The progress made by the Britith column driving from Italian Somaliland towards, Berar on the Djibouti. Addis Abdba railway has been swift and signiücant. There seems to be little resistance in this sector, primarily because the llalians had prepared their main defences facing north, and not south, and obviously did not expect to have the Fish entering by their back door, If the British manage {o cut the Tallway, the Italian position in the capital of Abyssinia will obviously become untenable, and it is, therefore. probable that increased resistance will be offered in this particular area. It is hardly likely that the Italians will regard the loss of their Abyssinian empire as a crippling blow. That N will be a severe reverse and Will cause a serious loss of prestige can be taken for granted, however. But the focal point of the campaign now being waged by General Wavels forces, with the assistance of the Abyssinian patriots, is clearly in Eritrea. In this felony, which is he centre of Italian adminis. iration of the whole area, the defences have been built up with the old.style colonial war-{are in mind. In this type of war a position like that now being held by the Italians at Keren might well prove decisive; on paper it should still prove enough o hold up any invading force from the Sudan. The British, however, are not fighting the old.style colonial war. They "have adopted the latest tactics of mechanized forces to he problem they'have to solve, and it is, therefore, likely that Keren will be isolated and left to be captured when it is convenient. After all, the importance of Keren lies in the fact that, in the old-style warfare, it Was a formidable barrier to the approaches to Asmara. It it is ignored—or isolated—and Brit. ish forces press on towards Asrara in total disregard of it, Xen it ceases {o have anything. but the: -st minor impórtance in the general carpa 2. Keren becomes merely a local operation, ur! can be undertaken when time permits. AЁ me moment strong pressure is being exeried by the British on Italian pos-Besslons in Exct Abrjca both from the east and from the west, while a successful revolt of tribesmen is being skilfully directed by British officers and N.C.O/s. The Italians thus have a dut io deal with, while e lime having to fight an enemy who is not standing by the usual rules of warfare and by means of well organized mechanical transport, prefers encirclement tactics to frontal attack. By this means the British are reducing the Italian prepared positions to almost corplete useléesness. In fact, these positions have been turned into a kind of trap, since small mobile unite can outflank them and out off their garrisons from any sort of supplies. And in this territory, to be cut off from supplies is fatal. AW Italian lines of communications in East Africa are now being threatened. if they have mot already been taken. By the of Moadisbu, the communications from the Indis Ocean have been; severed—though they were never very important after the British Succeeded in establishing corhplete control of the Eastern Mediterranean. With British forces within forty and sixty miles of Asmara and Massowa respectively, ahd rapidly approaching Њe Djibouti railway, the Italians are hemmed all sides. They have no hope of obtain. ing reinforcements or additional supplies, and it, therefore, seems only a matter of time—aha not very much time, at that—before they "Will be forced to capitulate.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.