"he -deelsratións of -Baron Hiranuma, Japanese Prime Minister, in an interview on the eve of the second anniversary of the outbreak' of Sino-Japanese hostilities, are amongst the most important which have been made for a long time past. The account which Domei carries, and which appears elsewhere in this issue, starts off with reference tine Tientsin question, and the negotiations which are shortly. to start in Tokyo, and in what the Prime Minister has to say upon this subject there is to be found a minatory tone. The conversations may "have to be cut short" unless Great Britain "appreciates the real intentions of Japan." There again peeps out the idle fire that Great Britain has to approach these negotiations in the role of a suppliant. That, it should be obvious, is very far from what the British Government has in mind. Unfortunately the British do fully appreciate what Japan's intentions in China are; they have done so for many years past, and the various declarations which Japanese statesmen have made from time to time permit of there being no misconception of Japan's intentions. It is that "appreciation" which stimulates what Baron Hiranuma and his colleagues consider to be "insincere behaviour," for, realizing only too well that the policy of the Japanese is the ultimate exclusion of all foreigners from China, Great Britain naturally opposes a process which would mean the sacrifice of interests which can only be represented in terms of hundreds of millions of pounds. It is apparent, therefore, that if the Japanese insist upon British recognition and acceptance of a policy which envisages their total eradication from China as preliminary to the conduct pf negotiations for the adjustment of the Tientsin issue, those negotiations are likely to be stillborn, for Great Britain does not enter into these conversations cap-in-hand, but with the knowledge of the possession of powerful weapons such as the strong are always reluctant to put into operation. It.is to be hopec that when the day comes for the commencement of these talks a more moderate atbtude will have been adopted by the Japanese.
Baron Hiranuma's insistence upon the recognition of a new order in East Asia is a matter which concerns not only Great Britain but every other nation having interests in this part of the world. That new order was not recognized when the first instalment was set up in the subjugation of Manchuria. It is not now, except by certain nations which have recognized Manchoukuo as a quid pro quo for Japan's entrance into the Anti-Comintern Pact, and, if Japan is unable to secure recognition of the new order in Manchoukuo, how can she expect to secure it for a similar state of affairs in China where the interests of third party neutrals have been more seriously damaged than ever they were in the north? The statement that immediate recognition would be extended by Japan to a new Central China regime foreshadows the creation of a new government probably to replace that at Nanking, which has not been operating with any conspicuous success, chiefly because the personalities comprising it have not: been strong enough to sway the masses to their way of thinking, and there seems reason for believing that the Japanese contemplate the appointment of some such notability as Wang Ching-wei as its head. Such a step would not be unexpected. The declaration that the new regime would be based upon the principles of decentralization of Government and ce-operation amongst its component parts, giving local self-government wide powers, suggests that the ultimate Japanese policy towards the new China which they are trying to create will be one of divide et impera, for doubt is expressed whether the new system would even assume the federal characteristics of the United States of America or of pre-war Germany.
A united China, it has been shown, is a China of growing strength. It was the growth of China during the decade prior to the outbreak of the present "Incident" which was viewed with no small degree of concern by the Japanese whose book was not to be suited by the growth of a strong, united continental neighbour, and a reversion to a modification of the system of division which prevailed before Chiang Kai-shek unified the country would be one of the means by which Japan could maintain control at a minimum cost of effort.
The Prime Minister in declaring that there was much to be said in favour of the view that Japan should declare war upon the Chungking regime in order to acquire belligerency rights, is to some extent offset by his remark that "I cannot tell you now when ther or not we shall invoke such rights." In this connection the Japanese Government is already in something of a quandary. Declaration of war would deprive Japan of the soiree of supplies of which she has extensively availed herself in the United States, but there is something even more important. A declaration of war against the Chungking Government would mean the recognition of a ruling organization which the Japanese have already contended is no more than a provincial regime-and which they refuse to recognize. To declare war upon it would be to confer upon it that national character which though it is denied by Japan, is conceded by practically the rest of the world, and it would amount to a complete reversal of Japanese policy, without securing any benefits which Japan does not already enjoy. Indeed there is so little that Japan could secure, which she has not al-Téady obtained, that it is to be doubted when ther she would surrender the facilities which she already enjoys so unprofitably. At the most a declaration of war at this juncture would merely regularize a state of affairs which has been fully understood for the last two years. Baron Hiranuma is probably correct in-his estimate of the fighting on the Manchoukuo-Mongolian border merely as an action in which Soviet and Outsr Mongolian forces were being pushed back across the frontier which they undoubtedly appear to have violated, but completely to minimize the matter in such a way may of itself be dangerous, for once fighting has started it is not always easy to confine its extent, a fact of which the Japanese have already received an object lesson in China.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.