The terms of the formula, agreed upon between Great Britain, and Japan, as a result of negotiations at Tokyo, having now been published, it is possible to måke that comment, which, if made earlier, would, in view of the facts as they are now known, have been premature. In brief Great Britain has recognized the existence of a state of affairs which has been patent for the last two years. Opinion in Washington sums up the situation clearly, holding that the agreement clarifies the status of Anglo-Japanese relations in a specific local instance, and yet frees British diplomacy to act on a more positive basis in connection with the entire Anglo-Japanese situation as the Japanese military authorities are themselves now bound by a specific formula, That opinion is strengthened in the view of legal experts, who state that Britain has now merely accepted a position acknowledged long ago by the United States, though the latter had been in a better tactical positión to confine the liberties of Japan under this status. There can in the circumstances be nothing in the nature of a' diplomatic victory for either side, but a compromise, which, faithfully adhered to by both parties, may have the effect of bettering relations between them, while at the same time doing the Chinese Government no disservice. Once recognition is admitted of the existence of large scale hostilities in China the rest of the provisions to be found in the formula logically follow. Obviously the Japanese have special requirements for the protection of their own security in the regions under their control, and the right to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will benefit their enemy, while as for the rest of the formula it is nothing but a reaffirmation of that neutrality upon which Great Britain has insisted ever since the outbreak of the "China Incident," and constitutes no departure from the attitude regarding neutrality which has been adopted by the United States and other Powers. By achieving this moderate settlement there has been no letting down of China, nor has there been any impairment of foreign rights in China.
If, consequently, the Tokyo formula is regarded as merely regularising an irregular situation full justice will be done not only to its real meaning but the statesmanship of the two countries which negotiated it. Viewed in that light the comment which has been appearing in the Press of the Axis Powers falls into its true perspective; a British defeat is claimed in order to cover up the disappointment over the fact that it was possible for Britain and Japan to reach an understanding so quickly. If there has been any defeat at all, it has been of those who wished to embroil the two countries in the Far East for the furtherance of their own schemes in Europe. To the terms of the formula need to be added the four points made clear by Lord Halifax in the House of Lords: (1) It is not, he said, part of Japan's intentions to preclude the British Government from making representations on any cases which might arise; (2) the British Government expressed the view that nothing in the formula affected the position of other Powers; (3) Sir Robert Craigie represented to the Japanese Government the great importance of discouraging Press recriminations, and (4) had made strong representations regarding the Anti-British agitation. The last two points are of the greatest importance for upon them largely depend the future of Anglo-Japanese relations. It has been stated by Japanese spokesmen that while Japan did not actually inspire the anti-British agitation, it could and would control it. That view is not wholly acceptable, and the fact that Sir Robert Craigie has made representations to Japan on the subject clearly indicates the British view of where responsibility lies. In this connection it needs to be strongly emphasized that a continuance of recriminations in the Japanese Press and the controlled Press in territories at present occupied by the Japanese forces is not conductive of the maintenance of the best relations between the two countries, and whatever ultimate settlement is reached will be largely nullified if there is to be a continuance of that vituperation which has appeared so persistently of late.
Great Britain, in the words of Lord Halifax, has every reason to expect that the anti-British agitation in China will cease as a result of the settlement which has been reached, and if it does not, then the good work which has been done at Tokyo will have been brought to naught, and the re-sultan situation rendered infinitely worse than it was at the commencement of the talks at Tokyo. Press recriminations and the continuance of the anti-British agitation may in themselves prove the best and most immediate test of Japanese bona fides, and it is devoutly to be hoped that by putting a stop to both of them Japan will make an important contribution to a general betterment of the situation. For the rest it must be emphasized that there can be no change of British policy towards China. Mr. Chamberlain has made that point quite clear, when he said last week that it was impossible for Britain to reverse her policy at the dictation of any other foreign Power, and it was underlined on Monday afternoon in the House of Lords by Lord Halifax when he said "To that position the British Government unhesitatingly adhere." There is nothing in the formula to suggest that there has been any departure from that position. British policy in China remains intact; it contemplates the maintenance of that neutrality which it has always sought to Observe in this present struggle, and there is nothing whatever to suggest that any modification of that neutrality has been, is, or will be contemplated. Accepted in this light the agreement reached in Tokyo should be regarded as satisfactory from every point of view. The rights of none are prejudiced, no principle has been sacrificed, and nothing done which could not have been done with propriety at any time during the last two years. It is, therefore, to be hoped that this agreement will mark a turning point in the situation in the Far East, and lead to a better Anglo-Japanese understanding than has existed for an uncomfortably long time past, Japan's Public Enemy One of the most singular" features of the agitation, which is being carried on in the Japanese Press, is the reiterated charge that Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, H.M. Ambassador to China, is something in the nature of Japan's Public Enemy: No. 1, and that the agreement reached at Tokyo constitutes something in the nature of a personal reverse for him. Sir Archibald is nothing of the sort, and has sustained no such reverse as his critics profess to see. For some reason or other those responsible for the outery against him seem to believe that he is pursuing a personal policy in China. That, of course, is hopelessly wrong. An ambassador is not responsible for the formulation of policy, but is nothing more than the personal instrument through which his Government's policy is made clear to the country to which he is accredited, and through whom negotiations are carried out. Ambassadors nowadays hardly come within the definition of diplomats as given by a famous writer,—was it Lord Chesterfield?—as persons sent to lie abroad for the good of their country, for nowadays they do not even have to do that. Sir Robert Craigie, H.M. Ambassador to Japan, does not come in for the criticisms levelled against Sir Archibald, and yet he also is merely the instrument of the British Government's policy. He has not yet been dubbed Japan's Public Friend No. 1, and if he were it would be equally, as untrue as the appellation given the British Ambassador to China. It seems a "bit hard" that Sir Archibald should be picked out for these unwelcome attentions, for if the British policy had been different, and more acceptable to the Japanese it is quite possible he might be occupying the position of Japan's Curly-Headed-Boy No. 2, though even that pleasanter róle might not be without its embarrassments.
Arms and the Gangster Chinese sources claim Saturday's sensational shooting was perpetrated by gangsters attached to the pro-Wang Ching-wei party operating from the "badlands" in an attempt to remove opposition to Mr. Wang's political campaign in Shanghai. Japanese official sources claim it was done by pro-Chungking gangsters with the intention of involving Japan and discrediting the Anglo-Japanese negotiations in Tokyo, although there was little success in explaining the fact that the gangsters started out from a base in the Japanese-controlled "Ta Tao" area in western Shanghai. One important fact deserving of the strictest official investigation, irrespective of the political inspiration of the affair, is the source of arms used not only by Saturday's party but by other gangsters in the unusual period of terrorism experienced in Shanghai this year. Every civil war waged around Shanghai left its flotsam and jetsam in the presence of hundreds of deserters and semi-bandits who indulged in criminal careers in the foreign areas, and large quantities of arms and ammunition became available, making arms smuggling an unprofitable and unnecessary occupation. The recent Sino-Japanese hostilities have apparently inundated this area with incredibly large supplies, and among them enorm: ous quantities of hand grenades of the military type. References to Mauser pistols, with virtual machine gun attachments as far as rapid fire is concerned, are too common nowadays to deserve comment, Anybody might as well refer to the large numbers of radios or electric refrigerator in use, so familiar is the term. The hand grenades present another problem and the indications are there must be huge stores of these missiles somewhere because the terrorists do not seem to lack supplies. The type in general use corresponds with a German "potato masher" type shipped in large consignments to Shanghai before the hostilities, Con ceivable, the thorough searches made by the police of the two foreign areas at the behest of the Japanese to prevent the spread of anti-Japanese terrorist acts prove that they are not stored in the foreign areas. They must be out side within easy reach of the gangsters. If the Japanese are sincere in their professions o complete control of the area within thei jurisdiction—and the situation in that criminal enclave known as the "badlands" is no compliment to the efficiency of this con trol—then they must possess some knowledge of this store of weapons which are used se regularly in this district. If these grenade: and other weapons are freely at the disposal of enemies of the Japanese authorities then the appropriate action would be to immunize thi: form of danger by seizing them.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.