Berlin's discreet opposition to Hungarian annexation of Ruthenia is interpreted chiefly as the result of a long-term German desire to secure a base for action against the Soviets in the future.
Some observers fear complications may arise in north-eastern Europe as sequel to Germany's asserted intention to make demands in regard to Danzig and the Polish corridor. In return for satisfaction of these claims, it is alleged; Germany would give Poland a free hand in Lithuania.
Public opinion here appears convinced that the Soviets will not permit any Polish military action against Lithuania, which is separated from Russia only by a thin strip of Polish land.
The Foreign Commissar, M. Maxim Litvinov, apparently considers that any discussions upon the value of Franco-Soviet pact can wait fòr some time, especially since the Soviet-German pact of friendship has never been denounced, Foreign observers do not see any Soviet hostility against France despite the surprise caused here by the Foreign attitude over Czechoslovakia, Feeling against Britain, however, remains most bitter, for London is considered to have ignored the Ru: sian factor in the recent crisis. Furthermore, Britain's attitude towards the Non-Intervention Committee and its work is interpreted as support for Germany.—Havas,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.