Steps towards aiding the Allies by material assistance short of war preceded the public announcement of that policy from the White House by several days. The Navy Department with White House approval arranged for the delivery of 50 first line scout bombers to the Curtiss-Wright factory at Buffalo. The planes were. to be traded in for new ones and immediately sold to the Allies and. reshipped to Europe. After the President had confirmed the adoption of this policy, another 50 naval planes, about 100 army attack planes, and several thousand French "75's were ear-marked for trading in and re—Shipment Then, on June 10, came the President's Charlottesville speech in which he declared, "we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation." He called for, "full speed ahead" in this programme. The following day the Senate approved of a bill making the legal position of the trade-in policy unassailable (by an amendment to the Army Expansion Bil). The Allied purchasing commission went ahead buying up 600,000 British Enfield rifles from American old war stocks, about 800 75's and stocks of machine guns, mortars and ammunition.
On June 15 the President reaffirmed the policy of full material aid in a cable to Premier Reynaud of France. In answer to the French leader's appeal for "clouds of aeroplanes" the President said, "This Government, so long as the Allied nations continue to resist, will redouble its efforts" This would mean "materials and supplies in ever increasing quantities and kinds." This state-2 marked the high point of American I-the-Allies policy (before August 1). In carrying it out the President had followed public opinion. It might even be said that he had been pushed forward by public opinion. Several newspapers carried out a campaign accusing the Administration of "blindness in not seeing the change which had over the attitude of the American pub-
The retreat from the aid-the-Allies policy)began on June 19 when Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs, denounced the projected sale of a score or more naval torpedo and submarine chas-f to the American youth who ing motor boats to the British as "a grievous may be called upon to fight for the defence of our country." On June 24 the President j the Navy Department's release to British Government of those boats after "word from the Attorney General that transaction would be contrary to an old Jaw passed in 1917. A subsequent law permitted the Navy to change its designs and modify its contracts, but in the existing state of opinion a decision to continue with the re-sale might have strengthened the Yhand of the isolationists. Congress itself was evidently a little uncertain of the egal position, so wrote into the Naval Appropriations Bill a paragraph stating, "No vessels, ships or boats, now in the United States Navy or being built therefor, shall be posed of by sale or otherwise or be chartered or scrapped without the consent of Congress." Thus at the beginning of the month Congress passed legislation to remove doubts as to the legality of sale of guns and Planes to the Allies and at the end of the month passed legislation to remove doubt as to the illegality, of the sale of naval vessels.
"There was probably another reason which influenced the Administration's action: The Democratic National Convention had been arranged for July 24 and it was felt desirable in view of the strong candidate, Mr. Wendell Willkie, chosen by the Republicans, to present a united party front. If a policy of tiding the Allies had been pushed too far, the isolationists in the Democratic Party, who were individually more powerful than the isolationists in the Republican Party, might have forced a debate on the floor which would have created a bad impression on the listening radio public. They might also have instigated a revolt against a third term. To keep them quiet, therefore, the President began to lay emphasis on the United States' determination to stay out of war. He included a pledge (end of July) that no American army would be sent abroad in a defence message asking for additional appropriations and his leaders at the Democratic Convention permitted the isolationists to draft the foreign policy plank of the party programme very much in their own words. Once the immediate objective of keeping the isolationists quiet at the Chicago Convention had been accomplished, however, the President corrected the impression that he had completely abandoned his former stand by emphasizing in his speech accepting the third term draft that his policy was still one of no compromise with dictators. But sales of surplus war Stocks were not resumed and many comment tators continued to write as though the United States were conferring a priceless boon by supplies to Great Britain if she paid cash down for there and took them away in her own ships. They assumed that this was what the President had meant when he promised full material aid.
The Pan: American Conference which opened at Havana during the closing days of July was another product of the defeatist spirit with which the United States looked upon the European situation at the beginning of July. It was called to study the future of the colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere which belong to France, Holland and England. If there were no German victory, there would be no problem in connection with these European colonies, but if there were a German victory, then their future became a matter of considerable importance. [America now has bases. En.] If they passed into German hands as part of the spoils of war, they would provide bases from which attacks could be made on the United States, or, if that danger were held to be remote, they would at least be bases from which totalitarian propaganda could be directed against the American continents. The United States had already told both Germany and Italy that any transfer of the territory would be contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, but it was felt desirable to" secure the approval of other American republics to any step which was necessary to carry out this policy. 3 After some objection from the Argentine, Mr. Hull was able to secure the approval of ihe conference to a document known as "The Act of Havana," which stated that in an emergency any country acting alone or in conjunction with others could take immediate steps and afterwards present the situation to a Pan-American body for approval This body was known as the Inter-American Commission of Territorial Administration. It was to act as the guardian of the orphan colonies until such time as they could be returned to their former owners or become capable of governing themselves.
While the Havana Conference was taking place, American opinion had begun: to change once more. The possibilities of Great Britain holding out against any German invasion were felt to be brighter and the problem of increasing American aid became once more widely discussed in the press. The independent American Commission known as the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies kept plugging away at the fact that the British fleet stood between Hitler and the United States. When it was realized that no American Atlantic Fleet could be constructed before 1946, the Comriittee argued, everyone must see the importance of preserve ing the British fleet as an American defensive outpost as long as possible. This appeal to realism carried far more weight than a dozen pleas from British speakers based on such idealist grounds as that help should be given to those upholding the principles of Democracy and the rights of small nations. es The British fleet in defending the Atlantic was in a state of war with the Powers which threatened the American Atlantic coast. The American fleet in defending the Pacific was still at peace with Japan and the Administration was forced to follow a delicate balance ing act in order both to remain at peace and keep the Japanese sufficiently uncertain to prevent them harming American Far Eastern interests too seriously or. thrusting down t" the Philippines or the Netherlands East Indies, thus cutting off the chief sources of American rubber, tin, quinine and other products. The Japanese have been growing increasingly truculent towards the Western Powers, feeling that England was fully occupied with the war and that the United States' determination to stay out of war was so strong that despite the President's declaration that there could be no compromise or appeasement, it would never take any action requiring the use of force. The United States objected strongly to Britain closing the Burma road, thus cutting off the main channel through which China received her war supplies. As advocates of a stronger Far Eastern policy were quick to point out, the United States could counteract this step by cutting off her own shipments of war materials to Japan. When the 1911 treaty was denounced, it was felt that some step in this direction would be taken, but the Administration considered that the threat of action had just as great an effect as would the action itself. Under the new defence legislation, however, the Administration was given powers to license and embargo commodities which were felt essential for defence purposes.
On July 24 scrap iron and aeroplane gasolene became subject to export licence restrictions. The press assumed that this step had been taken in order to cut off supplies to Japan and also to reinforce the British blockade of Germany and Italy. The headlines spoke.of the "proposed embargo." Angry protests were reported from Japan and the Administration hastily corrected the news-Paper assumption by declaring that a licence system did not imply an embargo. A week later an embargo was imposed on aeroplane gasolene but, in order to be thoroughly neu-ital and to avoid any legal grounds for Japanese protests, or threats of retaliation against American supplies of rubber and tin, the embargo was applied to all countries outside the Western Hemisphere.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.