The announcement that the Spanish Government has decided to withdraw all foreigners from the ranks of the Republican Army including all volunteers who had become naturalized since July 16, 1936, is either a very adroit move or a foolish one and as a gesture to the League of Nations comes at a moment when that organization is somewhat under a cloud. At the same time, however, it may force the League to take up the whole thorny question again, which in view of past failures over the Spanish civil war is probably one of the last things it wishes to do. The decision from a purely Spanish point of view is one which is likely to remove from the Republican Armies the reproach that it is merely a screen for the activities of Communist forces from abroad assembled to fight Fascist reinforcements and Nazi assistance which have been supplied in such strength to the rebels. It will remove, at least from the Government forces the reproach that they ace merely pawns in a war of ideologies, and will emphasize that they are the properly accredited forces of the recognized Government engaged in the suppression of e rebellion. What has induced the Spanish Government to take this step at this juncture is by no means clear, for, in face of the consistent defeat it has been encountering, the undoubted progress of General Franco and his armies,—even though they have been held up so sternly during past weeks,—suggests that any step likely to weaken the Government forces in their field would be rash in the extreme. It is suggested that the move has been decided upon as the result of some undisclosed passage in the conversations between Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden to the effect that he would withdraw all Germans fighting on the side of the rebels in the Iberian Peninsula. Whether any such statement was ever made or not has certainly not been made clear, but, if it has been, then the Republican answer, risky though it may prove to be, is a cordial reply to it.
The idea that the move is a purely chivalrous gesture may be discarded forthwith. Governments and nations fighting for their very existence, people realizing the retribution which must inevitably follow the success of one side or the other in anything so bitter as a civil war are not prone to making knightly, and perhaps meaningless gestures, and it is casting no reflection on the Spanish Government if it is suggested that there is some definite advantage which it is hoped will be gained by this development. Obviously if the Republican Government does in fact get rid of its foreign assistance it will make the task of any Power which accepts the róle of mediator very much easier. It paves the way for an approach to General Franco in an endeavour to persuade him to follow suit, and, when he has thus divested himself of the powerful assistance without which he most probably could never have progressed so far as he has, reduce the whole question from the international one it now is to one of purely domestic import. The exclusion of Germany, Italy and Russia from any attempts at mediation might be fruitful of success, if this could be brought about, but the prospect of their relinquishing their say in any scheme for the settlement of the Spanish problem must be regarded as unlikely, not only because of the size of the contribution they have made to this venture, but because of the strategical benefits it was hoped to obtain in a Spain either wholly Nazi-Fascist or Communist. If, in view of successes elsewhere, Germany might be prepared to forget the whole thing, there is at present no indication that Signor Mussolini would be prepared to follow suit, for if General Franco has failed to achieve all his objectives in Spain, and any compromise would mean that he would only attain a partial success, Italian intervention in the Iberian Peninsula will have proved a failure. There is one other important consideration, and that is that the Republican Government may have hopes that in the event of volunteer withdrawal on both sides, and the Spaniards left to fight it out for themselves, their chances of victory would enormously increase.
That would bring about an intolerable situation as far as the totalitarian states opposed to communism are concerned, and, for that reason, it is unlikely to prove acceptable. The main deduction to be drawn from the matter is that prospects of Republican Spain are by no means healthy, and that this is a last attempt to save something out of the wreck. Those nations whose fellows are fighting with General Franco will undoubtedly regard the move as a confession of weakness, and, while it is unlikely that Signor Mussolini would increase the assistance which he is giving to the rebels, this development may encourage him to continue with the maintenance of the present Italian forces in the field. As a move to bring the whole Spanish question before the League of Nations it must be regarded as valueless. That body has met with no success whenever it has sought to deal with the question, All endeavours to deal with other crisis have met with no real success, neither in Asia nor Africa, and there is no reason to suppose it would be any more effective in this instance. It may very well be unwise to adopt too pessimistic a view of the possibilities of this latest move, but it must be remembered that between two warring ideologies there can be no compromise. If that aspect of the matter can be abolished, and the struggle reduced to one between parties without the inspiration of such divergent political doctrines it would be possible to bring about some sort of compromise, but as matfers stand, not until the lamb can remain in safety with the lion will it be possible to secure it. Division of Spain into two parts might be a solution if either of the contestants wanted it, but at thes most it would merely bring about an armistice to be broken directly either one or the other of the two new nations thought it had the opportunity of imposing its will upon the other. A temporary solution would merely postpone future warfare, though at the moment it seems to surpass the wit of man to discover any solution other than the complete victory of one over the other.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.