The pendulum-like swing of American foreign policy has become more than ever marked since the European war began. Be~ fore the war the Administration showed itself strongly opposed to German aggressive policies. When war out, there was a sudden pulling back, The fear of becoming involved was the overwhelming emotion felt Ahroughout the country. Then came a gradual recovery of confidence. The United States evidently was not going to be dragged in. Congressmen, no longer seared of their shadows, were even able to listen to the President make a bold declaration in his annual message favouring international law ud order, without feeling that the country's neutrality' had been severely compromised. The invasion of Finland, too, emphasized the fact that two philosophies of life confronted each other in Europe and that the United States could not fail to be influenced by the outcome, of the struggle. Then round the middle of January, there was a now hesitation to be observed and a new pulling-back. Talle round the White House was all about the need for peace. A sheaf of protests was hurriedly sent to Great Britain complaining of various economic war measures taken against Germany. This constant swing back and forth seems to represent a lack of con sistency on the part of the Administration, but behind it all is the motivating force of isolationist sentiment, the political strength of which varies according to circumstance. It is not the weather cock which is variable, but the wind. The Administration is sensi tive to the slightest change in strength and direction of Congressional sentiment.
If the Administration feels that it is leaving itself exposed to attack, it builds up its defences even before preparations for the attack are visible, My. Roosevelt, for example, might be accused of being a President Ukely'to lead the country Into war; therefore, he takes pains to see that most of the publicity coming from the White House deals with his peace plans and projects For a time, the Administration evidently felt that sympathy for Finland was a per-feelly safe attitude to take, but as soon as it saw possibilities that Finnish aid could be represented as being dangerously unneutral, the President hesitated, American protests to Britain differ somewhat from the normal yielding of the Administration to public pressure, The initia~ tive and the drive all came from the department itself. There was little press criticism of British blockade measures until the department swing into action, Congress men who are easily stirred to denunciation if they feel any American interest is being slighted had been significantly silent. 'They received few lotters from constituents. When 'Senator Mead of New York, on pressure from the department, made a' lengthy speech, nobody rose to continue the debate. It looked as though the Administration were rushing ahead of the isolationists themselves.
Possibly one explanation is that there was fa difference between the original intention and the way in which matters developed. was quite conceivable that the President should give the all-clear signal to a plan which, on the surface, would make it impossible for the isolationists to exiticize him on the grounds that he was pro-Ally. But the subject was handled by a group of officials who were influenced by other considerations and suffered from a sense of grievance entirely unrelated to the matter in hand, The international lawyers of the department naturally looked upon their task as that of presenting a case ayainst a rival attorney in the best manner possible. They "were not concerned with policy, they were merely concerned with making out the best possible brief for their side. The heetorins tone and the hinted menace are part and parcel of the prosecuting attorney's make-up.
Secretary Hull, who could usually be relied upon to smooth away any difficulties, awas irritated at the cash and carry provisions of the Neutrality Act, proving an economic boomerang. 'The British were saving their ash to buy arms and not as much as before to buy agricultural products. 'This was undermining the support for the Trade's Agreement Act, Moreover, the Secretary of State had an attack of the ju" at' the]. critical moment which, owing to the absence on leave of the Under-secretary Mr, Sumner Welles, left Mr. Adolf Perle, Assistant Secre~ tary of State, in charge of the Department. Mr. Perle belongs to the little New Deal group who are interested solely in the domes-fie situation and fix their minds on the strategy necessary to secure a third term, if not for Roosevelt, at least for the New Deal, without considering possible repercussions abroad.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.