The latest and most serious Russo-Manchoukuo clash has occurred at a significant position on the boundary between Manchoukuo and the Maritime Provinces of Siberia, On the River Tumen, where the borders of Korea, Manchoukuo and Siberia practically meet, there is between the first and last a narrow strip of Manchoukuo territory running towards the sea and ending close enough to the shores of Possiet Bay to give a degree of domination of those waters in which it is reported is situated one of the Soviet naval bases. In the event of an outbreak of war, one of the first objectives of the Manchoukuo armies would be the capture of that bay and the consequent reduction of the number of places whence the Soviet fleet of submarines could operate. The boundaries in this area are not too well defined, and, unlike: the Amur River which provides an easily identifiable border, it is not so easily recognizable in that district of Chientao which is at present involved. It is but natural that the Manchoukuo Government and its Japanese advisers, for it is after all Japanese troops which would have to bear the brunt of fighting in the event of "war, regard this jumping-off place for any attack on Possiet Bay with no small degree of jealousy, and, if the action of the Soviet, soldiery in penetrating the border to a distance of three miles as reported, and there setting up defence works, were indeed accidental, a worse spot could not have been chosen for such a mishap. With all the plausibility in the world it would be difficult to convince the Japanese that there was not some sinister intention behind it all, and it is apparent from the reports which have already come to hand that both Hsinking and Tokyo are considerably exercised over the matter, and are preparing to take drastic action should the Soviet soldiers not be withdrawn. Nevertheless ihe theory of accident cannot be cavalierly dismissed, for with the admitted ill-delnition of the boundaries, and the reported prevalence of fog and mist there is, despite the frequency of these border clashes, still the possibility ihat the whole matter was a mistake.
A Transocean report from Tokyo indicates a serious fear in that capital that the Soviet occupation of various hills overlooking Possiet Bay may be taken as an indication of the intention of the Soviet Government to intervene in this Far Eastern conflict on the ide of China, and growing indignation is eightened by the report that not only have the Soviet intrude not withdrawn but that they are entrenching themselves in new positions. This if true would bring about a most serious state of affairs, for the supreme military commands of both Japan and Manchoukuo—one and the same. if the truth be known—not only insist upon withdrawal as the only means of settling the matter, but are reported to contemplate evicting the intruders by the use of military power if necessary. That need not necessarily mean war, for if Moscow is as unready for fighting as is reported following recent purges, it will be easy for her to disavow responsibility for the acts of subordinates; and permit the eviction with neither protest nor resistance. If on the other hand she is ready and willing for the war which she has recognized for some time past as inevitable then a very serious change may be expected to come over the Far Eastern situation, It would be idle to believe that Japan is unable to carry on war on two front:
China and Siberia, if her military caste to do so, The troops which have been d for the past year fighting in China are said not to be the best that Japan possess. It is reported that her crack regiments have been retained in Japan and in Manchoukuo against just such an eventuality as this dispute near Hunchun may bring about, and that, in the event of war, troops of a better calibre than those used in China would be thrown into the front line, On the face of it, should hostilities be resorted to, Japan would be fighting the first important war of her his-y, for whatever may be said of the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War and these last two adventures in China, Japan was not in any óf these occasions faced by an opponent anywhere near as well-trained and equipped as. those armies which Russia is now able to put into the field in Siberia.
With Vladivostok affording the ever-present threat of air-raids on the populous cities of Japan, all within comparatively short flying distances, the war can be carried into the very heart of the country. Russia's fifty or so submarines reported to be based upon Vladivostok might conceivably interfere to some effect with Japanese sea-lines, while on land mechanized forces on somewhat about a parity would be expected to clash. It remains to be seen whether faced with such a foe Japan would find victory quite so easy as it has proved to be in the past. This is certain, given adequate determination, Russia could fight a long war with Japan with better prospects than the latter, and the teaching to be derived from the happenings in China and Spain is that with all the modern equip-[ment that is available, the belief that the era of short, sharp, inexpensive wars has dawned, has, in the light of very bitter experience, to be considerably. discounted. But there is something even more important to be taken into account, and that is the effect upon Japanese resources of having to fight on two fronts. It is clear that the campaigns in China are proving much more costly than was at first anticipated, and the further Japan ventures into China the more rapidly does t cost increase, and if, as is believed, this inese venture has already cost Japan something in the neighbourhood of Yen 7,000,- 000,000, it is readily conceivable that a similar venture dimensionally as great if not greater, might do more than double that figure as annual expenditure. But the prizes of victory in this instance would be even more attractive than those offered by China. The occupation of Saghalien and the control of the oil supplies, the wresting of fisheries control from Russia with the saving of the annual rentals which Japan has to pay, together with the natural riches of eastern Siberia may prove attractive fruit In the eyes of the Japanese military, who from all accounts to hand still retain the last word as to whether there shall be peace or war. They may be influenced by the lateness of the season, for in a very few months winter will have descended\upon Siberia and a campaign in its icy fastnesses would certainly not be so enthusiastically welcomed as one to be fought under more acceptable climatic conditions, A Persistent Rumour It is astonishing how the rumour that Great Britain and the United States are concerned in putting forward armistice proposals at Hankow prevails, despite the repeated and em-photic denials of the British Ambassador, which had again to be emphasized yesterday, It is only a few days ago that it was stated on behalf of the British Government that while it was willing to offer its good services if asked in this Sino-Japanese dispute, there nothing to indicate that such a request was likely to be made in.the near future. Governments may not always give the fullest information to enquiring legislators, but they certainly do not lie about such matters, and if the British Government states that it finds the time not yet ripe for intervention, to be attended with any possibility of success, it is to be assumed that that is its considered opinion, and that its policy for the time being is dominated by that fact. The growing calmness of the Chinese in Hankow, the confidence that the Japanese advance can be held up for months to come, and the alleged belief that it may even be possible to prevent Hankow falling into the hands of Japan are all factors operating against the likelihood of any attempted intervention' being successful at this juncture. [That is all the more to be emphasized by the fact that the ultimate fall of Hankow is something which Generalissimo' Chiang Kai-shek has fully allowed for in his general scheme of resistance, and though there are people who think that the Japanese capture of Hankow would be a fitting occasion upon which -to commence a campaign for peace, it by no means follows that such a reverse would bring about the necessary change in the Chinese mind to make such overtures acceptable. Indeed it has to be remembered that, if Japanfse reports are to be believed, Japan leaks more towards a' collapse of the Chiang Kaishek regime than to any other method of securing an end to these hostilities. It is one of the principal Japanese aims; any intervention which envisaged the retention of Chinese leadership by the Generalissimo is not likely to. prove any too popular with Tokyo. Nothing has yet occurred to induce the Japanese to modify their original intentions, and there is, not a scintilla of evidence to indicate that any attempt at mediation at the present moment would meet with anything than an abrupt refusal from either side.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.