There is no doubt that at the time the President's speech at Crarloltesville was in tune with feeling throughout the country. When it became obvious that the German army was directly menacing Paris, opinion moved vapidly from its over-optimistic assumption that the Allies would win anyway to something approaching panic that a German vic~ tory in Europe might menace America. It became a question of vital self-interest to the United States to see that the danger to America was kept at n distance. Editorial writers and columnists at last realized to the full that the French army and the British fleet were not only the first line of America's Atlantic defences, but the only line, It would take several years for a second Amerlcan fleet to be constructed to guard the At-antic (the main fleet, stationed at Hawai guarded the Pacific). It would take at least one year for America's land armaments and coastal defences to be augmented sufficiently to meet any kind of invasion from enemy outposts established in Latin America or the Caribbean, "It was, therefore, as the President said, an obvious policy to bolster Anglo-French resistance to the utmost extent possible as a measure of American self defence, A change, however, took place when French resistance crumbled.
Many leading pro-Allied newspapers which had been adopting a strong Allied policy, such as the Washington "Post," the Philadelphia "Inquirer" and the St. Louis "Post-Despateh changed the emphasis of their remarks. The United States, they maintained, in its efforts to encourage British resistance must not make the mistake of misleading the British Government on the extent of the aid which might be expected. Said the Washington "Post," editorially, after giving a list of the military supplies which the United States had readily sold Great Britain, "The British People must not be misled, however, into' assuming from this that the United States is likely to enter the war. The resolve of the American people to avoid participation this struggle is exceedingly strong. Even if it wore less s0, the self-imposed task of defending all the Western Hemisphere necessitate a cautious policy with re Involvement in the European conflict.
Congressional isolationists once again raised their' voices in condemnation of the President for encouraging France and England to chal-Tenge Germany by making disguised promises which he was constitutionally unable to fulfil, Senator Nye declared in the Senate on June 21, "The military leaders of France and England knew, as everyone else knew, that the Germans were superior to them in planes tanks, and they would never have risked war, humiliating though a Polish diplomatic defeat would have been, if they had had no offset for the German superiority. They got what they thought would prove in time such an offset—American support... Our Presid= ent on his own responsibility by private as~ surances may have encouraged a rear and friendly Power to ruin... Will it now become our policy to encourage England and cause her to believe that we shall rally for her what we could not and did not rally for France"
While the reaction caused by the collapse of France checked the trend towards active non-belligerency, public opinion did not swing right back to isolation. Aid for the Allics—though there only appeared to be one Ally left—continucd to be the policy of the Administration and continued to receive the support of majority of Congress. The re~! sults of the Republican Convention at Phila~ adelphia clearly showed that the country ne Jonger believed in the old-style isolationist doctrine. An effort to include an outright Ssolationist plank in the party platform failed, while the candidate chosen, Mr. Wendell Willkie, had always been associated with a policy of aiding the Allies short of war. While the Republican Convention was_ still taking place, Senator Pittman, Chairman of the Foreign' Relations Committee, made press statement in which he declared that th further defence of England was hopeless and that the British fleet should be brought across the Atlantic to defend the Western Heini. sphere in conjunction with the United States med forees. The defeatist attitude gradually changed as Germany showed no signs of Jaunching. an immediate invasion and as the situation in the Mediterranean remained comparatively stable, The successful British efforts to take over the French navy also led to increased optimism over Britain's chances, for it, meant that she would continue to control the seas.
German domination of France brought the Nazi menace much nearer to the United States. France possessed colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Even if these were not handed over to Germany, they might, while retaining the form of French sovereignty. in actual fact be used as centres of German influence in the Western Hemisphere. Before the collapse of France, Congress had passed a resolution declaring that the United States would not recognize any transfer of territory. tu the Western Hemisphere from one non-
American Power to another non-American Power. This was a restatement of the Monroe Doctrine, followed by successive Ad-declared that if any transfer of territory appeared likely, the United States would consult with the other American Republics to determine what steps should be taken.
This was a restatement of various resolu-ions passed at Pan-American Conferences held during the Roosevelt regime. Fortified by Congressional approval, the Secretary of State instructed his Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin on June 17 to communicate to the German and Italian Foreign Offices as follows:—""The Government of the United States feels it desirable in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding to inform Your Ex-cliency that in accordance with its traditional policy relating to the Western Hemisphere, the United States would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American Power to another non-American Power.
On July 1, Joachim von Ribbentrop sent a reply so truculently worded that the State Department only issued a summary of its main points. It amounted to a refusal of Germany-to accept the American contention. The State Department summarized the German attitude as follows:—"The interpreta~ tion of the Monroe Doctrine implicit in the communication of the Government of the United States would amount to conferring upon some European countries the right to possess territories in the Western Hemisphere and not other European countries. He states that it is obvious that such an interpretation would be untenable. The non-intervention the affairs of the American Continent by Earopean nations which is demanded by the Monroe Doctrine can in principle be legally valid only on condition that the American nations for their part do not interfere in the affairs of the European Continent."
The Scerctary of State made no reply directly to the German Foreign Office, instead he issued a press statement reaffirm~ ing the American point of view. He pointed onl that the Monroe Doctrine had nothing to do with the possession of {erritories in the Western Hemisphere by some Powers and not others. That was the situation which existed afore the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed. "The Doctrine did not undertake to interfere with the existing situation, but did announce that further incursions would not be tolerat~ ed." The Secretary also pointed out the while the United States had refrained from interfering in the purely political affairs of Europe, it believed in ce-operation economic, commercial, and social matters with all nations, "wherever the policies of such, nations make it possible and whenever it believes that such efforts are practicable and in its own best interests'
It so happened that on the very day the Secretary of State made public the German note and his answer, President Roosevelt on week-end vacation at Hyde Park issued a statement condemning any attempt at com= promise with the corporate state. People should not be so impressed by dictatorial efficiency as to despair in demeraey, he Political considerations must have been responsible for a remarkable statement made to the press at Hyde Park by Mr, Stephen Early, the President's secretary. He came downstairs after his usual morning talk with the President and outlined a plan for dividing the world into three regional spheres. In the Western Hemisphere the twentieth cen= tury version of the Monroe Doctrine already provided a basis for such a regional understanding. The President was said to feel that just as the American Republics should decide what was to happen in the Western Hemisphere without outside interference, so. should the nations of Asia decide what was to happen in their continent and the nations of Europe what was to happen in theirs.
hould a victorious Germany lay claim to territories of conquered nations in thi hemisphere," said Mr. Early, "we hold tha the issue comes within the province of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States docs not take over the islands or territorial pos~ sessions of the conquered nations, but it be~ leves and holds the position that their dis position and administration should be decided bby all the American Republics."
This outline of American foreign policy taken at its face value amounted to a sur~ reversal of American policy in the past. It appeared to be a declaration that Japan could do what she liked in Asia and Germany do what she liked in Europe so for as the United States was concerned, provided that in return those two countries did not interfere in the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Early tried {0 soften the implication of his remarks by declaring that the United States would like to see the countries of Europe and the countries of Asia treating each other with the same respect as was shown by the Pan American countries. Even this, however, did not mean that the United States would take any steps to bring about conditions which it felt desirable, except in the New World.
The three regions policy was one which the {isolationists could readily accept. Even a convinced isolationist believed in the Monroe Deetrine. What he objected to was the Ad~
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.