The Archive · 1939

UNCOMPROMISING REPLY

March 31.

M, Daladier, the French Premier, has replied to Signor Mussolin\'s speech of' Sun~ day last, Tu-an address, which is almost epigrammatic in quality, he has made it quite clear that, while the French Government is prepared to consider the Ballan de= mands concerning Tunis, Djibuti, and Suez, there can be no question of any surrender fon essential points, In fact what he has Adumbrated is that France Is prepared to negotiate only upon the basis supplied by the Laval-Mussolini agreement of 1935. The reply isa firm one, delivered in_ perfectly conciliatory Language, but at the same time Teaving no doubt as to the French position with regard. to the Italian demands, Daladier makes a good point when he declares that the Tlalian contention that the conquest of Abyssinia creates now rights in favour of Italy cannot be accepted. It is a doctrine which both parties to the Rome-Berlin axis have been preaching, with enthusiastic imitation by Jupan. Nevertheless it is an untenable one, for it means that every new conquest, every new concession Would open new rights, "and every claim satisfied would contain within itself the seed of new demands. From every point of view this is a state of affairs whicn eanet be justified. If It Is accepted as being correct then every advantage gained by a wrongful act would be justifteation for a. further modification in the general situation, and it is quite clear that acceptance of such a contention would be to agree to the system of opportunist logic with which the govern= ments forming the axis have sought by specious argument (o bolster up a ease which has little foundation in justice, France be~ ing ready for a complete, and loyal execu tion of the 1935 agreements, and with their spirit to examine any proposal which may be advanced M. Daladier has _more definitely stated the French ease than Signor Mussolini the Mahan, If Tunis, Djibuth and Suez do indeed present problems for Thaly, they are of Italy's own making, Tunis was @isposed of in 1936, Djibutl und Suez arise only from Italy's own conduct, Coincident with M, Datadler's declaration is the statement made in the House of Con mons concerning the increase in the British Territorials. That they are immediately to be brought up to war strength, and then doubled, means that Mr. Chamberlain determined to explore to the fullest extent the possibility of Increasing Britain's military strength by voluntary means. To those who re firmly of the opinion that the only real elution of the problems, in light of all the circumstances, is. conscription, and that soon as possible, the decision will he une come. There Is, however, this to be suld about it,—voluntary armies are preferable from the British point of view to thave composed of conscripts, The only real que tion about which there can be any doubt as to whether the British Government will obtain that response without which Mr. Chamberlain's scheme must be a. fall On the face of it, the fact that the Territ at present from $0,000 to 40,000 under normal strength, does not surest that the scheme is receiving all the support iUshould. If that gap were filled up 1 there would be some ground for bel the additional 170,000 men would be easily obtained, but the fact that recent crises have not had the effect of bringing the Territo 1 strength rather discounts the very much

other hand, ndw that a new 4 contemplated: footing ry to attain the new= set for it strenuous campaigning, may be reached. It 1s certainly worth try= ug, even if the period for the experiment sonnet be unduly prolonged. 'T still remains the question of wi the French wwernment will be ied with the prow spect of Britain being in such a position us to be able to dispatch ove siderable doubt whether even 32 will be adeai They most cert not be in the event of a lone war, hi to the safety of the Britai pared to yo much Nevertheless the knowledge that Great

French understanding than originally

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

Your account