With the resignations of Mr. Anthony Eden and Viscount Cranbourne, Foreign Secretary, and Under-Foreign Secretary respectively, the British Cabinet is faced with a májor crisis. It was, considering all the circumstances, inevitable. It has been apparent, ever since he assumed the office of Prime Minister, that Mr. Neville Chamberlain intended to take a greater part in the administration of Great Britain's foreign policy than had his predecessor, Earl Baldwin. Of the latter it was remarked that he let his various Ministers control their own departmental policies, acting merely as a means of ce-ordination. This meant riding on a very slack rein, and in some quarters Earl Baldwin was criticized for it. Mr, Chamberlain, on the other hand, appears to have insisted upon all the rights of his high office, and to have maintained a greater degree of control over the various departments of his Cabinet. The foreign policy of Great Britain was to be his foreign policy, and the Foreign Secretary the medium through which it was to be carried out, That can be seen in two instances. His active intervention between Mr. Eden and Signor Mussolini, resulting in a most cordial exchange of letters, and his despatch of Lord Halifax to have conversations with Herr Hitler's government in Berlin were proofs of the Prime Ministers intention to take no back seat in any part of the Cabinet's activities, and more particularly in those of the Foreign Office. Indeed when it has happened that Mr. Eden has been absent from London for one reason or another he has in fact acted for the Foreign Secretary. In January one of this journal's correspondents had occasion to address the Foreign Office on matters connected with this paper, and the reply was signed by the Prime Minister's private secretary.
The crisis arises through the difference of opinion in the Cabinet, and more particularly the divergence of the views held by Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Eden. It is apparent that in his European dealings Mr. Chamberlain is more influenced by the realities of the situation with which he is confronted, while Mr. Eden continues to regard them in the light of the doctrines underlying the Covenant of the League of Nations. Both men would claim to be realists, though each would deny that quality in the other. The one believes that much can be done towards securing proper understandings between Britain, Germany and Italy by negotiations outside the purview of the League, while the other considers it necessary to act entirely through the League or along such lines as membership of the League would appear to require. That both of them desire to work for the peace of the world must be admitted, and of the sincerity of the two men there cannot be the slightest possible doubt, but there is a very serious difference as to the method to be followed, so serious that cleavage was ultimately inevitable. It is indeed remarkable that it did not come over the visit of Lord Halifax to Germany. There was a grave danger of it occurring then, and it was only because Mr. Chamberlain persuaded Mr. Eden to accept a compromise that matters were adjusted.
While no official statement has been made as to the immediate reason for Mr. Eden's resignation, the Prime Minister is credited with the view that it is desirable to exclude consideration of the Spanish question in any approach by Great Britain to Italy. Mr. Eden, it is stated insisted that the settlement of the Spanish problem should be included in any discussions which were to take part between Whitehall and Rome. The difference in method is quite apparent. Whereas Mr. Eden desired the settlement of important questions, upon which at the moment reconciliation seemed slow of realization, the Prime Minister is apparently very anxious that the situation should be bettered by the elimination of all matters of dispute between the two countries which were capable of speedy adjustment. It may be criticized as an opportunist policy, but there is this to be said for it—it would at least reduce the total of outstanding grievances felt by both nations, and with the clearing away of the minor problems, it would be possible to approach the major in a better atmosphere than would prevail under Mr. Eden's policy. The issue is quite clear: it is between the principles of Mr. Eden and the expediences of Mr. Chamberlaii The fact that up to the present so many Ministers have not resigned as was expected leaves room for belief that the schism in the Cabinet is not so great as to prevent Mr. Chamberlain carrying on. Should this prove to be the case, and it is hoped that it will, the appointment of Mr. Eden's successor will be of the utmost significance. There is no intention on the part of Great Britain to desert the League. No utterance of Mr.
Chamberlain's has even indicated the possession of such a desire, but he is making it quite plain that if he cannot work towards peace in Europe within the framework of the League, he will take such other action as is calculated to bring about a betterment of the situation as may seem tọ him most appropriate. From the realistic point of view there will be much to support the Prime Minister': view of the matter, for it is peace that is wanted and not the sterile vindication of principles, which so large a section of Europe refuses to recognize.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.