The outbreak of fighting at Changkaofeng Saturday, at a time when it was hoped the Manchoukuo-Siberian border—dispute might be settled by negotiation, has come a, [somewhat of a surprise, for, while, judging }from the reports of the meeting at Moscoy between M, Litvinof, Commissar for Foreip Affairs, and Mr. ' Shigemitsu, Japanese Ambassador to Russia, both Government were displaying so firm an attitude that the question arose as to whether both sides wer, [not bluffing, there were signs that the trouble was unlikely to lead to war. If either of the two representatives were bluffing it is now clear that, when' Mr. Shigemitst. said tha, if the Soviet soldiers would not retire from the Changkaofeng hills Japan might consider military action necessary he was indulging no such manoeuvre, and-it remains to be seen whether the Soviet Government will tolley up this initial reverse by endeavouring Jenforee their claim to the disputed area by military means. One of the in features of the whole business is the tender regard by the Japanese command for the niceties of procedure, and their attack on the Russian positions is excused by the allegation that the Soviet troops had first fired upo, Japanese patrols. It is quite probable that such was the ease, for such occurrences have been common enough during the past th years, But it does not matter one jot who. ther the Russians indulged in any such trick or not, for the fact was that according to the Japanese there had been an invasion of Manchoukuo territory against which there had been a strong protest and a threat of possible military steps to secure redress. The Japan. ese would have been perfectly logical in thet procedure if they had gone about ejecting the Russians without awaiting any such proxi mate cause as that which they allege pre. cipitated matters, but, the censorious world being what it fs, it is perhaps just as well bbe able to cite immediate causes, even for an action which was to be foreseen in the diplomatic exchanges which had taken place earlier in Moscow.
Messages emanating from Russia up to the time of writing indicated a desire on the part of the Kremlin to minimize the whole matter, and if war is not desired, that would appear to be the best course to follow. At the same time failure on the part of Russ to maintain the stand taken up when the disputed territory was first occupied, ant default in the insistence of rights which Litvinoff claimed were supported by a trealy dating as far back as 1869, will put earlier Russian intransigeance in the matter in a strange light, Was M. Litvinoff bluffing in his retort to Mr. Shigemitsu, and, if he were, his buff been called by the Japance troops? That is the question which only the immediate future can answer, but if the Soviet Government is unable to proceed (0 lengths sufficient to vindicate its claims in the region involved, the world will dray only one conclusion, and that unfavourable to the Russiuns and their real ability to protec! their alleged interests around the Siberian-Manchoukuo border. For that reason the developments following upon Saturday's clash will be watched with considerable interest by practically every government in the world, What has happened would be, until only a few years ago, adequate cause for war. Soviet Russia has been—boasting of her strength to deal with all comers and to be able to protect her boundaries against aggression. "A very considerable amount of scepticism has been expressed aprond—con-corning the Soviet's claims in this connection, and the opinion has been freely expressed, with no small amount of evidential support,—that recent developments in the Siberian Army have made it very doubtful whether it is now so capable, as it wot before the last purges were made, The question arises as to whether, despite all the eliminations which have been carried ott in the higher ranks of the Siberian armies they are any more loyal than before the removal of those officers who had come under suspicion. It is upon the answer 10 that question that the military strength of Russia, whether in Siberia or Europe, must necessarily depend, for in time of war, and with the subordination of civilian processes 10 the needs of the military, it would be only through the unwavering loyalty of the mil tary chiefs to himself that M, Stalin could hope to remain in power. If he cannot depend upon such fidelity then he cannot to war, and the Soviet military machine useless for purposes of Soviet policy.
Tf the truth were known it is probable that the importance of the week-end develop: ments is not 50 great as the Japanese claim. nor so small as Moscow would apparently have the world believe. The policies of the two countries require that there shall be degree of exaggeration either way, for while it would be satisfying to the Japanese Jearn that a successful action had restored disputed territory to Manchoukuo, Russian "face" requires that the incident shall be placed in such perspective as to make it wholly negligible affair, not justifying the us? of Soviet might to rectify it," For that reason the reports concerning the size of the engagement require to be accepted with very considerable caution, and the chances art (Continued on page 183.)
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.