai in the Diet January 21, has gone fa to rent are prestige of bot jor par and to win back the voters who deserted them a year ago. The proposed Rightist party is still a chimera from the standpoint of practical polities, Even the Army which Is so insensi tive to popular feeling has been badly startled by the reaction against it during the past two weeks, a Fenetion so pronounced that it penetrated the walls of the War Omce and caused much trepidation, The midnight counelt of the Emperor with the Lord Privy. Seal and Grand Chamberlain is likewise believed to have induenced the military leaders, and the outcome is that for the moment they are in a somewhat chas-fened mood and are not attempting to push through their radical and} extremist programme which leads straight In the direction of a mili-i tary tolalltarian State and, ultimately," foreign war, Temporary Phenom:
How long his chastened mood will continue is unforseeable, but certain "it is a temporary phenomenon. Japan's extremist Army officers have hot changed heart overnight. A similar subdued mood prevailed for 4 few months following the military insurrection of February 26-29 Inst year, but by July it had entirely evaporated, and the then Minister of War was slating that the Government could and should issue ¥.10,000,000,- 000 in national bonds if the Army needed that amount, that the Diet should be dissolved time after time until one was secured which. would do the Government's bidding, and to him that meant the Army's bidding.
The parties have had their fling, expressed their indignation at rmilitary interference and tampering with parliamentary government, and have drearly strengthened themselves with the public at large. The Army has awakened to the necessity of proceeding more cautiously and gradually if It Is not to provoke an uprising among the masses. The result of these two factors is that a truce has been declared in the Japanese poll tical world, and the Hayashi Ministry fis the fruit of that truce. Being truce, it cannot be expected to endure, and few indeed give the pres Government as much as a year's on life. It is more apt t0 be. six months or perhaps even less.
The decision between Fascism and parliamentarism has not yet" been made in Japan. tt has merely been postponed. Sooner or later this con-{let between two utterly irreconellable theories of government will be Fesumed, and sooner or later it will be fought to a Anish, with death for tone and sooner or later it will be fought to a finish, with death for one and triumph for the other.
In the meantime, the makeshift bureaucratic Government of Gen. Senjuro Hayashi will carry on, General Hayashi himself Is a moderate, and his War and Navy Ministers do Fol come from the extremist group. The Influence of the Army is the! strongest influence in the present Cabinet, but It is far from being the ly influence. The Navy, ever more ieed in Its outlook than the War 'OMiec, can make itself felt. Even the parties can exert pressure in an indirect way because of their command for the nonce of public oplnion, and big business and fnance have the Army just a wee bit frightened of them.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.