give keener, smoother, cheaper shaves and more shaves per blade suggests that reports to the effect that the only material available to resist the Japanese consists of provincial levies without any mechanized assistance are in the main correct. The problem which the Chinese have to solve is whether they can afford to detail reinforcements from the Hankow area to assist in the defence of Canton, or abandon Hfnkow in the hope of saving Canton, or remain where they are and let the southern port go. The speed with which the Japanese are advancing in the south will in all probability decide the matter for them, for if they do succeed in reaching the Canton-Hankow Railway from Waichow via Lungmoon the principal route for Chinese reinforcements will have been severed making it impossible for them to reach Canton in time for it to be saved. On the map the time factor seems already to be operating against the Chinese and they will in all probability continue their stand around Hankow, for a division of their strength now would seem to be fatal.
With the development of the Japanese manceuvres the magnitude of the grandiose scheme behind them becomes apparent. For some time there has been talk of the Japanese domination of China's coastal provinces, but as time passes it is being demonstrated that the Japanese contemplate the occupation of the territory between the railways stretching from Canton to Peiping and the coast. Just [ne their western frontier would be is not at-the-moment clear, but.it.is manifest. that Japanese control of Canton, and the railway would permit of the easy maintenance of their troops along a line of communications somewhere behind their front. Successful development of such a plan would produce a similar situation north of the Yangtze, with the result that such a line with ports available in the south, on the Yangtze and the north connected with railways would permit of the maintenance of a well-organized and supplied front against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the southwest and west of China. It is indeed a grandiose scheme which will undoubtedly involve Japan more deeply in China than she originally contemplated. The task of establishing control over the area so bounded must prove a difficult one, probably requiring more men than have at present been brought to China. Even in the north where some provinces have been overrun for nearly a year it cannot be said that the Japanese have established full control. They have it is true command of the outlets and lines of communication but the activities of the guerillas clearly prove that the task of subjugation is still a long way from completion, which stage indeed it may never reach. So long as Chiang Kai-shek can keep his armies intact it can never be said that he is beaten, and the opportunities of harassing the Japanese will always remain. If the Chinese are willing even now to accept the prospect of many years of hostilities which may be still ahead of them they may yet present Japan with a victory, pyrrhic in its expensiveness. That will entail the maintenance of good morale amongst the Their officials may be right in believing that revelation of unpalatable fact may weaken that morale, though from the evidence provided by the past behaviour of the Chinese in this struggle indicates that the publication of the truth would probably do no very great harm.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.