The manner in which the struggle in Flanders is fluctuating is to be seen from the fact that, though over the week-end the Allies appeared to have improved their position somewhat, the capture of Boulogne by the enemy clearly indicates that much will have to be done before the situation can be considered stabilized. Thus, though the Allies have reduced the width of the corridor along which General von Reichenau's army was able to proceed to the Channel coast and northwards to Boulogne, and now have it under artillery control, the situation will not improve until it is finally closed and this particular section of the German forces surrounded, and destroyed. Towards this end the French have been strongly attacking north of the Somme while it is apparent that in addition to forcing his way to Boulogne the German commander has been endeavouring to turn the Allied position in the Bapaume-Cambrai sector with the design of wiping out that salient and thereby stopping the Allied attempts to force their way southwards and effect a junction with the French forces who are struggling towards them. The course of the next few days will show whether they are able to do that, and the reports which have come to hand clearly demonstrate that the enemy is meeting with a stern resistance which is helping to turn the time factor more favourably towards the Allies. The capture of the Channel ports, serious as it is, is not and will not be disastrous unless the Allies in Flanders collapse. There is nothing to indicate any such likelihood and until the Germans can obtain access to the ports by more satisfactory routes than that along the northern bank of the Somme they will not be able to make use of the ports as bases for the onslaught upon Great Britain. The invasion of that country has for centuries been the dream of continental enemies of the British. Phillip of Spain had the idea during the reign of Queen Elizabeth. It was for years the obsession of Napoleon, and is the present craze of Herr Hitler. William the Conqueror was able to do it, but it must be remembered that King Harold was preoccupied in the north of England at the time and it was only by forced marches that he was able to reach Hastings before the Norman invaders had penetrated further inland. In the case of Napoleon it was British sea power which made him continually postpone the intended invasion, and finally robbed him of any chance of success in this direction.
The situation is very different from what it was in those days, but it is generally conceded that, unless Herr Hitler can obtain command of the sea, and the air, the chances of his being able to land and maintain sufficiently large forces in Britain are not very great. It would be necessary for him to free a large section of the English Channel from any danger of Allied attack by sea and air, and before he will be able, to secure that he will have to deal with the combined sea and air forces of the Allies who may be counted upon to place all manner of obstacles in his way. At the same time it is reported that the enemy also contemplates a second invasion using the Norwegian ports as basi The distances he would have to send his troops across the North Sea and the command which the Allied fleets have over those waters suggests, if anything, that difficult as the Channel passage would undoubtedly be, that from Norway would be even more so. Consequently the massing of transports at Norwegian ports may not mean much for the present, and may turn out to be for the purpose of bringing back some of the German forces in Norway as it was hinted some few days ago the German command was contemplating. Reverting to the plan to invade Britain from the French Channel ports the scheme is not so simple as some of the German enthusiasts would appear to believe. Even if the enemy succeeded in wipe ing out the Allied forces in Flanders, they would still have along their flank the substantial forces which already are on the line from the Channel in the west to Sedan in the east. The Germans would not only have to secure themselves from offensives from that line, but would find themselves at all times harassed by Allied air attacks at the ports which they would have captured, and which would necessarily be concentration points for the forces destined for Britain. They would thus be considerably exposed to Allied action which could be safely relied upon to inflict the greatest amount of damage possible.
The latest reports from Britain indicate that the Government is by no means minimizing the possibility of this threat of invasion. The appointment of Sir Edmund Ironside to head the Home Forces will be heartily welcomed as involving the right man being put in the right place. There are large numbers of men available for the defence of Great Britain, a substantial air defence and sufficiently large numbers of aircraft to give the German invaders an exceptionally rough time, and it is considered doubtful whether the Germans could land enough men at any one time to be able to withstand the terrific attacks which would be made upon them by all arms. Any such landing would need to be supported by naval as well as aircraft. Of the former the Germans have been largely deprived by the successes of the Allied navies which have greatly reduced the German effective strength on sea, and while some support could be given from the air the ability of the Allied air forces to hamper it considerably must always be taken into consideration. Furthermore the South Coast is of such configuration that the landing places for which the German invaders would be likely to make are quite clearly indicated, so that any element of surprise would not be so important as it might be were geographical conditions different. It is not quite apropos to endeavour to draw any parallel with the Allied venture at Galli poli during the last war, for conditions are so very different, but one lesson learned then was that even with the support of a powerful fleet,—for which the air-arm is not in every way the perfect substitute,—progress after landing was not only difficult but costly, and that in face of an enemy which was so well equipped to offer the excellent resistance it did, as the British would be on this occasion. All this has been written not for the purpose of showing that a German invasion of Britain is impossible, but to indicate that it is surrounded by difficulties which it might take the Germans considerable time and great effort to overcome. Herr Hitler will endeavour to embark upon it as soon as he may be able to consolidate his position in the French Channel ports. He has not even done that now, and the present battle has not yet decided that he shall. But his overwhelming desire to strike a blow at Britain may tempt him to embark upon another of his wild gambles. They have been rather more successful than is comfortable at the present time, but it is only gambling with the possibility of the luck turning against him at any moment. The elimination of the Allied forces in Flanders, even if he is able to achieve that, would not mean any great simplification of the task, except to make the ports easier of access, and it is because of all these reasons that it is contended that the loss of this present battle by the Allies does not mean their ultimate defeat, though should Herr Hitler lose this first throw his prospects of final victory will be slim in the extreme.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.