By Ouaven Srewanr First-line strength is the strength that can, be put into battle at any -moment, It is reached by adding up all the aircraft in the operational squadrons which have their crews and equipment, and stand ready to go into the air. But that does not. mean that all the aircraft in the operational squadrons must bbe included. There are also the immediate reserves. They are aircraft which are also yeady'in all respects, but which are not used by the squadrons except as replacements for! aircraft lost in action or by accidents. Between these immediate reserves and the stored reserves the division is a little blurred.
But, generally speaking, one may say that] the' stored reserves consist of complete aircraft on which a certain amount of work would have to be done to fit them to take the air. The work might be nothing more than fitting two or three instruments, but it serves to give some sort of dividing line between immediate and stored reserves. So the operational side of the air force there are these three divisions. But that does not mean that they include all the aircraft in the force. There are also the enormous numbers of training aeroplanes.
People have said that it is a mistake to talk about first-line strength because it is not a true measure of an air force, but per~ sonally I know of no better measure. It is the strength which can go into battle at any given moment, and that is surely the thing] that matters, "But it will be clear from what] have said that first-line strength, when cor-voetly understood, must be a very' small pro= portion of the total strength, including training alreratt, of an alr force, And that, 1 think, is how we get these big discrepancies the estimates made by different observers, he person who says that Germany's ait strength "is 9,000 aeroplanes is obviously. thinking of first-line strength in the narrowest interpretation, whereas the one who says it is 60,000 machines is obviously thinking of total strength. The sort of proportions T would expect would be a total of 30,000 aeroplanes for a first-line strength of about 5,000. For as about 90 or 40 men are needed on the ground for every one in the air, so 8 good many training and reserve machines are needed for every one first-line machine.
And now for a guess at German air strength. 1 would not like to try to give a precise figure; but I would say that the total 4s below 35,000, and that the first-line strength, slightly above 6,000. T think it doubtful if the German first-line strength is above 6,000. One will appreciate that I am basing. my guess_on very incomplete information. I am going on the strength the Germans deployed in August and September and before that in France. And I am assuming that some German units are held always somewhere within easy reach of the Russian frontier.
There is, of course, always the possibility that the Germans have been holding large] forces back; but that possibility is now re~ mote. When the German air force was being] shot out of the sky in mid-August and mid~ September, it would have called up all the machines it could lay hands on. And in fact the use of some partly obsolete types indicated that the Germans were nearly fully extended during these two months, Since then the German air force has been able to repair its losses and then build up {ts.air force to a greater strength than before. The economical tactics the Germans have been employing in their attacks on this country during the past few months are an indication that big efforts to build up are joing on behind the scenes. They have been hoarding their machines, sending them over sonly when they are fairly certain they will nct be intercepted by our fighters. Tf German first-line air strength was 5,000 in August it is likely to be rather more than that by April But the strength of the Royal Air Force sis also increasing rapidly. The Royal Air Force was not eaten into so seriously during those critical months of August and September as was-the German air force. It was able 4g, make good its losses from its reserves all the time. Neither in men nor in machines did it dwindle, though its rate of growth was obviously retarded, But the essential point Yemains true and it is the point that must be Kept in mind when considering numerical strength, Tt is the shape of the two curves showing the strength increase of the German alr force and of the Royal Air Force.
Some time before the war began, in the greatest secrecy, the German air force was being built up.' The curve showing its in~ Bee exactly when the huge enemy produc crease cannot be yet drawn, for we do not
ion programme swung towards its peak... But we do know it must have been a rapidly "Avising curve. We also know that at this time the Royal Air Force increase rate was comparatively slow. The curve was going up, Dut only on a gentle slope. We were merely going through the preliminary stages of vast reduction., We were planning rather than producing. Germany had planned and was different. " Germany's production curve nearing: its peak. She can still squeeze more aircraft out of her factories every month; she can still build more factories—and is doing so. But the limit is within sight.
With us the production curve is sweeping] up. It is nowhere near its peak. Indeed, if you take in United States production we still cannot see where that peak will come. Our: delay in getting under way is in one way to our advantage now. Like the athlete in the race we hold something in reserve with which we can put forth a further supreme effort, whereas the enemy has already put forth nearly all his strength.
At was, of course, a frightful gamble. In August and September his air force was much stronger than ours. If we had-not held him then all our production -planning would have been useless and he would have overrun us. The same still is true. We must hold the enemy while the factories work up to full pressure here and in the Dominions and in the United States. And although we are a little better off for holding the enemy in the alr today than last summer, the improvement is less marked than might appear at first sight for we have further commit ments. We have to reinforce our air force in the Middle East and also in Greece. We have to increase the strength of the Fleet Air Arm. We have to augment the Coastal Command in order to allow it to deal with submarines and surface raiders. We have to! consider our air strength in the Far East.
I cannot even make general statements about our present air force strength. But 1 can say that we began the war with a first~ line strength of about 3,000 aeroplanes and that our big production programme is now getting into its stride, T can also say that} inthe matter of trained aircraft crews we are in an even more favourable position than' {in the matter of aircraft, The Empire training scheme is one of those examples of forward planning which are as rare as they are valuable, We can man all the aircraft that can be produced for us. Germany's immense man-power cannot go farther than fours in the provision of properly-trained pilots and aircraft crews. We call on the men of the Dominions who, in this war as in the war of 1914-18, prove themselves 1o be exceptionally well adapted to air warfare. They have a sort of genius for it which, I imagine, is something to do with their me dividualist tendencies.
On the numerical side, then, our position is improving. We are still weaker than the enemy in numbers; but we are gaining on him, and we may expect our rate of gain to increase more and more rapidly with every week that passes. In technical merit we! started with marked superiority and we still hold that, superiority.
Tam not going to predict what the tech~ nical position will be next year. Germany has Kept her new types very secret. But there is this to be remembered, that technical advances cannot be readily imitated even when the details are known.
I always remember the late Sir Henry] Royce telling a lot of newspaper men all the secrets of the racing Rolls-Royce engine just before the last Schneider Trophy race. Air 'Ministry officials were horrified because they feared the Italians would learn these secrets; but when this point was put to Royce he said that even if the Italians knew every' detail of the engine, it would take them three years to build one—and the race was to be flown the next week." That was a good point. We shall see in 1941 the fruits of research and development work that has been going on for a long time. Our engineers and designers have proved themselves once and we rely upon them to prove themselves again.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.