The arrival in Shanghai of the White Paper containing "Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939" permits examination of the full text of this interesting document, of which hitherto only telegraphic summaries have been available. A gross of documents, covering over five years, and concluding with Mr. Neville Chamberlain's broadcast to the German people on September 4 of this year, record the development of German-Polish relations, from the agreement between the two countries of January 26, 1934, to the outbreak of war, and bears striking testimony to the endeavours which were made by Great Britain up to the very last moment to avert hostilities. The German-Polish agreement provided that in no circumstances would either party "proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching any decision" in any dispute between them, and for five years after the signature of that pact Herr Hitler made a number of speeches friendly to Poland, as, for example, "the home of a great, nationally-conscious people." It would be "unreasonable and impossible" so the dictator acknowledged "to deny a State of such size as this any outlet to the sea," while on January 30, 1939, he stated that the agreement had "worked out to the advantage of both sides," Then as late as January 30, 1939, exactly two years later, Herr Hitler in the Reichstag said "We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace with regard to the value of this agreement. One only needs ask oneself what might have happened in Europe if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago. In signing it, this great Polish marshal and patriot rendered as great a service as the leaders of the National Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland was one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe.
That agreement was designed to last ten years. The German adventure into Czechoslovakia and the occupation of Prague brought about a very different state, of affairs, the Anglo-Polish agreement of mutual assistance was held by Herr Hitler to be incompatible with the German Polish non-aggression pact,—though why it should be unless Germany attacked either one or other of the contracting parties it is difficult to see,—was denounced in a speech before the Reichstag on April 28.
It suited Herr Hitler's book to do so. The success of the Prague scheme, justified in his eyes the forthcoming attempt on Poland, and April 28, 1939, may reasonably be taken as the convenient date from which the fulfilment of the designs he had in view should commence. On April 27, Herr Hitler had denounced the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935. It was all part and parcel of the scheme. Herr Hitler's reasons for denouncing the agreement were duly and ably refuted, especially the claim of persistent hostility of Great Britain to Germany, but this had no effect and the situation with regard to Poland rapidly worsened. From time to time throughout the various documents which the White Paper contains Germany is assured that Great Britain would support Poland. Thus when a German Under-secretary stated that "Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig, the British Ambassador on July 14 assured Baron von Weizsacker, repeating the affirmation already given by H.M. Government, that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would support Poland by resisting force by force. Such assurances apparently had no effect whatever upon the German leader, and the situation worsened as every day passed until the fatal period commencing on August 22 arrived. On that date a most amazing interview took place between Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador to Germany, and Der Fuehrer. The latter was warned that, "whatever might prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement it would not alter Great Britain's obligation" io Poland. This was backed up by the addendum that Great Britain desired that there should be no such tragic misunderstanding in this regard similar to that which it was alleged, though not admitted, existed in 1914. Herr Hitler was "excitable and uncompromising," his language was violent and exaggerated both as regards England and Poland To the British warnings that direct action against Poland would mean war with Great Britain he replied "Germany had nothing to lose, and Great Britain much: that he did not desire war, but would not shrink from it if necessary, and that his people were much more behind him than last September."
Herr Hitler had long before determined on war, and judging from the White Paper the efforts of Great Britain and also of France, with which this volume does not deal, were destined from the commencement, so far as Germany was concerned, to utter failure. At the same time it is noted that while on occasion Herr Hitler bitterly criticises Great Britain, at others he is wooing her with suggestions of an understanding between the two countries, a mixture of threat and cooing, and even of bargaining right up to the last hour. Thus Sir Nevile Henderson's report of his interview with Herr Hitler on August I finally repeated to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation so far as I was concerned, namely that it lay with him as to whether he preferred a unilateral solution, which would mean war, as regards Poland, or British friendship. If he were prepared to pay the price of the latter by a generous gesture as regards Poland, he could at a stroke change in his favour the whole of public opinion not only in England but in the world, I left no doubt in his mind as to what the alternative would be, nor did he dispute the point.
At the end Herr von Ribbentrop asked me whether I could guarantee that the Prime Minister could carry the country with him in a policy of friendship with Germany. I said that there was no possible doubt whatever that he could and would provided Germany ce-operated with him. Herr Hitler asked whether England would be willing to accept an alliance with Germany. I said, speaking personally, I did not exclude such a possibility provided the developments justified it in amplification of this report, in a later telegram, the Ambassador adele In answer to a suggestion by him that Great Britain might offer something at once in the way of colonies as evidence of her good in-mentions, I retorted that concessions were easier of realization in a good rather than bad atmosphere.
The events of the next few days up to the outbreak of war between the Allies and Germany are too recent to need recounting here, though one remark of criticism may be made.
The warning, addressed to Germany, on September 1, that, unless satisfactory assurances were forthcoming that the German Government had suspended all aggressive actions against Poland, and were prepared promptly to withdraw German forces from Poland, Britain would honour her obligations to that country, contained no time limit. It was not an ultimatum, and its form might have induced Herr Hitler, whose wish might very well have been father to the thought, to believe that, at the very last moment, Great Britain would back down. The delivery of the ultimatum with a limit of a few hours at 5 a.m., on September 3, served to rectify matters, though history will always question whether if the first had been an ultimatum Herr Hitler's course of conduct would have been different.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.