After 1935, however, conditions began to improve noticeably, but the assignments of the Second Five-year Plan as regards the reconditioning of the permanent way were not fulfilled. At the end of 1937 the length of the operated track increased by only 3.8 per cent, as compared with 1932. Only towards the end of the second planned quinquennium did the rate Of increase in transport material (namely, tractive power and freight capacity) begin to exceed the demands of goods traffic.
But it is noteworthy that in spite of the deficient material basis the quantity of goods transported exceeded the original plan. This is certainly indicative of improved organization; but it also furnishes Proof that the Soviet railway system has to work under heavy strain, Very great improvements will be needed to put the Soviet transport system on a really sound footing, the more so as goods turnover is rising fast and military requirements are not easily calculable. Particularly questionable is the "export capacity" of the Soviet transport system, for Russian communications have been developed in the interests of the dó- mes tie economy.
In conclusion, the opinion may be hazarded that these short-term weaknesses of the Soviet economy may easily be exaggerated, since it is fashionable among the Bolshevik leaders to delight in ventilating their various difficulties (perhaps as a kind of psychological compensation for the colourless political unanimity). On the other hand, there can be no doubt that since these disabilities cannot be repaired in the short run they present substantial impediments in the way both of internal economic activity and of export capacity.
it is hoped that this survey will help the reader to arrive at a correct appraisal of Russia's economic strength.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.