Though in the past what appears to be too much prominence has been given to the writings of Signor Gayda in the "Giornale d'Italia," his latest article, written at a time when it appears likely that Great Britain and Russia will eventually agree upon a pact for mutual defence, has rather more than usual significance. Not because it is entirely possible to agree with all he says, but because there are some points with which democracies and dictatorships can find some common ground. Thus it is true, as he says, that two blocs have been formed in Europe, though there will always be a difference of opinion as to whether both of them can be described as defensive.
That quality is claimed for the anti-aggression scheme initiated by Mr. Chamberlain in an endeavour to resort to some modified scheme for collective security. It is not at present possible to give the same qualification to the German-Italian combination, because of the conduct, and speeches of the respective rulers which have consist tently envisaged war as a means of satisfying their desires, and though they may euphemistically describe their intentions as seeking to secure peace for the world, it has always to be remembered that it will be the type of peace in which they shall have gained everything they want, no matter how much or how little their claims may be justified. It is true to say that the Old Continent has arrived at the crossroads again. They are the same old crossroads at which it arrived in 1914; the line-up is. practically the same, and there is comparatively very little difference in the issues involved, nor in the manner in which they are being approached. Indeed, when the history of the years immediately preceding the Great War is recalled, the fear that Germany would be the aggressor, and the eventual justification of that fear, the parallel is so striking as to give cause for much of that uneasiness which is being displayed. The question, therefore, is not that which Signor Gayda poses,—'whether the imperialistic democracies will plunge blindly into war or adopt a new policy, at once more cautious and more generous,"—but whether the dictatorships will agree to endeavour to adjust grievances by negotiation against which the democracies have never closed the door.
Signor Gayda is entitled to his own opinion when he states that the German-Italian bloc is superior to that of the "Versailles encirclement powers," whether there are many more, outside those who wish to believe so, who are of the same thinking may be a subject for much sceptical speculation, but when he follows up that expression of belief with the assurance that Germany and Italy have no intention of taking the initiative in a resort to force for the solution of pending questions, he is giving an assurance which, if, in the light of all that has passed, it could be believed would set at rest, once and for all, those prevailing anxieties concerning the possibility of an outbreak of war. Unfortunately itis not, and cannot be believed. Much has happened since Prince Bulow, the German Chancellor, visiting England in 1899 wrote:
"The English politicians......do not know much more about conditions on the Continent than we (Germans) know about Peru or Siam .. There is something naive in their unconscious egotism, but they have also a certain credulity. They are not prone to suspect really evil intentions; they are... rather indolent and very optimistic."
Signor Gayda seems to share that belief in British naivete, which was further ebphasized in a letter written by the Counseller of the German Embassy in London, and afterwards Ambassador in Washington to the German Chancellor, suggesting an arbitration treaty with England:—
"Such treaties are quite harmless and de facto of no importance. At the same time it is surprising to note the extent to which, in political matters our practical Englishmen, ere dominated by phrases. If we were to agree to an arbitration treaty a very large number of people in England would believe that the Germans had put off their desire for conquest and had become peaceable individuals. In consequence we could build a few more battleships, especially if they were not given too much publicity."
Written some years ago, they nevertheless still represent an opinion commonly held of British naivete, and when it is remembered that Herr Hitler in his "Mein Kampf" wrote "Germany must be a World Power, or nothing," it is quite apparent that the desire for conquest mentioned in the above quotation still animates the policies of Germany, and by proper inference those of the rulers of Italy.
British credulity has disappeared before the ruthlessness of the past two years. It was slow in going, but has now been completely destroyed, and no amount of assurance will now remove the suspicion which has become engrained in Britain, France, and most of the other countries of the world that if they consider it necessary in the furtherance of their policies, Germany and Itcly would resort to war, so long as their leaders thought there was anything like a probability of their being able to emerge victorious from it. There is every justification for Great Britain, France, Russia and those other countries which have reason to anticipate aggression, for believing that failure. on their part to make concessions under the menace of German and Italian armaments may induce the dictatorships to seek to impose their will upon them by force. If there were no such justification, there would also be none for the enormous sums of money which are being spent to ward off a menace, which if Signor Gayda is to be believed; never in fact existed. He is not believed? Rather it is anticipated that if the dictatorships find themselves unable by present menaces to achieve their desired ends they will resort to war. Hence the preparation of the anti-aggression scheme, and the endeavour to effect a complete understanding with Russia for a tri-partite system for mutual defence against that offence which is most certainly to be expected. The democracies of the world, as also the "practical Englishmen" can no longer afford to be dominated by phrases. It has been borne in upon them that some agreements and pacts are worth but a moment's purchase, and. that assurances may be nothing but the smoke screens with which to hide malign! intentions. This does not obscure the fact that injustices should be remedied. There are very few indeed who would have the hardihood to deny that contention, but there is nothing to show that in the case of both Italy and Germany the appetite would not grow with eating, if it were found that mere threats could wring concessions from the democracies. The real fact is that by their behaviour the dictatorships have created such a general atmosphere of suspicion as to their motives and good will, that the only possible method of procedure must be one based upon the belief that the less there is of indulgence in trust, the safer will the world at large be.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.