Attempts to estimate the importance of the Yellow River floods from the military point of view have been hampered by the statements of the two parties involved in the present hostilities, claiming on the one hand an important success through the instrument of one of nature's most terrible weapons, and on the other an abuse of the most elementary tights of humanity, whereby hundreds of thousands of innocent. farmers have been made homeless and other thousands drowned. This journal has already made known its opinion on the justifiability of the opening of the Yellow River dykes in a war in which the very existence of the Chinese nation as an independent sovereign unit is at stake. Therefore there is no need to labour the point that, from the military view, the opening of the dykes was a drastic but helpful move. It only remains to deplore the conflict of the accusations made by both sides, placing the responsibility for the huge amount of suffering which much inevitably ensue upon the shoulders of their opponents in hyperbolic communiques which recall regrettably the terminological inexactitudes of Matilda that made her friends "gasp and stretch their eyes." It is early yet for authoritative statements from neutral sources on the change brought about in the military situation by the Yellow River floods; but enough is already known for it to be said that Chengchow is saved—for the moment; that the Japanese advance on the Pinghan line soüth of Chengchow has been thwarted; and that an inereasingly~difficult problem has been set the strategists from Tokyo if they wish immediately to pursue their attack upon Hankow. The Japanese had cut the Pinghan line somewhere in the neighbourhood of Sincheng, by means of advanced mechanized units operating with very little solid support. And even this support has now been cut off by the waters of the Yellow River, so that neutral observers are inclined to credit the Chinese claim that the Japanese on the railway have now been withdrawn and that the whole line, south of the Yellow River, is again in Chinese hands.
So far can at present be the flooded area in Honan and Anhwei provinces extends from the Yellow River to a p on the Lunghai Railway a few miles to the east of Chengchow on the one side, and a miles west of Kaifeng on the other.
either one of these large cities seems as yet to have been directly affected. And only a number of comparatively small towns between them and to the south of them have suffered. This fact seems to diminish the importance of the Japanese claims of enormous human losses in the floods; since it is well known that a rural population can usually move in time to avoid advancing waters—provided it has not already moved to avoid advancing soldiery—and that heavy casualties in flood times are generally experienced in cities, where movement is necessarily more restricted and the inhabitants paradoxically are more deeply rooted. From the Lunghai Railway the flooded area, according to the same sources, extends southward as far as Fukow, while Changko, Yushih, and Chusienchen, to name only a few of the smaller centres, have been inundated. It is státed that the waters are steadily spreading southward, to the greater embarrassment of the Japanese who will find, if this happens, that the main highways leading from their present positions in central Anhwei towards Yencheng, which would seem to be their next logical objective if Chengchow has been made impossible, will also be closed. At present there is nothing morg than Chinese official claims to support the tatement that the floods are spreading southward with any speed. But the prospect of the Chinese canalling the flood waters southward into the streams and rivers which run near these highways to Yencheng is not overlooked; while the heavy rains which have fallen in central Anhwei during the last few days, as they have fallen here, will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to advance as far as Yencheng while the highways are still open. If this is the case, it appears as if the opening of the Yellow River dykes has definitely blocked ihe Japanese attack on Hankow from the north—for the present, at least.
There remains a way open for attáck on China's present political capital from the east—that narrow and somewhat precarious route along the north bank of the Yangtze. This attack has also, it is reported, been considerably hampered by the weather. The Japanese, however, are believed to be preparing for a drive on Matung Bluff, in the neighbourhood of which there is a Chinese boom which is, at the present level of the river, sufficient to prevent any naval campaign towards Hankow. The Chinese have not been blind to the importance of this boom and to the natural defences of the Matung Bluff. This bluff was formerly fortified with obsolete cannon and other defences which seemed, to the unprejudiced eye, to be admirably suited to the wars of the Three Kingdoms, but hardly adequate ior a twentieth century "incident" It is understood, however, that modern field artillery has been brought up to the bluff, while troops are disposed in strong positions to resist any Japanese attack. A Japanese land attack, to clear away these troops, would be a prerequisite to any attempt to open the boom, which in itself might be a long task if the rising waters of the Yangtze do not render the boom of little value by making the depth of the water over it sufficient for the passing of small gunboats. Granted that the Japanese are able to overcome the difficulties of the Matung boom, however, and that their way is cleared for proceeding westwards towards Hankow, their operations may be extremely hard. Between the mountainous country of the interior north of the river and the Yangtze bank the terrain is low and narrow. Troops pushing forward over this terrain would be open to flanking movements which could only be nullified if there could be a simultaneous attack from the north—an attack, as has been seen, which very unlikely in present conditions, The prophet is without honour wherever he opens] his mouth, but nowhere is he less honoured than on the field of battle. Therefore these speculations on the next movements in the struggle for Hankow are given with reserve.
As things appear at the moment, however, the risk taken in stating than Hankow seems safe for the next few months may be taken—- the risk, that is to say, of attack from the land; the chances of attack from the air must be measured by a different standard, the raids on Canton and the uniform success of the Chinese air force in repelling raids on Hankow.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.