The agitation which has been proceeding in France in favour of a more energetic prosecu~ tion of the war has resulted in the resignation of M. Daladier, who recognized that the vote of confidence which was passed by the Chamber of Deputies was not fully representative of that assembly owing to the fact that more members abstained from voting than actually took part in the division. Thus, though the Chamber passed the vote of confidence, the figures indicated that M. Daladier could not count upon the support of the majority of members, and, in the circumstances, he took the only course possible by resigning together with the rest of his Cabinet. The development need cause no anxiety whatever, for it in no way indicates any weakening on the part of France of its intention to fight this war out to the bitter end. Indeed it may in some respects prove of decided benefit, as enabling whoever follows M. Daladier to form a more compact ministry composed of men eager to instill more vigour into the conduct of the war. At the same time there is every prospect that this sudden development in France may have repercussions in Great Britain, as strengthening the hands of that section of the politicians at Westminster who are also of the opinion that more energy is required in conducting hostilities, and if during the Easter holidays Mr. Chamberlain is found to make changes in his own Cabinet to meet this demand, no great amount of surprise need be felt. That is not to suggest for one moment that either Mr. Chamberlain, or who succeeds M. Daladier in France will immediately go the whole hog in changing Allied tactics, for obviously the assumption of the initiative in this war is attended with grave risks which it would be rash indeed for any statesman to ignore. In this connection it is not to be expected that the Allies will seek to force a decision on the Western Front, for to do so would prove a most expensive business, as has been clearly demonstrated in the Russian onslaughts on the Mannerheim Line in Finland.
A great deal has been made of comment in neutral countries to the effect that this is a "phone" war. The very evident desire of some neutrals to see more action is all of a piece with that former attitude which bitterly condemned Mr. Chamberlain when he negotiated the Munich pact, and yet did not fail to do the same thing when circumstances forced him to declare war. Now they want to see action, and it may be remarked without any undue cynicism that the enthusiastic manner in which some neutrals would conduct the Allied campaign is in direct proportion to the strength of their desires to keep out of the struggle themselves. As Mr. Oliver Stanley, Secretary for War, has rightly said, the language is culled from the ringside where people after a good dinner watched men hit each other, without danger to themselves, and urged the contestants on to greater efforts. Mr. Stanley makes out a good case for caution in approaching the question of using greater energy in the prosecution of this war, when he points out that while half military history is full of battles lost through lack of enterprise, the other half is full of battles lost through lack of patience. The tempo of this war was set when Mr. Chamberlain warned the Empire to prepare for a long war. It is controlled now by the speed with which Great Britain can mass and train her armies, and to throw caution to the winds and embark upon a course of action which would necessitate the utilization of the whole of the Allied strength, when that has not yet been fully developed, would in the circumstances merely invite disaster. It would undoubtedly be playing into the hands of the enemy who would be more than pleased to see the Allies commence to hammer the Siegfried Line: That those defences can be breached is accepted by practically all experts, as is also the belief that the doing of it would indeed prove costly. There are, however, other directions in which greater energy can be displayed and it is chiefly towards these that the supporters of the view which is rapidly gaining ground are looking.
The very successful bombing raid on Sylt is but one example of what is in mind, There is undoubtedly an important school of thought which will criticize the government because of the fact that it was not until the Germans staged their raid on Scapa Flow, that the British air force was sent against perfectly proper military objectives. The bombing of this important air base, they contend, should have been undertaken weeks ago, especially as it was the place from which raids on the British coast were sent out.
There is much to support their view The scattering of leaflets over Germany by the Allied air forces is all very well so far as it goes, but the novelty of that procedure has already disappeared. The necessity for more positive methods has been indicated, and the vote in the Chamber of Deputies clearly demonstrates that in France that opinion i very strongly held. The formation of a new French Ministry pledged to carry out the wishes of French representatives should inevitably mean something in the nature of parallel action in Great Britain. The community of purpose of the two nations, the excellent understanding which prevails between the two governments, and the determination of the two peoples to stand shoulder to shoulder in this struggle, all demand that common decisions shall be reached as to the manner in which this war is to be conducted in the future. If it is the French wish that hostilities should be prosecuted with greater activity; that is a point of view which the British Government will have to take into consideration. Obviously the war cannot be allowed to remain static as it is at present. At the same time it still seems to be the wiser course to play a waiting game until Herr Hitler's desperation forces him to throw over the restraint which his generals have up to the present been able to impose on him, permitting in the interval the Allied economic blockade to get on in its deadly work. The need, therefore, for a sudden development of activity on the part of the Allies does not appear to have been completely made out, though as the months pass it becomes increasingly clear that action will eventually have to be taken.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.
