The addressing of similar Notes by Great Britain, France and the United States to Japan on the subject of her naval intentions should serve to'clarifr the air, no matter what attitude Tokyo adopts in the matter. She may refuse to give the information desired of her, and in all probability that will mean that the Powers concerned will accept as correct the information upon which they based their communications, That has not been made public, but ít is apparent that Japan has already commenced, or contemplates the commencement of, the construction of war vessels outside the limits prescribed by the London Naval Treaty, and that the signatories to that document feel that advantage should be taken of those safeguards which were inserted in the Treaty as precautions against the very situation that has now, apparently, arisen. Japan is party to no treaty limiting the numbers or sizes of her war vessels, and shortly after she left the London Naval Conference in 1936, when her proposal for a "common upper limit" was rejected, the Naval Minister boasted that Japan had now been "released from the naval ratio bondage." There is, therefore, no reason why she should not proceed to increase her Navy to any extent she considers desirable, and in any consideration of the subject that fact should always be borne in mind. It does not matter how wise or unwise her naval policy may be considered, it is perfectly plain that Japan is well within her rights to do what it is believed she is either actually doing or about to do. It must be apparent that the three Governments acted upon information which they have every reason to believe, for no responsible Government would take such action upon mere guesswork or ill-founded belief. The United States' Note is quite explicit. It says:—
"There for some time have been persistent and cumulative reports, which, in the absence of explicit assurances from the Japanese Government that they are unfounded, must be deemed authentic that Japan has undertaken or intends to undertake the construction of capital ships and cruisers not in conformity with the above limits. (Those to which Great Britain, France and the United States are committed by the London Naval Treaty of 1936).
Governments do not address Notes in terms such as those unless they are quite sure of their ground, and it would seem that there is very little room for Japan to reply with a denial. Refusal to give the assurances required will immediately bring the "escalator clause of the London Naval Treaty into operation. Article 25 provides:—
In the event of any vessel not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions as to standard displacement and armament prescribed by Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the present Treaty being authorized constructed, or acquired by a Power not a party to the present Treaty, each High Contracting Party reserves the right to depart if, and to the extent which, He considers such departures necessary in order to meet the requirements of His national safety.
It will be seen that what appears to be the present naval policy of Japan does not bring about any breach of the provisions of the Treaty to which the three countries are party, but provides for their taking common action within its framework calculated to offset whatever may turn out to be Japan's ultimate intentions. Failing a satisfactory reply from Japan, these three Powers will take steps permitted by the above clause and proceed with any construction they may deem necessary always notifying each other of their intentions. Thus, should they find that Japan is indeed proceeding with the construction of a 45,000 ton capital ship armed with 18 in. guns, they each may decide to build one, and if Great Britain and the United States desired to insist upon the 5-5-3 ratio they might each very well lay the keels of two such vessels, vith the result that the construction of one by Japan might call five others into being.
It is apparent that Japan is being faced fairly and squarely with the responsibility of making the world embark upon a naval armaments race. She and she alone has to decide what the naval future of the great Powers is to be. An acceptable assurance that she has no such intention as that suggested in the Notes would, at any rate for the time being, prevent any competition, but, if the unofficial statement of an official of the Japanese Ministry of Navy is anything to go by, Japan will not give any assurance which would place her under exactly those same liabilities which she left the London Naval Conference to avoid. It would indeed be a step back towards the ratio system which Japan resents as a yoke. There is still a way out if Japan is already committed. The American Note states that in the event of this being so it would be willing to discuss with the Japanese Government the question of tonnages and calibres to be adhered to in the future, providing that such consultation! i: would be concluded by May 1. It is apparent, however, front all that has occurred in the Bast that nothing will satisfy Japan except the "common upper limit," or, in other words the substitution of naval parity for the 5-5-3 ratio under the Washington Treaty. That the other Powers are still as unlikely to accept now as they have been in the past, and it is more than a little doubtful whether any settlement of the matter can be reached along these lines. There is no reason in the world why Japan should receive parity, for she has neither the possessions abroad nor the, long sea lines to protect which is the case with the other Powers. Her navy from the point of view of defence is adequate for that purpose, and a decision to build to higher limits can only be taken as a sign of an aggressive policy which the signatories to the London Naval Treaty cannot afford to ignore. With all that Japan is at present committed to, she is not so well placed as either Great Britain or the United States to enter into the competition which appears inevitable if Japan adheres to what appear to be her present intentions, and even now it is to be hoped that she will modify; her naval policy, for the only danger of aggression which she might ever run will be of her own causation,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.