The worldwide reaction to M. Molotov's speech before the Supreme Council of the Soviet last Friday, is of the greatest possible importance, for the attention which is being paid to what he said completely surpasses any that has been given to Herr Hitler's lucubrations since the outbreak of war. The interest it has created may be due to a number of causes. Obviously the first is that Soviet Russia, having brought its Finnish adventure to an end at no small cost to itself, has reaped the immediate advantages of the Soviet-German agreement of August last, and has reassumed its position of neutrality; the second is that M. Molotov's speech reveals the fact that the German attempt to bring about a closer tripartite understanding between Italy, Russia and Germany. has completely failed, and the third that the Hitlerian project for the carving up of the Balkans into three spheres of influence by those three Powers has met with the same fate. German diplomacy has failed to achieve one of Herr Hitler's major ambitions, and in failing has suffered a defeat of the first magnitude. All this need not necessarily mean that Moscow will definitely retreat from the position it adopted when it entered into the august pact with Berlin, but in the words of the Italian journal "La Stampa" "Stalin has recovered his neutral position as soon as it was possible, and is now waiting for the progressive efforts of the belligerents to offer him the most favourable chance to realize the imperialist intentions and programmes of old Russia and to try eventually to introduce Bolshevism to Europe and Asia." In other words M. Stalin has retraced his steps, having obtained all he wants at present in the Baltic, and has taken up a position from which he expects to be able to snatch any profit from the further progress of the war between the Allies and Germany. It is a purely opportunist policy on the part of the Soviet leader, and augurs no better for Germany than it may for the Allies. The latter need have no very great concern as to the next steps the Soviet may take, for it is obvious that they have already made their dispositions to meet any threat Russia may offer irrespective of where it may be presented.
This adoption of opportunist neutrality is all of a piece with the whole of the Soviet policy. The resistance of the Finns put an end to the Soviet's idea that by fishing quietly in troubled waters it could hope to enrich itself with spoils at little cost to itself, and the knowledge that the Allies are better prepared to offer a successful resistance to any Soviet schemes than was gallant Finland should have the effect of restraining M. Stalin's appetite. The Allies are in a position to offer a check to any schemes which Russia may have in the Balkans or the Near or Middle East, and with the support which is already in being for Turkey it can be confidently expected that M. Stalin will be obliged to wait until more propitious times come round—if ever they do,—before embarking upon any further schemes for territorial aggrandisement, or for the expansion of the Bolshevik revolution. The whole situation adds point to the comment which was made in this column a few days ago relative to the necessity of having a strong Japan in the Far East. The arrangements which the Allies have made in the Near East, together with a strong Japan in Asia are the best guarantees for the future inaction of the Soviet Government. The Allies"are not to be expected to attack Russia. No war with that country will happen unless she takes the offensive, but the Allies will never lose sight of the fact that the ambitions which Bolshevik Russia holds just as much as it did in imperial days may sooner or later lead to a clash.
The situation thus created by M. Molotov's speech necessitates a review of the whole position. it is clear that Herr Hitler can no longer hold up Soviet Russia as a bogey with which to frighten the Allies. It is even clearer that the Kremlin is not prepared to throw itself into Germany's arms, while whatever assistance Germany hopes to obtain from Russia will undoubtedly have to be paid for and that handsomely. It is extremely doubtful whether Germany will be able to obtain much from her neighbour. Russia is barely supplying enough raw materials and foodstuffs to meet her own internal needs, and the possibility of expanding her resources is not only a question of finance but very much so of time, and while Germany may have all the time she wants, she has not got the money. An endeavour to surmount this difficulty by the barter system is not likely to prove satisfactory because of the fact that Russia is unable quickly to absorb the products of German heavy industry at a rate sufficiently fast to make any such system workable. These facts, and the Soviets retreat to its former position must be disquieting factors for Herr Hitler. It is plain evidence of the failure of his policy in this respect. To have succeeded in uniting Italy, Russia and Germany into a formidable anti-democratic bloc would indeed have been an extraordinary feat. The dice, however, were loaded against Berlin, for the most difficult part of the task was to persuade Signor Mussolini of the wisdom of any such combination. That Herr Hitler for his own purposes could throw over the whole of his own doctrines in return for an understanding, with the Soviet Government was one thing, that Signor Mussolini should do the same because it was necessary to Herr Hitler was an entirely different one. It was for that reason that the loudly advertised meeting of the two dictators in the Brenner Pass came to a fruitless conclusion. There is also the possibility that there would have been: failure on the Russian side as well, for M. Molotov has made it quite clear that the Soviet desires to keep out of the war, while there was the danger that, had Herr Hitler succeeded in bringing into being the tripartite understanding, Russia would inevitably have been dragged into hostilities, and such hostilities which would have been very uncomfortable for her. The destruction which the Allies are capable of inflicting upon her, the possibility of a long unfruitful war disturbing the internal security of Russia are factors which M. Stalin was unlikely to ignore, and the whole episode is a clear indication of how circumstances are now commencing to operate against the fortunes of the Reich.
A Regrettable Step The news that Mr. Ranald G. McDonald has ledded to stand as a candidate for election to ihe Shanghai Municipal Council was not unexpected, though it is nevertheless greatly to be regretted. Mr. McDonald offered himself for the suffrages of the British voters in the straw Vote conducted by the British election committee, and he was not successful. Since then he has been endeavouring to extract information concerning the straw vote, which it was not in the general interest of the British community should be made public, and he was not given it. That Mr. McDonald as a ratepayer has every legal right to offer himself for election in the manner he has there cannot be the slightest possible doubt, but there is very considerable question whether he has adopted tHe most honourable course in doing what he has done. It will be remembered that as the means of avoiding split votes the scheme was adopted some years ago whereby the British and American communities each selected their cand-dates by means of straw votes, the underlying principle being that those who stood in the straw votes would abide by the decision of the voters and refrain from offering themselves as candidates in the municipal election itself if they had not been successful. That understanding has been faithfully observed ever since the system was introduced. It was perfectly well known throughout the whole of Shanghai, and it was believed that when he offered himself as a candidate in the straw vote Mr. McDonald accepted that position, That he had not comes very much as a painful surprise. It is true that no formal undertaking in writing had been required of the candidates in the straw vote, probably because it was felt that there was no real need to reduce a gentleman's agreement to the formality of a written document. Mr. McDonald, it is understood, considers that he has some grievances against the election committee because they did not publish all he sent them concerning his qualifications, and further that by some mishap his name was incorrectly spelled. With regard to the first he received just as much publicity as the rest of the candidates, and it may as well be pointed out that the capabilities of Mr. McDonald are so widely known that he could suffer no disadvantage at not being given greater space in the straw vote literature than he received. The second point is just as trivial, for the British voters were perfectly certain as to his identity by reason of the description of his qualifications which was published. If it is because of these ug matters that Mr. McDonald considers himself justified in endeavouring at this juncture to throw a monkey wrench into the electoral machinery, it is as well that he should know that there are not many who will agree with bim, for it is apparent that this attempt to bring about a split in the British vote at a time such as this is a direct blow against British -interests. Voters will best show their indignation at Mr. McDonald's most unfortunate action by taking care that he shall receive none of their votes, and making sure that their suffrages are cast only for the official British and American candidates, for apart from other considerations it must be quite obvious that a man, taking such an injudicious action in the light of prevailing circumstances, is not one to whom the representation of British, or for that matter any other interests on the Municipal Council should be granted.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.