The Russian-Japanese truce made in September, the friendly overtures to Japan, by Molotov in his October speech and the repeated rumours that a Russo-Japanese commercial understanding is in process of negotiation have increased the interest of the United States in the Far Eastern situation.
The possibility that the two traditional rivals in Eastern Asia might in future act in concert just as Germany and Russia have acted in concert to the astonishment of many even who now claim to have predicted it, has led to anxious enquiries as to whether China is likely to share the fate of Poland and if so what will become of the Open Door policy and American traditional rights.
The Administration have at least made it abundantly clear that they have no intention of abandoning any of their rights in China gracefully or voluntarily. Even if there is no possibility of the United States fighting for them there are means "short of war" by which the country's irritation can be shown. On January 26 the 1911 trade treaty expires and no concrete or specific steps have as yet been taken to negotiate a new treaty or arrange for a modus vivendi while a new treaty is being negotiated. This means that on January 26 the Japanese may cease to benefit from any of the tariff reductions made in the 22 reciprocal trade agreements negotiate ed by Mr. Hull. That in itself is a form of sanction but there is a widespread demand in Congress for the imposition of some form of embargo against Japan, a measure which would be legally possible when the treaty of 1911 has ended. The State Department have taken the position that they will not negotiate any new trade treaty until they have some guarantee that American rights J|in China will be respected. Their position in China has been settled in the past by treaties and agreements between the United States and the recognized China authorities and the American Administration do not admit that a third party, Japan, has any right to change or modify those treaties and agreements.
Renewed Russian interest in the Far East has not softened the Administration's views of Japan's activities in the slightest degree. Neither Japan nor Russia find their activities condoned in any way. Administration spokesmen have commented on Russian action just as severely as they have on Japanese or German. The three "desperado powers," as they are sometimes referred to, may not have any hard and fast binding understanding among themselves but in the eyes of the United States they are all alike wilful violators of international law. The American Government would no more consider attempting to check one of them by cultivating a friendly understanding with another than the police department of a big city would enlist the aid of one gang of lawbreakers to check the activities of a second.
The United States can say with some justification that they are not engaging in balance of power politics in the Far East. In th past there was frequently a tendency to balance Russia against Japan and vice versa. In fact one of the reasons for the recognition of the Soviets in 1933 was that it might provide a useful counterweight in the Far East. When one or other of these two Far Eastern powers became too powerful the United States opposed its expansion. Russian economic penetration of Manchuria in 1899 was the chief contributing cause for the Open Door doctrine. The presence of Ameri-con troops in Siberia after the last world war acted as a check upon Japanese ambitions in that area. United States sympathies have swung from one power to the other throughout its history. Now there is opposition to the policy of both.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.