March 30, Ever since the capture of Barcelona by General Franco's troops there have been divi~ sions in the Republican camp. The politicians wanted to fight on while the generals realizing that the Spanish civil war could now only have one end were in favour of obtaining the best terms possible for surrender. It fs possible that General Franco might have offered something different from the unconditional surrender, which he did in fact demand, if it had not been discovered after the capture of Catalonia that the Bishop of Teruel, in the hands of the Republicans as a prisoner, had been murdered apparently shortly before. Republican hopes for a general amnesty were completely dashed by that discovery, and it said that General Franco was 50 enraged by it that anything less than unconditional surrender he would not countenance. There followed the rebellion on the Republican side by the Communists who wished also to continue the fight, and at the same time secure command. That was quashed by the effective work of General Miaja and Colonel Casado, and with those two military leaders in power negotiations were opened for peace. These were abruptly broken off at Burgos, with another demand from General Franco for unconditional surrender, and with the entry of the Nationalist troops into Madrid it is clear that at least the old capital which has withstood a partial siege for thirty-two months has capitulated, and that the end of the Spanish civil war has been brought appreci~ ably closer. General Franco has secured unconditional surrender so far as Madrid is concerned and if the rest of Republican Spain still decides to fight it out, a futile and criminal decision it will be, it can only post-one what has been recognized for some considerable time as the inevitable end.
The events of the past few days have turned out fortunately for Madrid. General Minja and Col. Casado, military men, fully realized the hopelessness of the Republican position, and the advice which they gave to the civil Leaders to abandon further resistance was, in the circumstances, the only advice which soldiers could give their Government. It is more than a little probable that the refusal of those men to accept that counsel arose ax much from the desperation of their own position as from any belief that in a continuance of the warfare there was any real chance of the tide turning in their favour. That, however, is no excuse for their desire to prolong the misery which Spain has endured for well over two years and con= demnation of their behaviour in this connection cannot be too strong. Whatever might have been General Franco's decision regarding how the end of the struggle should come about prior to the fall of Catalonia, the discovery of the wretched murder of the Bishop of Teruel, and a number of other prisoners undoubtedly caused him to refrain from giving any undertakings which would tend to hamper whatever designs he may have for the punishment of those whose earlier crimes were brought into stronger emphasis by this unhappy demonstration of a useless vindictiveness. It is not difficult to understand, in the light of recent happenings. why it was Impossible for the Republican military leaders fo obtain any terms whatever from the victorious leader, and short of a miracle General Franco' should ultimately secure complete control of the whole country with-ut any limitations upon his future policy with regard to the defeated Republicans, will do well, however, if he confines his rotribulive activities {othe punishment of those who are truly criminals. There will be no criticism if he succeeded in bringing to Punishment those guilty of these latest murders. or indeed of any others whose offence is more serious than what he may choose to consider a misguided loyally to wrong principles, Punishment of men for-their political beliefs will not commend itself to many nations, and may do his own cause a domestic disservice. It is becoming increasingly plain that General Franco's troubles do not end with victory, but only commence. He has not only to get control of his own country by the despatch of the allen assistance he has received to its countries of origin but has also to meet the aspirations of those various parties in Spain which rallied to his cause, and which will hope to receive rewards for their faithfulness The task of uniting the various political parties in Spain, which huve supported him, il indeed prove difficult. while the pacificution of those still adhering to republican doctrines will in itself present no easy task. The latter he may be able to force und ground as has been done In other countries, but the satisfaction of those who have fought with him, varying as their ideas as to Spain's future undoubtedly are, will in itself require the display of a degree of statesmanship which General Franco has yet to prove himself to possess. Internationally there are also important questions for him to decide. Most impressive of all is what is to be his attitude towards the democracies. The rehabilitation of Spain after all these months of warfare, the restoration of its industries and the general return to former prosperity cannot be achieved unaided. Neither Germany nor Italy ure in a position to afford that help. Too close an alignment with them will make Use democracies reluctant to give that assistance which they alone are able to afford, and if General Franco eventually finds himself on the horns of a dilemma as to whether he shall commit himself unreservedly to the totalitarian states and forego democratic as~ sistance, or necept the latter and antagonize {the former there need be no cause for surprise. He will find himself in any event in a dim-cult position which may take a great deal lof the gilt off the gingerbread of victory.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.