bbe given her to make any successful attack on Brilish vessels. It is to be assumed that France will eventually adopt the same procedure, which while it may have its inconveniences is un~ Soubtedly the safest step to take. It has. been [pointed out that Italy's war strategy calls for sudden and overwhelming attacks on enemy merchant shipping before convoys can be organized. The step which has been taken effect ally prevents that, and relieves the Allied squadrons in the Mediterranean of the necessity fof providing such convoys. The fact that they can devote their attention' to the more active prosecution of the war is a feature which should operate in the Allies' favour, for the blockade of Italy can be maintained quite easily at Gibraltar and Aden, while the further aplication of the navicert system should do comparatively little harm to the Interests of those Mediterranean nations which may sull desire escape being involved in the struggle. All this has been necessitated by recent belligerent state ments by Italian leaders and newspapers, 'Those Utlerances have been rendered. all' the more significant by the refusal of the Iallan Government of the French invitation to negotiate upon Joutstanding questions. Tt will indeed be unfortunate if Italy should enter the war, but it is a [contingency which has all along been expected by the Allies, and taken fully into account when they declared war upon Germany when that nation invaded Poland. The British attitude towards Rome has been somewhat blunt of late, requiring that Italy should declare her hand. That she may do at any moment, though itis fo be hoped she will not. Paradoxically fenotigh the entrance of Italy, into the [war would in some ways benet' the Allies and particularly the effectiveness of the blockade. Italy has undoubtedly been a channel {through which contraband has been reaching Germany, and once she aligns herself with that nation automatically comes under the same sort control, Cabinet and Norway The possibility of there being a crisis in the British Cabinet over. the situation in Norwiy has always to be reckoned with in considering the situation, but that need not be anything which should cause any great anxiety. Ministries were changed in the last war without any disruption of the energy with which the various campaigns were prosecuted, and there is no Fesson to believe that anything of the nature will occur on this occasion should such a step become necessary, Much will depend upon the statement which Mr. Chamberlain was to make the House of Commons yesterday, and which was not available at the time these lines were written, There is in the situation no reason for alarm. The fact of the matter Is that the Germans at present have the advantage in the air over Norway. It must be the policy of the Allies to wrest that from them. Again parallels The Deadly Typewriter There is still much speculation where Ger= many will strike next, and some quarters are Armly of the opinion that the Balkans will come next. Should that prove to be the ease the Reich will doubtless quote the reinforcement of the Allied navies in the Mediterranean as on ex-fuse, alleging that that concentration was cubitedly designed to support an Allied invasion, of the Balkan Peninsula. Knowing the German facties it 1s more than fikely that the Reich ready in possession of documents showing that such Allied aggression was in fact planned; such Papers are so easy to fabricate. The fact of the matter is that the two dictators have been playing a very shrewd game, and the truculent attitude of the Italian press, and certain of the leaders in that country was expressly designed asa diversion in ald of Herr Hitler's Norwegian adventure. The Allies could not afford. to neglect the situation which has recently been created in the Mediterranean, and the fact that they have been able to divert considerable strength from the North Sea to the south of Europe is in itself the most striking expose of the falsehood of the German claims to have inflicted enormous, damage upon the British fleet. "Had that indeed been the case, it would have been impossible to detach units from the North Sea, for the existence of the present Allied forers in Norway depend upon the maintenance of ines of communication between Britain and Norway. The German claims can, therefore, be rejected, for it is obvious that If Dr. Goebbels continues to destroy the British navy at his present rate he will soon be hard put to it to explain why the Ailles are still maintaining practically intact forces at sea, Indeed, in the naval campaign, up to the present. the typewriters of Dr. Goebbels! myrmidons has proved far more deadly than has the German Who is Responsible One of the principal arguments adduced by Herr "Hiller in his "Mein Kampe", against democracies is the irresponsibility of tie mem bers of any government elected by the people. The fallacy of such an argument could not have been better illustrated than. by the agitation which has grown up in the House of Commons against the Cabinet, owing to the temporary setbacks which have been suffered in Norway. Undoubtedly, the Cabinet, in the opinion of the British public, is responsible, and they are expected to produce rabbits out of their hats in order to counteract it. No one who understands anything of the machinery of modern govern= ment can entertain this idea for more than a moment. The Cabinet must necessarily depend for expert advice upon those who are thoroughly familiar with the situation to be faced, and fu the case of the landings in Norway, there seems to be little doubt that, if anyone was at fault, it was the General Staff, Tt is means certain, even, that the General Staff erred, for there seems to have been an under estimate of the powers and enthusiasm of the Norwegian resistance which seriously hampered the small bodies of troops landed and now withdrawn, But whoever can have been at fault in this connection, it is obvious that the Prime 'Minister and his more intimate associates, who have all the major problems of statesmanship to consider, should not be blamed. Mr. Chamberlain, like any other man who might hold a similar' post, mUst be in the hands. of expert advisers, He cannot be another Hitler—an exrt in all departments of war or peace, whose jolee"—as It has been well described by Sir Nevile Henderson—is more powerful than the force of gravity. Sir John, Simon's reminder of the united responsibility of the War Cabinet was therefore timely. Though there may be many who think that a man of seventy-one is too old to bear the tremendous responsibility of conducting a war against an admittedly feffcient, and quite ruthless, enemy, it would be unfair to attribute to him alone errors of Judgment—it they were errors—made by com-Parative juniors. There seems, therefore, to be something artificial in the personal agitation against "Mr. Chamberlain and his senior col-Jeagues..In the long run "it's steady as does it." No one should confuse the old ndage that. man is as old as his arteries" with the truism that "a prime minister is as old os his youngest adviser."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.