Aprit 4.
'The figures which Mr. H. Dalton, Minister! of Economic Warfare, gave in the 'House of Commons on Tuesday off the imports' into unoccupied France, of which the Axis Powers are alleged to be receiving the' greater part, clearly indicate the correctness of the British position with regard to the blockade. As much. og half of these imports, and in some cases even more, is being turned over to Germany and Italy,, the former receiving the lion's share, It'was stated that during December and January no less than half a million tons of cargo, mostly foodstuffs entered the port of Marseilles indicating that if this is allowed to continue approximately six. million tons would enter unoccupied France in the course of a full year. 'That represents a very serious oak in the blockade, and, if the British seek to stop it, they will be' well within their rights, The fact of the matter is that, while Vichy is making a great outery, asking Britain for supplies of food, these imports passing through Marseilles are largely devoted to the purposes of the enemy.
'Apart from the fact that the Vichy Government is completely under the influence of the Germans, there is also to be taken into consideration' the enmity for Great Britain which Admiral Darlan has evinced. He may be more honest in his political concepts than but the fact does remain that his April 5.
While the British evacuation of Benghazi will have come as something of a surprise to most observers there is nothing about it which need be regarded as particularly alarming at the present moment. Following its fall it was believed that General Sir Archibald Wavell_ would venture on. into Tripolitania and destroy the remnants of Marshal Graziani's armies. But that expectation was not fulfilled, and for reasons which were made plain only a few days ago. After the British entry into Benghazi and the Dushing of light outposts further south, it will be remembered that General Wavell was able to detach a considerable proportion of his forces, and transport them a thousand miles across the Sudan to participate in the general onslaught upon the Italians in north~ east Africa, Since then large numbers of British troops have been sent to Greece, variously estimated by the enemy at from 70,000 to 200,000. These two transferences were made possible by the almost complete destruction of the Italian army in Libya, and it would be more than a little surprising if General Wavell had kept in Libya much more than a mere holding force.
In the meantime the Germans, in what. strength it is not at present known, have managed to get troops and material across the Mediterranean, for the purpose of stiffen~ ing the remainder of the Italian army, and it is more than likely that the light British forces holding Libya have for the moment again been faced with superiority in numbers it was when Marshal Graziani made his original attempt to invade Egypt. Should this indeed prove to be the case, it will be no cause for surprise if General Wavell decides (o withdraw even further before the German advance, for the more he falls back upon his original bases the stronger. must he become, and the weaker the enemy. Should he in fact do so, he will simply be choosing his own ground where he will fight,—namely the desert, warfare in which is so eminently his specialty. It remains to be seen whether the German mechanized troops will prove any better adapted for that form of fighting than were the Italians, though there is every reason to believe that the German mechanized units are much superior to those which the Italians used in Libya.
Tt has been stated that the number of Germans in northern Africa has not been ascer-
Hesility to the former lly of his country is such that he would go considerable lengths to prevent Ser winning the war, even though that would undoubtedly mean' the ultimate ruination of France, and her final and complete subjection to German domination. Much has been said of the permission given by Great Britain for the passage of two ship-' Toads of foodstuffs to unoccupied France. It tained. That numbers of them succeeded in crossing the Mediterranean is largely due to the difficulty of keeping a blockade of the 'Libyan and Tripolitanian coast,—which can' Quickly be reached across the narrowest part that sea,—by means of a navy based either on Alexandria or Gibraltar. The possibility of the enemy being able to keep up a steady trickle of reinforcements between Sicily and northern Africa cannot be disregarded, but the recent heavy defeat of the Italian Meet, and the substantial reduction in the number Of effective. vessels, should permit of the British navy keeping a much closer eye on that coast than at any time since hostilities first commenced. It is doubtful in the extreme whether the combined German and Italian -forees will ever again reach the numbers which Marshal Graziani originally hhad.at his disposal, for the naval situation in the Mediterranean has undergone a profound change since the time when he was pleading for those reinforcements which Mussolini either couldn't oF would not send What the Germans are bent on doing is to prevent as far as possible Great Britain send ing substantial forces into the Balkans, but whether they will succeed or not stil remains to be seen. It may be taken for certain that General Wavell who is now choosing his own battleground, will retake the initiative when it suils him as he did in the case of Marshal Graziani, and there need be no occasion for surprise if he falls back further than he has already done: As it has been pointed out, in desert" warfare it is the loss of men, and materials which matter rather than the loss of local territory, and it may easily prove to be the case that the Battle will swing backwards and forwards in northern Africa before a final decision is reached.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.