March 13, was' inevitable that M. Josef Stalin by his speech before the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress should have created something of a sensation in Great Britain and France, for it was remarkable for its attack' upon the Democracies and its silence with regard to the German Reich. Accusing, without foundation, the former of desiring] to push Germany into a war with the Soviet 30 that they might profit by it, M. Stalin at! the same time refrained from any attack on the Reich which has been such a feature of many of his previous speeches. That may be attributed not only to a desire that forthcoming Russo-German trade negotiations may be brought to a successful conclusion, which! might have proved unlikely had he attacked Germany, but also to the fact that in the course of his recent speeches Herr Hitler has not only made no attack upon Soviet Russia but has not even mentioned that country. When the inveterate hatred of Herr Hitler for Communism in all its forms is remembered, and the fact that he was the prime mover in' bringing about the anti-Komintern Pact and in extending it, it must be apparent that, there are very serious reasons for this modification of procedure, for, as It is contended in London, it cannot' possibly have! been merely a coincidence. There is much in the suggestion that the commercial parleys may eventually lead to a political rapprochement between the two countries. It is true that Der Fuhrer himself is the main obstacle to such a thing coming about, but there is no immutability of policy in these days, and when it is remembered that many of his sup-Porters, and particularly amongst the military]
30 far to support the idea of an alliance between the two nations the possibility of a better understanding is by no means as remote as some people seem to think. The German designs upon the Ukraine might be very well diverted to Poland, and the parti~ tion of that country between Germany, and Russia, leading to a reconciliation which would bring about a most remarkable change in the state of international polities, and one which would give the governments of some countries furiously to think.
Herr Hitler in such a reconciliation might} never surrender what are reported to be his major schemes with regard to the Ukraine, though he might decide to proceed towards that objective via Poland, a temporary friendship with Russia, and eventually. the throwing of that over and the securing of the culmination of his policy of drang nach Osten. But what in the meantime would have happened to the Anti-Komintern Pact? Herr Hitler could very well accept the specious contention of Moscow that there is 1 vast difference between the Soviet Govern ment and the Third Internationale, and accepting that convention reach friendship with the Soviet Government while still professing to despise the doctrines which animate it. But what, then of such nations as Italy and Japan? Neither of them would be likely to reap any benefit {rom such a change in the International situation, and it is more than possible that it would operate to the disad-Vantage of both. For Japan friendship with Russia is well-nigh impossible, The menace which that country, and the doctrines under which it is governed offer to Japan must con-inno to militate against any such arrange ment. The very fact of reconciliation with Germany would immeasurably strengthen Russia's position, and it may very well be believed that in'such an event the firmness which the Kremlin has been recently display ing with regard to Tokyo would be increased by the freedom from menace of her western frontiers. This may not be taking avery, long, view of the situation; the asperities of 1M. Stalin with reference to the Democracies, and his silence regarding the Reich both indicate an improvement in the Russo-German atmosphere, and it that improvement were carried to the lengths which are apparently desired by influential circles in both countries, then Japan would in all probability find itself deserted by the most powerful partner in the Anti-Komintern Pact, and at the same time left, by reason of her own actions, with out any other friend upon whom she could rely for support. A position of isolation in such circumstances might appear very splen~ did but would most certainly not sult the Japanese book.
It is not suggested for one moment that the Anti-Komintern Pact was not inspired by a desire to offer the completest resistance to the spread of Communist doctrines. The vvery real opposition to them to be found in German policy would give any such sugges tion the lic, but there is always the possibility that the inclusion of Ttaly and Japan within the bloc was a move on the part of Germany more in her own particular interests that in those of the two countries mentioned. may have been originally designed as a permanent feature of the policy of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, but that does not do away' with the conclusion that friendship of one of, the contracting parties with the nation against which the Pact was originally aimed, would completely destroy its meaning and its effectiveness. Italy has received nothing' from the tripartite combination. Indeed up to the present she may be said to have had the worst of the bargain. Japan it has already been pointed out might with the development of better Russo-German relations be Jeff out in the cold. That is a possibility ith which Tokyo will have to reckon increasingly as the trade negotiations between Berlin and Moscow progress. Should they result in a satisfactory arrangement the first signs of the decay of the present arrange~ ment would become apparent, and should give Tokyo reason to consider anxiously how ong it may expect to continue to reap the! benefits which it has already conferred upon it. The complete difference between the! German and Russian ideologies need not necessarily continue to give Japan the support which she is at present receiving.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.