M. Daladier, the French Premier, has replied to Signor Mussolini's speech of Sunday last. In an address, which is almost epigrammatic in quality, he has made it quite clear that, while the French Government is prepared to consider the Italian demands concerning Tunis, Djibuti, and Suez, there can be no question of any surrender on essential points. In fact what he has adumbrated is that France is prepared to negotiate only upon the basis supplied by the Laval-Mussolini agreement of 1935. The reply is a firm one, delivered in perfectly conciliatory language, but at the same time leaving no doubt as to the French position with regard to the Italian demands. M. Daladier makes a good point when he declares that the Italian contention that the conquest of Abyssinia creates new rights in favour of Italy cannot be accepted. It is a doctrine which both parties to the Rome-Berlin axis have been preaching, with enthusiastic imitation by Japan. Nevertheless it is an untenable one, for it means that every new conquest, every new concession would open new rights, and every claim satisfied would contain within itself the seed of new demands. From every point of view this is a state of affairs which cannot be justified. If it is accepted as being correct then every advantage gained by a wrongful act would be justification for a further modification in the general situation, and it is quite clear that acceptance of such a contention would be to agree to the system of opportunist logic with which the governments forming the axis have sought by specious argument to bolster up a case which has little foundation in justice. France being ready for a complete, and loyal execution of the 1935 agreements, and within heir spirit to examine any proposal which may be advanced M. Daladier has more Jefinitely stated the French case than Signor Mussolini the Italian. If Tunis, Djibuti and Suez do indeed present problems for Italy, hey are of Italy's own making. Tunis was disposed of in 1935, Djibuti and Suez arise only from Italy's own conduct, Coincident with M. Daladier's declaration s the statement made in the House of Commons concerning the increase in the British Territorials. That they are immediately to ce brought up to war strength, and then doubled, means that Mr. Chamberlain is determined to explore to the fullest extent the possibility of increasing Britain's military strength by voluntary means. To those who are firmly of the opinion that the only real elution of the problems, in light of all the circumstances, is conscription, and that as Soon as possible, the decision will be unwell come. There is, however, this to be said about it—voluntary armies are preferable from the British point of view to those composed of conscripts. The only real question about which there can be any doubt is to whether the British Government will obtain that response without which Mr. Chamberlain's scheme must be a failure. On the face of it, the fact that the Territorial army is at present from 30,000 to 40,000 under normal strength, does not suggest that the scheme is receiving all the support which it should. If that gap were filled up rapidly there would be some ground for believing the additional 170,000 men would be easily obtained, but the fact that recent crises have not had the effect of bringing the Territorials up to normal strength rather discounts the probability of getting that very much greater number which is necessary to attain the newly contemplated war footing. On the other hand, now that a new goal has been set for recruiting, it is possible that by strenuous campaigning the enhanced figure may be reached. It is certainly worth trying, even if the period for the experiment cannot be unduly prolonged. There still remains the question of whether the French Government will be satisfied with the prospect of Britain being in such a position as to be able to dispatch overseas an expeditionary force of 32 divisions. Most certainly it is an improvement on the 19 divisions which are at the moment available, but the experiences of the last war give rise to considerable doubt whether even 32 divisions will be adequate. They most certainly will not be in the event of a long war.
Nevertheless the knowledge that Great Britain is prepared to go much further in her contribution to the safety of the Anglo-French understanding than was originally contemplated is a very considerable factor of strength. As such it may in the not too distant future tend to render the idea of a four Power mutual defence pact more acceptable than it at present appears to be in some quarters, for once it is made quite clear that the former policy, which seemed so uncertain, has been changed to one of decisive determination to resist any, and every form of aggression, the entry into practical politics of such a consideration must make any proposal for collective security much more attractive than it otherwise would have been. There can be little doubt that M. Daladier was informed of the British determination before he made his speech. It is not very likely that that knowledge had any very definite effect upon the general trend of the sentiments he expressed, but they have been very realistically emphasized by this latest British development. Those who fancy they see signs of possible aggression by either Great Britain or France arising out of these additions to national strength completely fail to understand the feelings current in those two countries. They are both animated by a desire for the fullest possible self-protection. Their very democratic constitutions are in themselves the best possible guarantee of the pacific qualities of their common policy, for it can be said without the slightest hesitation that if either the British or the French Governments dared to embark upon a war of aggression their political lives would be numbered. That, however, does not prevent M. Daladier from giving the direct uncompromising answer which he has done to the Italian demands.
In the circumstances he could have done nothing else. The announcement by Mr. Chamberlain, however, has done much to strengthen the position of the Entente as a whole and that of France as an integral part, and Rome can now not have the slightest doubt as to the real facts of the situation.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.