(Continued from pave 266, Col. 4) is not yet a great deal of reality about it, and appears to have headway amongst those Chinese who would demonstrate against something or other anyway and especially if paid to do so. An attempt to reduce the British Community in China to a. state of "jitters" was part and parcel of the whole scheme of the Japanese Army to enable the Japanese Government—drawn how willingly into the whole business no one fat present knows,—to obtain a quick diplomatic victory. That has failed, firstly because the issues raised, in addition to those which brought about the original dispute, are such that "Great Britain cannot, and' will not negotiate without the full' knowledge and consent of the other Powers concerned, and, secondly, because of the delays which' have inevitably occurred because of the necessity of consulting them. If, therefore, the Tokyo negotiations do eventually break down, the responsibility will Iie more particularly with the Japanese Army. If they are carried on to suitable conclusion, in the absence of the Japanese Army representatives, there is Reason to believe that the latter will do anything to carry it into satisfactory execution, for the history of the past two years has conclusively shown that the control of the Japanese Government over its forces in the field is, to say the least, somewhat attentuated.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.