The fact that Count Stephen' Csaky, Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, abandoned the idea of having a holiday after his conversations in Venice with Count Ciano, and instead hurried back to Budapest, suggests that some progress was made in the difficult task of forming a Balkan bloc for the maintenance of peace on the one hand, and defence against the inroads of Communism on the other. It is much too early to believe that any real progress has yet been made in bringing the Balkan States together, for there is so much to keep them apart that it may require a very considerable period of patient negotiation before existing issues are sufficiently adjusted to permit of the creation of a much more cordial atmosphere than at present exists. The post-war settlement of Balkan troubles was just about the most unfortunate arrangement that could have been come to, and sowed the seeds for further troubles instead of effecting a permanent settlement most conducive of peace. Thus Rumania, more than doubled in size after 1918, through the acquisition of Transylvania from Hungary, the Dobrudja from Bulgaria and Bessarabia from Russia, has around her neighbours who wish the return of their former territories. Hungary lost further territory to Yugoslavia and Burgenland to Austria, and the general effect of the peace settlements has been to maintain the Balkans in a state of instability and division at a time when the completest friendship and ce-operation is necessary not only against the possible invasion of Russian influence but also against that of Germany It was in the disunion prevailing in the Balkan States that the Reich had its best opportunity of pursuing its policy of drang nach sudan to which the only real check has been the reluctance of Italy to see its own dominant role subordinated to the wishes of Herr Hitler and his government. It is possible that Italy and Germany could have agreed for a considerable period just what were to be their particular spheres of interest, but following Herr Hitler's surrender to Moscow in August of last year, and the Kremlin's demonstration of the significance of its foreign policy, a complete change came over the whole situation:
Italy was then awakened to the possibility of a challenge to her own position in the Balkans, not from Germany, but from Russia, with at least something, in the nature of German toleration if not actual consent, and the prospect of Bolshevism extending its influence right up to the east coast of the Adriatic was not one of the most pleasing to Italian eyes. This did not mean that the Balkan States were willing to accept the spread of Communism. Indeed it may safely be said that if there is one thing upon which they are in a fair measure of agreement it is in offering opposition to the onward march of the' Bolsheviks. The position now appears to be that Italy is prepared to render military aid to Hungary if that country is attacked by Russia. There is some difficulty regarding the passage of Italian troops through Yugoslavia, but that, it appears, is by no means incapable of adjustment. Then there is the more immediate menace to Rumania. King Carol in a very significant speech last week made it quite clear that Rumania would resist any atten: pt by force to infringe its territorial integrity. Am improvement in Rumanian-Hungarian relationships would be the first step towards securing a common front against Bolshevism. It has long been believed that between Rumania and Bulgaria there has been a tacit agreement which relieves the former of any immediate anxiety concerning the Dobrudja, and if it could be brought about that Hungary would undertake to refrain from harassing Rumania on the subject of Transylvania so long as she was menaced by Russi, an understanding. may be reached whereby long-standing differences might be thrust into abeyance until the more imminenif threat of Russian incursions had been
statesmanship if the outstanding questions dealt with. It would be the a of good between. Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia could be settled once and for all. That, however, is a matter attended by very considerable difficulty, and the Italian Government is probably adopting the best line when it seeks to minimize causes of possible dispute and thus bring about a common front in opposition to the very apparent designs of Moscow.
The "Venice Policy" is obviously designed to prevent third parties taking advantage of the intro-Balkan disputes, and to provide an atmosphere in which they may be settled amicably. One of the obstacles to a thorough settlement is the very definite stands that King Carol has indicated, involving the determination of his Government to make no such territorial concessions as alone could satisfy his neighbours and thus bring about a better state of affairs. On the other hand it may be possible for Italo-Yugoslav efforts to procure some sort of modus vivendi between Rumania, and Hungary, which in itself would bring about a generally easier situation in the Balkans. It is quite clear that if those States are ever to combine in a common resistance to the onward sweep of Bolshevism there will have to be introduced a greater spirit of give-and-take than has been apparent up to the present. All of them must understand by now that if they foil to combine, Russia will be able to pick them off one by one because of the weakness which would be attendant upon the maintenance of existing divisions. The Italian policy seems to be in the light of all the circumstances the only correct one, and it is to be hoped that it will succeed in achieving those ends which alone can ensure the continued existence of the Balkan States and their freedom from Russian domination, It is almost as clear that were the Soviet Government to endeavour to seize control of the Balkans by force of arms, Italy in sheer self-defence would have to offer military opposition. She would be in a much better position to do that effectively if she had the united support of the nations in whose defence she would also be acting. A Balkan bloc supported by Italy would produce an invincible opposition to all Russia's plans to reach an outlet on the Mediterranean, and would be the best possible defence to western Europe so sadly menaced by the defection of Herr Hitler to the Soviet Government. It is possible, therefore, that these recent conversations at Venice may be productive of much good, and that the way is being opened for the maintenance of the integrity of the Balkan States and the supremacy therein of Italian interests.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.