There is much of significance in the interview granted by Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, Japanese Home Mini: Tokyo correspondent of the "Paris is a complete revelation of J s policy regarding the friendly relations existing between Great Britain, France and the United States, That these three Powers are becoming increasingly anxious over the Far Eastern situation has been. apparent for some months past. Holland also cannot be left out of the picture, and though there is no formal agrecment between these nations concerning Far Eastern matters, there is a community of interest which will naturally serve to bring them very close together. They may never unanimously agree upon concerted action in this part of the world, but there is always the possibility that, working along parallel lines, their actions may assume a common quality. That is a development which Tokyo earnestly wishes to avoid, and the rapidity with which the USS. Panay was dealt with, as compared with the incidents in the Yangtze involving the British war vessels, indicates that, however the issue with the British is to be settled, Japan wished to clear away the embarrassment created by the bombing of the Panay as a preliminary move. This has not been entirely successful, for the tone of the American reply shows that considerable stiffness remains and a tendency to watch future Japanese actions in the light of what has already been revealed. Admiral Suetsugu's remark that between Japan and France "Friction could only arise from too close a ce-operation between France and Great Britain," being the statement. of a responsible minister, must be taken to mean exactly what it implies, namely that Japanese is aimed at isolating Britain from state:
whom she is in the friendliest contact and to weaken the relations of the nations whose interests in the Far East are being imperilled by Japanese action. That such a policy is unlikely to succeed goes almost without saying, for the peace-loving nations of the world will not permit the principles for which they stand to be subordinated to the expediences of the more bellicose countries of the world, On the subject of the occupation of the island of Hainan the Admiral is apparently completely contradictory, Admitting that the present blockade of China is "utterly inefficient" and that arms and munitions continue to enter China freely, he suggests that in order to reinforce it, it would be necessary to occupy Hainan temporarily, He is then reported to have added that it was of vital interest to establish permanent naval and air bases in the island due to the fact that Hainan is nearer to the continent than Formosa, It might be added also that Hainan is nearer French Indo-China as well, and of that fact the French government will not remain heedless. The naivete of the Admiral's statements is quite refreshing, for from the immediate plea of a temporary necessity for occupation he proceeds to show why such a process should be made permanent, and it is now perfectly clear that, should the Japanese occupy the island, it will be for always. The domination of Indo-China from Hainan will be a matter of considerable importance to France in view of the manner in which the Japanese expansionist policy is expected to develop, and the danger to French interests ising out of such an event is something hich Paris cannot afford to regard lightly. Therein lies the community of interest between France and Great Britain, and it will require something more than the adroitness lof kind words to bring about the cleavage between the two countries which the Admiral so apparently would like to see.
Not only that, Anglo-French interests in other parts of the world are now closely entwined, that an endeavour to separate them is foredoomed to failure: if the two nations ever became at variance with one another the present precarious peace of the whole world would be in imminent danger of tota! collapse. The protection of occidental interests in the Far East, so clearly threatened by Japan's actions, is rapidly becoming a question for the common attention of the four nations concerned, and if, as a result, a close understanding is reached between them, Japan will only have herself to blame. And it must be remembered that though the final solution of the problems now presented may be a long way off it is not likely to be brought about by any unilateral decision which Japan may make. the Admiral's warning, that if the Powers continue to provide assistance to China, Tokyo will be compelled to occupy Canton at the risk of friction with London, is an interesting one. Conditions being as they are any and every nation has the right to supply China with anything she desires. The cordial relations existing between Japan and Germany does not preclude the latter from making deliveries of arms and munitions to China, and if Germany can do so without Japanese reproach, there is no justification for suggesting that the other Powers are doing something which should be reprehended. The sauce for the German goose in this case is equally suitable and appropriate for the other nations' gander. Singular also is the Admiral's reference to the U.S.S. Panay incident in which
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.