The Archive · 1940

Economic Myths

Byen before the launching of the Soviet Russian attack on Finland, which must have its feonsequences in regard to supplies, considerable doubt was cast on the extent of Russian material assistance to Germany following {he conclusion of the Russo-German agreement. Examination of the possibilities of help from other sources, such as Manchoukuo, has also. [induced an altitude of extreme scepticism re-[garding the magnitude of the economic. ally which Germany has acquired. Professor Bruce Hopper, of Harvard University, in the winter isle of "Foreign Affairs," says quite frankly that the expectations freely publicized by Germany are largely mythical and are based on hopes, not on facts. Excluding Russian. [shipments of manganese ore, which could bel increased, Professor Hopper observes that there fare no great surpluses of anything in Russia despite her vast resources. Domestic require ments of all have arnest overtaken production [capacity and foodstuffs rank Ju the same category. Even if these resources were easily avail-fable, the greatest weakness in the plan is transport facilities. As very little can be transported Cittwesr $48 Pen ANNUM, $1 PER COPY by water owing to the British blockade, tremendous strain would be thrown on the railway systems of Germany and Russia and quantities of rolling stock vastly execedingg the present Joint resources would be required to transport the products needed to fill German requirements. For instance, to transport. 8,000,000 tons of all a year from' the Caucasus to Germany would require 95,000 tank ears, which Is. twice as many as Russia possesses. Extending the transport problem to the Far East, haul' from 'Manchoukuo to Germany, 2,800,000 tons of soya beans, needed to replace the 47,000 tons of vegetable olls imported in 1997, would require 328 trains, containing 16,250 freight cars constantly under' land not mentioning. the re turn journey over a distance of 4,300 miles. Transportation of manganese. ore would be more feasible as it could be done with only 3,000 freight cars. Any effort on an individual product might be parily carried out but. the Simultaneous transport of these three commodi-ina quantity suMeient to meet German needs is a task far beyond the practical capacity of the Soviet railway system, A Plausible Tale 'The theory held by some French observers that Germany with these repeated menaces 0 the Lowlands' borders is playing the game "Wolf, wolt!" appears tohave some foundation, If story of the latest menace to the Netherlands and, Belgium came to be known, is true, The account fag it appeared yesterday. morning was (0 the feftect that a German officer, entrusted with the Nazi plans for the proposed onslaught, Ina flurry to rejoin his newly-married wife, took fan aeroplane to go on his mission instead. of travelling by rail. The pilot made 9 navigational mistake, and was obliged to. make a forced landing' in Belgium' where his "passenger" was captured with the plans intact upon his person, The Belgian authorities were quickly able. to ascertain that the troop movements with which the plans were concerned were actually takin place. "Hone the alarm, It reads just a little oe plausible, and if the whole affair was not designed to plant these plans on the Belgian authorities. it. looks remarkably like. it. thought that by continually. raising alarms of this sort, which turn out to have been unjustifed by eventual facts, it ts hoped to Wear onl the vigilance of the' Lowlands' government JAt the best it is a very poor hope for, s0 lon fas the very existence of those nations' depends Upon their readiness and ability to offer. re: sistance to a threatened invasion, they. must accept every such alarm.as being the real thing, land not be led into the mistake described the Zsopian fable, Tt is now, as it has always been, part of Herr Hitler's war of nerves to keep neighbouring countries continually on the qui vive, permitting of no relaxation but maintaining continual strain under which it hoped either Governments or nations will sak. At the same time the threatened countries dre obliged to meet the heavy costs of coninual mobilization, and, while It may not. result in their bending to the pressure Herr Hitler is exerting on them, the whole process has an Jannoyance value which cannot be ignored. One fof these days an alarm will not prove to. bea false one, but the Hollanders and the Belgians [will be ready to face it, Tension Relaxed Though it is reported that tension in Bel and the Netherlands has relaxed somewhat, there Is still the danger of the German. threat to those two countries being changed Into aetion. "For that reason it is reported that the precautions which have already been taken will be continued. Neither of the two threatened countries have gone so far as to declare a general mobilization, but what they have done fg only one step short of such a development, To effect the last stage would now be only a matter of a few hours, and to. all intents and "purposes the Lowlands are ina complete state of defence, Despite German protestations denying any contemplated attack on those tivo countries, Government circles in Brussels state they had reason over the week= fend to expect "grave events." That reason to be found in the generat tone of the German press and the disposition of forces. along the borders of Holland and Belgium, It is sul to be feared that the German forces will continue to remain close to the threatened borders, and it is thought that when vigilance in the Lowlands has somewhat relaxed they will attack with lightning speed. There is, however, very little kelihood that there will be any diminution of the effleieney with which the two countries will watch over the territorial integrity, and {ttle doubt that both Holland and Belgium will be able to hold off German attacks until. the Allies can go to their aid. The defences which those two countries possess have been prepared embodying all the lessons learned as the result of the last war, and with present-day preparcdess there Is very little chance of the German armies securing "any advantage from surprise Such as they did when they invaded Belgium twenty-five years ago. The history of the past four months "has shown that the Blitzkrieg theory can only succeed against poorly-equipped or unprepared nations, and" even though Herr Hitler may decide to try and force the issue he will meet with a resistance which may bring about his defeat. The decision as to when actual fighting will break out is left entirely to him, though it nay be confidently expected that thotigh hie may decide when it will commence, the Allies will In their turn decide for him when it shall be ended.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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