While it is not to be expected that the British memorandum on the termination by Herr Hitler of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement will contribute much to the settlement of outstanding differences between the two countries, the document is of interest as clearly establishing Great Britain's position vis-à-vis of Germany. It is moderate in tone, and permits of no misunderstanding of what is Great Britain's policy, and the attitude she would adopt in the face"of certain events occurring. Nothing can be clearer than the statement that the Government, far from seeking to promote a war with Germany, desires to establish Anglo-German relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the needs of both countries, consistently with due regard for the rights of other nations. The Naval Agreement was regarded as introducing an element of stability in the relations between the two nations, avoiding unnecessary competition in armaments, but it contained no provision for unilateral denunciation, and contemplated termination or modification only after mutual consultation. The British position has never accepted the theory that recent developments in Europe justified the contention that there was no longer a basis for such an agreement, and it will be remembered that when Herr Hitler denounced it, a most painful impression was created. The Agreement itself was regarded as a signal proof that it was possible to reconcile Anglo-German views on that one subject at least; the British approval of the German exercise of rights provided by its terms demonstrated at least the readiness of Great Britain to shake concessions to the German point of view arising out of naval developments in other countries, and there cannot be the slightest doubt that Britain was loyally adhering to the provisions of that important document. The importation of new considerations into the general situation, the new developments in Europe resulting from what can only be considered as German aggression, led the British Cabinet to embark upon a policy aiming at securing the greatest possible degree of collective security against the further menaces which German action foreshadowed.
Though it is the German contention that the negotiating of mutual defensive pacts against aggression, and the extension of guarantees to nations who were threatened with such action, were in themselves a threat to German security, it is quite apparent to the world at large that, even if it could be described as a policy of encirclement, it was only to become effective following action by Germany herself. The memorandum makes it clear that it is not the case that in whatever part of Europe Germany may be involve ed in war, Britain must always take an attitude hostile to Germany. That hostility, it is emphasized, can only arise in the event of Germany committing an act of aggression. The responsibility for Great Britain becoming involved in a European war is solely that of Germany's, for so long as she refrains from aggression there can be no question of British intervention. It is unlikely that any single Power in Europe would wish to attack Germany. If it did, it would meet with the disapproval of Great Britain, but it has now been made perfectly clear that if Germany and its ally, Italy, seek to further their territorial ambitions by the use of armed force they will meet with the sternest possible resistance. The day of power politics has gone, gone it is hoped never to return, and the sooner it is realized that the best interests of all would be served by negotiation of outstanding questions not under the shadow. of the gun, the better it will be for the world. One of the features of the German policy of the last few years has been the endeavour to establish the doctrine that refusal to accede to each and every demand by Germany is a demonstration of enmity. That is obviously not the case, and the memorandum makes it perfectly clear. If friendship with Germany means the complete and abject acquiescence in everything which Germany decides she wants, then there can be no friendship, but if there is on the German side a desire to negotiate in an endeavour to decide what can be done to fulfil her aspirations without infringing upon the rights of others, then there can not only be friendship but the prospect of a lasting peace.
The memorandum clearly contemplates the reopening of negotiations to reach another naval agreement, and invites information as to the scope and purpose which the German Government would consider appropriate to such an agreement, but the real question is asked when Great Britain desires to know how Germany would ensure that any action in the shape of denunciation or modification of the new arrangement during its term of validity should carry the consent of both parties. It is obvious that the manner in which the old agreement was reduced to nothingness must arouse considerable uneasiness as to what degree of permanency could possibly attach to a new instrument. If there is to be no more than in the last one, the entering into any new agreement might prove no more effective than the conclusion of the one which has been denounced. There can be no stability in the world if parties to international agreements denounce them because of some act by the other side, not in contravention of the terms of the documents, of which they may happen to disapprove. If then an international document having a term of years to run can be thrown aside upon any caprice, or temporary political desideratum, it is of only" momentary value. It may exist one day and be swept aside the next. Such instruments can have no real worth whatever, and are most certainly not things upon which permanent relations between nations can be established. It is an important point upon which the answer of Germany will be awaited with considerable interest. The question necessarily arises as to what form of guarantee, that another agreement would not be recklessly thrown aside, could possibly be acceptable in the light of Germany's attitude towards her obligations as evidenced by the denunciation of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Satisfaction on that particular point may be difficult to accord, but it should not be impossible. Everything that can be done to prevent an insane naval building race between the two countries should be, but agreements reached one day and torn up the-next, comparatively speaking, provide no safe basis upon which to seek to establish a common understanding. Such cannot exist in the circumstances, and that the memorandum makes quite clear.
Another Kalgan Arrest Another prisoner of the Japanese authorities at Kalgan is Mr. George Soderbohm, a Swedish subject and one of the best-known foreigners in North China. Son of the Rev. C. G. Soder-boom, head of the Methodist Protestant Mission in Kalgan, Mr. Soderbohm has been a highly respected importer and exporter in one of the most little-known parts of the Asiatic continent for many years, and as the spy-mania appears to have become an obsession of the Japanese authorities in the Kalgan district it is to be expected that when the explanation of his arrest is wrung from the Japanese it will probably be included in this category. George Soderbohm, however, has greater claim to fame than through his trading mercantile activities. He was one of the most valued members of Sven Hedin's expeditions in Mongolia and Central Asia, and probably his sojourn as a Japanese prisoner will not strike him as anything like so exciting as his adventures with Sven Hedin, especially in 1933 when the Swedish explorer was commissioned by the Chinese Central Government to conduct an expedition to Sinkiang in order to mark out two motor roads between China proper and this remote north-western province. In thet expedition George Soderbohm and Karl Efraim Hill, algo a Swedish missionary's son, both speaking various Chinese dialect better than the Chinese, were chauffeurs and mechanics. Sven Hedin encountered a first rate revolution when the Tungan General Ma Chung-yin, colloquially known as "Big Horse," had to flee during one of the periods of bloody fighting in the province. George Soderbohm, among other adventures, had the distinction of being kidnapped by one of the "Big Horse" officers and compelled to-drive him to safety. He squelched the kidnapping attempt successfully by driving his motor truck as hard as he could over hard bits, bumps, canals and bridges and everybody but two of the party got ill as a result of the shaking. According to Sven Hedin in "Big Horse's Flight," Soderbohm's story was that he spoke frankly to the party and told them they would certainly get a bad reputation fleeing like that:
Chang (the officer) said, "We don't care a hang about our reputation; we had simply ío obey orders." "Well," I said, "I'm telling you straight out what I think of you. Here I sit, alone and unarmed, among twelve soldiers armed with rifes and pistols. You can shoot me if you like, I don't care; but as long as I can speak I'll tell you the truth."....We got to Bugur. They were done up by the awful drive that they had to stay the night there and have a good rest. Chang had a long talk with the officer in command and other Tungan officers and heard a lot of news about the war. He then said to me, with surprising, frankness, "Ive heard that we can't get any farther than Kucha. The road to Aksu is blocked. You can go back. We don't need you any longer."
That is how the valuable motor truck was returned to the expedition after a trick which must have resembled the famous rocky road to Dublin.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.