Probably the most intriguing puzzle which the Sphinx in the Kremlin has given political commentators to solve is the ban announced on Tuesday forbidding the passage of war materials in transit through the Soviet Union. Munitions, aircraft parts and accessories, machine tools for making munitions, explosives and poisons come under the decree, while transit of other goods will be allowed, but only under special authorization, or by reason of trade agreements. Speculation as to what this latest move really means is all the more complicated by the apparent conflict of possible reasons for it. If some of its implications are apparently anti-Axis it is also a fact that other nations who may not have any enthusiasm for either Germany or Italy are also involved. If it is correct that this ban will prevent the passage of war materials across Russia between Germany and Japan, it is also true that the same thing applies to the Swedish supplies to Turkey, while Iran and Afghanistan will also be cut off from the potential armaments resources of Germany, Japan and Sweden.
In the case of Turkey there must be ron-siderable astonishment that M. Stalin should have made such a move. Turkey has declared herself to be ready to defend herself against aggression. She has a very definite understanding with Soviet Russia, and the fact that this ban may deprive her of the additional material resources which might become necessary to her if she is obliged to resist German aggression, suggests prima facie that this! move is designed to assi: Hitler in whatever designs he may have in his mind against the Turks. If that is indeed the case then M, Stalin has made a treacherous move which may operate ultimately to his disadvantage. A Turkey overrun by the Germans would mean that the latter would be facing the Russians on a front stretching from the Baltic to the Caucasus with tne consequent threat to the very rich oilfields situated there. It seems inconceivable that M. Stalin would make any move creating any such likelihood, but that is the situation Which would be created if Turkey were to fall under the German yoke.
London observers, however, take a somewhat different view of the matter describing the ban as the neatest trick that M. Stalin has pulled for some time. It is believed that Germany has made at least informal remonstronees to Moscow following last week's announcement that the Russians had agreed to the transit of armaments from Sweden to Turkey. It is suggested that M, Stalin not only complied with Germany's views but went the whole distance of prohibiting the transit of all munitions, thereby striking a heavier blow to the German-Japan trade than io anything else. That particular phase of the traffic in war materials is certainly more imposing and more important to those two countries than could be the Swedish supplies to Turkey. There is nothing inherently improbable in such a story, and if it is true, suggests that M. Stalin is not without a degree of sardonic humour. Instead of a particularized neutrality which was apparently desired by Germany M. Stalin has gone the whole hog, and the results are likely to be embarrassing to Hitler.
The importance of the German remonstronees on the subject lies in the fact that there are indications that, now the Greek campaign has for the time being been brought to a close, increased pressure is to be brought upon Turkey to enter the Axis fold. Ribbentrap and von Papen have all along been working bard to bring about such a development, but up to the present the Turkish Government has resisted their blandishments, It is possible, now that the Germans have secured control over the Balkans, that Hitler will adopt a sterner attitude, and demand that Turkey shall toe the line. Only the future can tell exactly what the Turkish attitude will be, for, though its Government and Press have declared that they would resist aggression, the results of the Greek campaign may very well tend to modify that determination. There is, therefore, just a possibility that M, Stalin is acting in Germany's behalf in cutting off from Turkey a source of supply which might prove valuable, should she be forced to engage in hostilities with the Germans, War Sidelights The papers which are now arriving from Home are full of interesting and significant sidelights on heppenings in Europe. most of which agree with the judgment which has already been arrived at in this part of the world that nothing the Nazi promises or aims at can be relied upon. There is no trick too low for the Nazis to stoop to play. For example it was learned shortly after the British Minister to Rumania was forced to withdraw, that the Nazis, under the guise of giving him a special train in which to make his departure, had given him a-very special one indeed. This train had been fitted up with microphones and recorders, which meant that all the conversation between the British diplomats on the train was put on record for the Nazis to go. through at. leisure. It was fortunate for the British mission concerned, that they woke up to this fact early in the journey. The discovery was made by accident, but has -resulted in zn order being issued that, in future, when Rritish missions are required to evacuate the countries to which they are accredited, strict silence, or the most fulsome conversation, are to be the rule. Another interesting sidelight on the state of Italian moral is contained in a news despatch by mail from England, which tells of the story how an Italian officer who was captured in the British drive on Libya asked a British officer to deliver a postcard to the Italian's brother, who was the manager of an hotel in Addis Ababa, since this personal delivery was the "quickest postal route" the Italian officer knew. He apparently believed that the British would be in the Abyssinian capital long before any ordinary mail organization could deliver the postcard. As it turned out, he was right, The British, though not that individual officer, were in Addis Ababa long before any ordinary mails could have reached that city. At no time do the Italians who were captured in Libya seem to have had any faith in the ability of their government to stop the British drive either there or in further East Africa, And this, it should be remembered, occurred in spite of the fact that the British could only use two divisions, or thirty thousand men, at any one time, against a force which numbered over two hundred and fifty thousand Italians. It seems to have been the fate of the British army and air force in this war up to now to meet greatly superior enemy forces. Against the Italians, they have been uniformly successful. Against the Germans, they have been forced to retreat after inflicting the heaviest possible losses on their foe. In the air the RAF. have always given a good account of themselves. They have invariably inflicted such losses upon the enemy that the latter have had to withhold the maximum action of which they might otherwise have been capable. The results of these various actions, though they have up to the present been unfavourable to the British arms, have legitimately led to the question what would happen when the British and the Germans meet on equal terms. If the British can hold the Germans even when they are outnumbered and out equipped in the way they have been, what will happen when, as will shortly be the case, the British can meet their enemies on equal terms, or even possess a slight superiority in armaments? With the assistance of America, the time will not be far distant when this equality or superiority will be attained. That is the moment to which the Germans can look forward. It has been shown that they can do no more than dent the British front when they are greatly superior. What will they be able todo when the British front is as strong, if not stronger, than their own?
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.