Finland's appeal to the League in connection with Soviet aggression, and the decision to summon a League of Nations Council on Saturday, and the Assembly on Monday are logical developments resulting from the invasion of Finland, viewed within the ordinary processes of the League. That body, however, has become so attenuated of recent years hat its decisions, whatever they may be in this instance, will be robbed of much of their authority by reason of the number of nations which are no longer members, and even if unanimous resolution is passed condemning Soviet aggression it will be the opinion of a comparatively small section of what was formerly an imposing body. The attitude of the various Powers towards this summoning of the League has not yet been made clear. Russia is still a member. It remains to be seen whether she will send a representative, though whatever possible excuse he could give for his Government's outrageous behaviour it is more than a little difficult to see. Should Moscow decide not to be represented that will be tantamount io withdrawal from the League, while if she docs send a delegate she is liable to be pub-liely condemned, and expelled. Italy, whose notice of withdrawal from the League expires on December 11, is still a member and its Government may decide to send a delegate in view of the very changed situation which has come about since the intention of withdrawing was first announced. On the other hand Rome may decide that the present is inopportune for taking any overt action which may align Italy with one camp or the other, and Signor Mussolini may dee to preserve a sphinxlike imperturbability similar to that with which he has watched the developments of the last three months. That his hatred of Bolshevism, and disgust at the manner in which the Rome-Berlin Axis has been betrayed by Herr Hitler may ultimo ately oblige him to make decisions very different from what might otherwise be the case is very apparent, but he may choose to remain impassive until Italian interests and influence are more openly threatened in the Balkans than they are at present.
The countries which can be represented at Geneva include besides the foregoing the Argentine, Belgium, Bolivia, China, the Dominican Republic, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iran, Latvia, New Zealand, Peru, Sweden and Yugoslavia. There are amongst them undoubtedly countries anxious that their representatives should roundly condemn evil such as has been wreaked upon Finland, but there are reasons why some of them might feel disposed to hold their hand in this matter. China is in receipt of substantial aid from the Soviet, and to join in the proposed condemnation of Russian outrage may imperil her good relations with Moscow, and possibly the continuance of the supply of necessary assistance, and war material It'is not suggested that China would willingly sacrifice moral principles for sheer expediency, but the Central Government in Chungking will have to face that sue, and make its own decision, for the Soviet can strike back should it so desire. It is not to be believed that Latvia, now in the position she is, would be willing to incur Soviet vengeance by daring to vote condemnation of the invasion of Finland. She is definitely under the Soviet gun and may deem it wiser in the long run to refrain from attending. Sweden already realizes the menace she is facing in the extension of the Russian sphere of influence in the Baltic, and, whatever its Government may think of Russian behaviour, may decide to pour no. more oil on the flames, and also refrain from assisting, while Yugoslavia, by no means as remote from ultimate Russian influence as she would wish to be, may also prefer to adopt a more guarded attitude than that which would be necessitated by support for a resolution of condemnation of the rape of Finland. While it is thus clear that the positions of certain of the remaining members of the League may not be conduct ive of a clear-cut, unanimous decision, the attitude of the Allies has also yet to be determined. Even they are faced with some difficulty, and the decisions which they may have to reach may be dominated by very serious and important factors.
In the case of Poland, though Russia assisted in carving up the country, the policy of Great Britain and France was not to regard Russia as an enemy in this present war. The view was taken that while the Allies had very definite commitments to Poland in the event of German aggression, the same obligations did not apply as against Russia. They will now have to decide when ther they will adopt a course of action im-
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.