1f the Tokyo Foreign Office needed to be saved from its friends, it must surely be desiring that the Japanese military authorities would not try to prove so helpful, for a clearer admission of the reckless conduct responsible for the incidents at Wuhu, involving British war vessels, could not be found than that embodied in their statement issued in Tokyo on December 28. The facts of the matter as set forth in the statement are clear. On December 9 the Japanese Consul-General, Mr. Okamoto, requested third Powers to evacuate their nationals from the scene of hostilities. That was, in fact, except for the small band of foreigners which decided to remain in Nanking, being done, and on December 11 ten large steamers were observed fleeing—up-riv from Hsiakwan. Those vessels were fired on that day, the shells according to the statement falling short. A command was then issued that the vessels should be attacked by units in the neighbourhood of Wuhu. The next day, although it is claimed there was a dense fog, four large steamers were discovered anchored about three kilometres north of Wuhu. At about 9 a.m. some of the ships commenced suddenly io send up black smoke, and the commander, deciding that they were endeavouring to hide behind a smoke screen, ordered fire to be opened, and shells were seen to hit the forefront of the first and second hips. The ships in the rear retreated down stream, while one of those in front advanced towards the Japanese forces, the British flag was identified, and the order to cease fire ven. When the vessel came alongside it was discovered that she was H.M.S. Ladybird. In. reply to British protest said by the commander, presumably Col, Hashimoto, that the British flag could not be discerned owing to the fog and black smoke, that he believed, therefore, that they were enemy vessels, and that it was his duty to sink all enemy vessels on the river. It would seem that Col, Hashimote's statement was reported at the time completely coincides with the statement now issued by the Japanese military authorities, with the saving adjectival grace of the word "enemy The announcement really takes the matter no further than did the original reports. If Col Hashimoto's orders were to sink al! enemy craft, there can be no quarrel with such a statement, He was obviously not instructed to sink all vessels, irrespective of nationality, and to that extent no particular blame attaches to those who issued the original orders, But in the carrying out of them, there was either an enthusiastic desire to effect them completely, or a failure to recognize that the safety of foreign neutrals was still the paramount obligation of the Japanese forces operating in that area. It is clear that the British shipping involved was endeavouring to get out of the scene of hostilities. It was also well within the knowledge of the high command, and ought to have been within that of Col. Hashimoto, that there was a quantity of foreign shipping on the river, and that it should not be molested, Col. Hashimoto was firing on all shipping. There is nothing in ne statement to show otherwise. The exis tence of a dense fog, and the fact that the vessels which had been at anchor all night were emitting black smoke, probably getting up steam to proceed further away up the Yangtze, provides no excuse for what happened. It was the bounden duty of the Japanese officer responsible for the occurrence to have ascertained the identity of the vessels before he opened fire, and there can be only the severest criticism of the failure to take that ordinary and essential precaution. In the circumstances the reference in "The Times" to the incident concerning the U.S.S. Panay may here be just as appropriately applied. What then looked like wanton malice has been lessness or incompetence. It is quite possible to accept the assurance that the whole incident was unintentional, and that the British men-o-war would not have been fired on if their identity had been established, but it is in the failure to establish that identity—the onus of which was on the Japanese officers—that the real essence of the matter is to be found.
At the time of writing, the details of the Japanese reply to the British note, handed to the British Ambassador in Tokyo by the Japanese Foreign Minister, had not been made public. It may be assumed, however, that the explanation of the matter will not be very different from the statement now under consideration. Whether it will prove entirely acceptable remains to be seen, though should the Japanese Government in addition to the expression of regret similar to that of the Japanese military, give satisfactory assurances that every proper precaution will be taken to avoid repetition of such an unfortunate affair, it is probable that the British Government will adopt an attitude similar to that taken up by Washington. It isto be hoped that such in fact will be the case, for serious.as the affront has been, it does not yet appear to have assumed that gravity which would call for further and stronger action. This journal fully appreciates the sincerity of the regrets which have been expressed, and the embarrassment which the Japanese Government must feel over the ungenerous to adopt attitude, nevertheless, be pointed out that whi feared at the momerit'is that there may be repetitions of these incidents, and should that prove to be the case the anger which is mounting in both Great Britain and the United States will be further intensified. Such a state of affairs would be truly deplorable, and for that reason it is devoutly hoped that the Japanese reply will prove a mare acceptable document than the military statement. In endeavouring to explain the accidental features of the whole incident the drafters have pinned responsibil lity on the appropriate person, and if he were dealt with adequately for his conduct, a reality would be added to the anticipated terms of the Japanese reply which would do much to restore the cordiality which ought still to exist between the two nations concerned. It might also tend towards nonrepetition of these incidents as impressing on other officers the necessity of taking the care, which was so apparently not taken in this instance.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.