the denunciation of the 1911 treaty of commerce and amity with Japan completely Surprised everybody. Not only had foreign capitals no previous inkling of what was to occur, but the American public, Congress, and even the State Department itself, had no advance warning. The President acted quickly, impulsively, and even impetuously in the matter, and showed that the surprise stroke was not the prerogative of the dictator powers alone, He had acted in a similar way one before, when, without advance warning, he had sent a peace plea to both Herr Hitler and signor Mussolini suggesting that they should. pledge themselves not to attempt to settle their grievances by force for at least ten years, but should submit them to Washington for friendly and peaceful discussion.
The motive behind each move was the same, It was what the President himself called, "a'shot for peace." He had complained when the Senate refused to modify the Neutrality Act along the lines he re-requested that they had deprived him of ammunition, His denunciation of the 1911 treaty showed that there was still some left in the pouch, It reminded, not only Japan, but the other dictator powers, that there was 4 vast field in which the President could exercise functions derived directly from the Constitution, whatever the attitude of Congress might be. It made them realize that he might very well have other shots in re~ serve, and' so created a feeling of suspense about future Amefican action which the President undoubtedly felt, would have a deterrent effect and make them think twice before taking any action which might lead war, the reaction in London was a mixture of pleasure that the step should have been taken and irritation that the British Government had not been told about it in advance. For many weeks, the British Government had been attempting to deal with the difficult situation in Tientsin without any assistance from the United States. The prevailing attitude at the State Department seemed to be one of thankfulness that British citizens and British interests were being attacked by {he Japanese and that American citizens and American Interests were being loft alone The suggestion that since both British an American chestnuts were in the same fire, and since by Keeping the fre away from British chestnuts, American chestnuts would also be saved from burning, ce-operative action might be taken was evaded.
Only a day or two before the Japanese twenty was denounced, an approach by the British Government that the United States should associate itself in a protest to Tokyo was flatly tured down, "As a consequence the British Government agreed to a formula of negotiations which might be interpreted tas acknowledging Japan's special interests in the Far East and as giving her the privilege of a belligerent without any of its incon-Yeniences. The tactical position of the British negotiators in Tokyo had been made more aiMeult by the feeling which was prevalent in Japanese elreles that the wave of isolationist sentiment in the United States would prevent the United States from taking amy strong. stand:
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.