The Archive · 1939

The Suggested Alliance

IMPARTIAL NOT

It was only to be expected that the Japanese Cabinet would split over any question involving a broad tripartite military alliance with Germany, and Italy as a totalitarian answer to the proposed democratic united front. The signing of anti-Comintern Pacts s one thing, the definite commitment to go to the assistance of two European Powers in e event of war, two Powers who ha nothing in common with Japan except their dislike of Communism, is something entire! different. At the most all that Japan appears to have contemplated has been that la the event of Germany warring with Soviet Japan might attack the latter in Rus: Siberia, the understanding also being tha: should Japan and Russia be involved, Ger-ould go to Japanese assistance by ching Russia on her western frontier.

how that would be done without into with the security and integrity of d it is not easy to perceive, but joint inst the Sovi always been contemplated under the anti-Comintern Pact, oven if there has been no really definite military commitment. Generally speaking opinion in Japan may be divided into three. There are sections of the Army which favour: uch an alliance as a means of furthering r own grandiose schemes. The Navy is not so keen as it might mean that Japan would be required to send her navy to Europe in the event of a European war, aprently without guarantees of compensation.

he third view is that in any such arrang ment Germany would be seeking more than she was willing to give. The slow progress made in Germano-Japanese trade negotia-lions is because their actual needs are in direct conflict with each other, both desiring foreign exchange, and both finding it difficult, it not impossible to accommodate each other n the matter. There is also the fact that Japan has not yet cleared up the "Chi incident" and until this is done, she will nardly be in a position to render that military aid against Russia which might be-some so necessary if she were to play her part in favour of the Rome-Berlin axis in ihe event of a European war.

There are amongst the leaders in Japan men who believe that the best means for 1 satisfactory escape for Japan from her present difficulties would be found by cooperation with at Britain, and the United States, even though at the moment there is nothing to suggest that such coj"peration is possible. If alliance party has been defeated, as one report suggests, it is in all probability due to the fact that, whatever the Army might think about t, Japan is in no position to assume the heavy commitments which such an alliance would entail, while further caution is inspi ed by the realization that Japan would be asked to join in a gamble the is of which would be by no means sure. The view that Japan in her present position could not afford nsi on which undoubtedly weighs heavily with those opposed to the proposal. The impression to be gained from the reports which have come to hand is that there is a substantial following of that school of thought which would prefer Japan to remain in the market for the best offer available. Great Britain and the United States have much more to offer Japan than either of the dictator The rapidl: increasing need for fir one of the major factors in the situation. It is likely in the long run to prove the most decisive, and it is becoming clearer daily that the accumulation of bargaining points in China has been effected for the purpose of having something with which to go to Britain and the United States in the hope of securing that financial assistance without which any profit from the expensive Chinese venture must be indefinitely delayed. The proposal to enter into this alliance with Ge many and Italy is just such another. It is of by itself a very potent one; nor are the othe! if they are also thrown in, for if in the event of a European war Japan did decide to throw her lot in with Germany, and Italy the economic effect of her action upon herself might very well prove disastrous. It would involve a very substantial reduction in her overseas trade, which is already suffering heavily from the China Incident, and in certain eventualities might bring about something almost equivalent to total extinction.

From a military point of view, it has to be admitted that such an alliance would embarrass the western democracies, but it has to be remembered that the strength of the Japanese navy lies very much in where it happens to be situated. In its own waters where an enemy would have to travel far to find it, the Japanese navy is unquestionably strong, but the further it goes afield the weaker it becomes, and while for a time it might be able to raid Anglo-French shipping, etc. as a weapon for the destruction of those nations' fleets it has quite seriously to be discounted. In the event of a universal conflagration the only really safe place for the Japanese navy would be within its own waters, and there it would be able to play no very important part in any solutions which might be reached in Europe. There is the further possibility to be considered, that in the event of the British scheme for securing a Four Power mutual defence arrangement succeeding, the inclusion of Russia would also necessitate the retention of a substantial portion of the Japanese fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is true that the present strength of the Russian naval forces in this part of the world is not very imposing. Nevertheless the need for Japan to maintain her lines of communication open with the mainland would oblige her to keep considerable strength in these waters. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the advantages to the Rome-Berlin-

Tokyo axis deriving from such an alliance as that proposed are more fancied than real, y, and t the contribution which she would be able to give to the cause of her European allies in the event of war would involve action closer at home than some of the supporters of the scheme appear to think. Such an could without a doubt cause the democracies some inconvenience but there n to believe that it would make in the European situ Further in the event of the axis being and this is by no means improbable, Japan as also her allies would have to face the ultimate settlement. She very 5 obviously cannot afford to be on he losing

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