There were. in fact, for Herr Hitler only two solutions: the use of force, or the achievement of his aims by the display of force. "It you wish to obtain them by negotiation, you must be stronger That was a remark which he made to a foreign statesman who visited him this year, and it expresses in the concisest possible form the Hitler technique. It was exactly that which he displayed in September 1938. He was no more bluffing then than he was bluffing in August 1939. Up to the middle of August this year the fear of a war on two fronts, with Russia hostile or at least unfriendly, might possibly have deterred him and kis military advisers from action against Poland. There was no Eastern front to give him cause for hesitation in 1938, and he could have counted then on Hungarian as well as Polish support in his nefarious plans for the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia. But for Munich he would without a shadow of doubt have invaded that country on September 29 last year, just as surely as he invaded Poland on September 1 this year, and the war would have come eleven months earlier. In both cases the methods employed were identical: the gradual mobilization of the German army over a period of months and its secret concentration at the appointed positions, whence the advance could begin at almost any moment end within a very few hours.
So it was again in 1939. If he could have secured his objectives by this display of force he might have been content for the moment. with all the additional prestige which another bloodless success would have procured for him with his own people. But it would only have been to start again once the world had recovered from the shock, and even his own people were beginning to be tired of these repeated crises. Millions of Germans had begun to long for a more peaceful existence. Guns instead of butter were becoming more and more unpopular except with the younger generation and Hitler may well have wondered what might lis pen to his Nazi revolution if its momentum were allowed to stop. Moreover the financial and economic position of Germany was such that things peuld scarcely continue as they were without some form of explosion, internal or external Of the two alternatives the most attractive from the point of view of his growing personal ambitions, and those of the clique which was nearest to him, was war.
Meant to Teach Poles a Lesson It is scarcely credible that he would have acted as he did if bloody war. rather than a bloodless victory, had not seemed the fairer prospect for him. He had always meant to teach the Poles a lesson for what he regarded as their base ingratitude in refusing the "generous" demands which he had made to them in March. His only manceuvres since that date were with the object of creating circumstances favourable to his plans or of inducing Britain and France to abandon their Polish ally and to leave him a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe.
To this end, encouraged by Herr von Ribbentrop, who apparently advised him up to the last moment that Britain would not fight, he worked unceasingly. In the course of one of the five interviews which I had with him during those last few days, I remarked to him that it was he who was ungenerous to the Poles, in view of the advantages which his treaty of 1934 with Pilsudski had brought him. Herr Hitler denied that that treaty had ever been of any benefit to Germany and asserted that it had merely been unpopular with the Germans. It was a remark which was typical of Herr Hitler's capacity to ignore everything which he might have said, promised or done in the past as soon as it had become contrary to views for the present or the future.
Never Travelled Abroad One of Herr Hitler's greatest drawbacks is that, except for two official visits to Italy, he has never travelled abroad. For his knowledge of British mentality he consequently relied on Herr von Ribbentrop as an ex-Ambassador to Britain, who spoke both French and English and who had spent some years in Canada, and whom he regarded as a man of the world. If report be true Herr von Ribbentrop gave him consistently false counsels in regard to England, while his successes in other spheres induced Herr Hitler to regard him more and more as a second Bismarck, a conviction which Herr von Ribbentrap probably shared to the full.
Even the most absolute Dictator is susceptible to the influence of his surroundings. Nevertheless Herr Hitler's decisions, his calculations, and his opportunisms were his own. As Field-Marshal Göring once said to me, "when a decision has to be taken, none of us count more than the stones on which we are standing. It is the Füehrer alone who decides."
1f anything did count, it was the opinion of his Military Advisers, I have always believed that it was they who, in the interests of Germany's strategical security, recommended the establishment of the Protectorate over Bohemia. And again this August, it was they, I fancy, who told Herr Hitler that further delay would be fatal lest the seasonal bad weather in Poland might upset their calculations for her swift overthrow. The army grudged him even the week between, August 25 and September 1 which his last attempt to secure British neutrality or at least goodwill had cost it.
Precipitate Action Yet even so the advice of his soldiers was probably merely cover for the prosecution of Hitler's own plans. His impatience and precipitate action on that last day of August can scarcely have been other than premeditated. All through the summer he had been waiting on events to turn in his favour and had beef making his preparations to seize the opportunity, when it was offered to him. The Russian pact appeared to give him the advantage which he was secking and thereafter there was no time to lose, if mud was not to be added to Poland's allies. When therefore the Polish Government delayed 48 hours in sending its Plenipotentiary to beg for terms at Berlin and even then sent only an Ambassador without plenary powers, Herr Hitler in spite of the expressed readiness of Poland to enter into direct negotiations, finally made up his mind not to keep his army waiting any longer. The order for the advance into Poland was probably given immediately after M. Lipski's interview with Herr von Ribbentrop of 6.30 p.m. on August 31.
Late in the afternoon of September 2 I communicated to the Secretary of State for the information of the German Government the verbatim report of the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on that date. Therein Mr. Chamberlain stated that while His Majesty's Government could not agree to the proposal of the Italian Government for a conference while Poland was being subjected to invasion, they would be willing, if the German forces were withdrawn from Polish territory, to regard the position as being the same as before the forces
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.