Oct. 28.
The report that Germany is massing troops from the Ems to the mouth of the Elbe is being interpreted as indicating the possibility of a descent upon Holland for the purpose of occupying positions on the coast opposite England, whence an invasion of that country might be attempted. In this connection it is interesting to recall a similar scheme which the French Republic conceived in 1801, and which Napoleon revived in 1803, and main tained asa menacing possibility until August 1805. 'The assembly of flat-bottomed boats at Boulogne in 1801 and the contemplated invasion, even though Nelson tried unsuecess~ fully to' destroy the craft, was regarded at the time as more of a threat made for diplomatic purposes than as an actual military menace. 'The uneasy two years which followed the signing of the armistice in London' on October 1, 1802 and the subsequent Peace of Amiens, ended on May 18, 1803, and for the next two years and two months Napoleon made most determined attempts to throw an invading army across the Channel to land somewhere on the English const between Dover and Hastings. The scheme was founded on the republican Boulogne flotilla. The Republic had collected 240 vessels and with these as a nucleus Napoleon commenced to build up a fleet of no fewer than 2400 such boats, consisting of prames, ship rigged of 35 metres long and eight metres beam, carrying twelve guns, chaloupes ca. noniéres 24 metres long and five wide carrying five guns and brig-rigged, bateaus cannowiers of 19 metres long, 1.56 wide and carrying two guns, and, finally, mere boats. All were built' to be rowed, were flat-bottomed; with shallow draft capable of navigating near the shore, and of being grounded without harm. The shallow waters of the French coast made it impossible for the British line-of-battle ships and even large frigates to press an attack home on them, while they were able to beat off smaller vessels, with the result that the concentration at Boulogne was "effected, and 130,000 men kept in readiness, and thoroughly drilled in embarking and disembarking quickly.
The idea was that this flotilla could push across the Channel during a calm, but ex-Perience showed that, when the needful allow ance was made for the time to bring them out of the harbour (two tides) and for the influence which the Channel currents would have upon their speed, it was extremely rash to rely upon a -calm of sufficient length. Napoleon then sought to concentrate his fleet in the Channel in an endeavour to secure mastery of that stretch of water, but in this he never succeeded, and when in 1805 Villeneuve, deeply impressed by the inefficiency of his ships and especially of the Spaniards, and convinced that an overwhelming British force would be united against him in the Channel, sailed south for Cadiz the whole elaborate scheme was ruined. Napoleon at once broke up the camp at Boulogne and marched to Germany. It will be seen that the dominating factor operating against the success of Napoleon's plan was Britain's command of the seas. If indeed the German high command has in mind a similar venture mastery of the seas will again prove of considerable if not decisive importance, but things have changed considerably ' since Napoleon was thwarted, and in addition any attempt to invade Britain from Holland will not be successful unless the invader not only commands the seas but the air as well. Germany certainly has not control of the seas, and in all human probability never will. Neither has she yet mastery of the air. That issue has still to be decided, but without both these things it is unlikely that Germany will embark upon any such rash undertaking. As a repetition of the diplomatic menace of 1801 it may have some weight, though, even that will not be impressive so Jong as the Allies can maintain present superiority at sea, and challenge Germany on basis of equality in the air. Unless Germany could at all times maintain reliable lines of communication across the North Sea, and that at any rate at present would seem to be impossible, the chances of such an invasion of Britain would be slim in the extreme, for as Napoleon recognized unless the communications across the Channel could be Kept open by an overwhelmingly powerful French fleet the maintenance of French armies on British soil would not have been possible.
If may be safely assumed, however, that the Reich will refrain from infringing the neutrality of Holland and Belgium until the last moment. When it happens it will be the result of counsels of desperation, for while few believe Herr Hitler's assurances that the neutrality of these two countries will be respected, the effect upon world opinion of any German attack upon them, is something which even Der Fuehrer cannot lightly ignore. That it would be possible to establish air bases in a conquered Holland closer to Britain is undeniable, but in this connection it must be remembered that such step would not be without benefit to Britain, bringing centres in Germany, suitable targets for the attentions of British' bombers, within a much shorter range. Destruction of the neutrality of either of those two countries would bring Britain just as close to Germany as Germany would be to Britain, and the roundabout routes which have at Present to be followed by those aircraft which carry propaganda to the interior of Germany would no longer be necessary. Tt is to be assumed, however, that the Netherlanders would resist any German attempt on their country. It is known that they are prepared to flood extensive tracts of the land fas part of their defence scheme. Hence the suggestion that aeroplanes and war vessels would be used in an endeavour to turn the Netherlanders' land defences. The whole scheme is.a very grandiose one, even though it is merely a belated copy of the French Republic's original plan. It is not suggested that it is impossible of being carried out, but it is quite apparent that the initial obstacles; to a German success in this direction are very great. With command of the sea and there is no reason why an invasion of Great Britain by German armed forees could not be attempted with considerable prospect of success. But Germany has neither of those advantages yet and may reasonably bbe expected never to secure them. Were they to effect a landing they would find just as determined resistance as the British were prepared to offer Napoleon, and the difficulties of maintaining adequate communications across the seas would in all probability be the deciding factor in the fate of the invaders. In short, if Herr Hitler can succeed in carrying out so great a scheme, he will have completely outclassed Napoleon and that, as Euclid is reported to have stated, absurd.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.