Aug. 21.
The evacuation of British, Somaliland was foregone conclusion from the moment the defection of France was realized, and within the past week or ce it was fully understood that it was merely a question of time when that would come about. With France still in the field there was every probability that the Italian forees in Abyssinia estimated to have been in the neighbourhood of 80,000 would have been satisfactorily dealt with. When France collapsed and it was made plain that.some if not all the colonies would remain loyal to the Petain Government, the British force in Somaliland could no longer depend upon the support of the French troops at Djibuti who were to hold the right flank, and a decidedly inferior British force, numerically' speaking, was left to face the enemy. The British command was left with a weighty decision to make. It could either' reinforce the troops in British Somaliland and fight it out, or resort to an immediate and unresisting evacuation, or remain in the field with the comparatively small force, doing as much damage to the enemy as possible, and withdrawing when that became inevitable.
'The British command adopted the third course. It was not only wise, but in keeping with the best of British traditions. A stubborn rearguard action was fought against' the superior Italian forees, considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy, and evenually the British troops were evacuated in wood order, with a great part of their material—the balance being destroyed—and. all the wounded. Even if the time factor had not been against it, to have reinforced the troops in the small' colony in order to fight it out with the Italians would have been playing the game of the enemy, for it would have needed the utilization of men who could with advantage be used in other theatres of] war. The lessons of 1914-1918 have been thoroughly well learned by the British and the last thing they can be expected to do in this present struggle Is to dissipate their forces in unnecessary and indecisive theatres of war, The refusal to be drawn into a major struggle in Norway was a decision not play the game as the enemy would wish it, and the refusal to consider British Somaliland as a suitable scene for a major struggle represents a continuance of. the. same policy. So for the time being tt} Italians will be left in possession of 2 small British colony, the arid fruits of a victory for which it is reported they have paid dearly, while the British forces have been withdrawn to be used in some other field of get lon, 0 reinforce instead of being. rein-
It is but natural that the Italians will sock' to make the most of this success. Signor Gayda's blatant boasting shows that they are already doing so. They have to. They are being struck such blows in northern Italy thal the success in British Somaliland has to be exaggerated in order to offset the impression which the British Air Force has created there, for they are being shown that not even the air might of Germany can protect them from British visitations. The capture British Somaliland confers ne benefits upon the enemy. They are still out off from thei home bases by the superior might of the British Navy; the capture of further coastline in the Gulf of Aden constitutes no threat to Aden itself, for without control of the: sous the Italians are completely unable to throw remains to be seen what next the will endeavour There is the possibility of a descent upon Kenya, which will prove an entirely different problem for them, or they may, ut Mr. Lloyd suggested in a recent speech, when he said the Ttalians had reached Kassala just inside the Sudan border, decide to direct efforts towards an invasion endeavour to strike at Khartoum. There, too, they will encounter serious difficulties, and stub-bor resistance, increased by the fact that, dependent as they are upon the supplies they' already have, and being completely unable to obtain more, the Italian forees in that rca must eventually become idle because of the exhaustion of their resources. Thus, in ac~ it needs {o be emphasized that the original conception of how the campaigns would be fought there has undergone a complete change since the defection of France brought about an entirely novel and unexpected sift
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.