The new Japanese Cabinet, as was ex pected it would be, isin fact. indicative {Of the assumption of complete control of the Government by. the Army and Navy, with the former predominant." At any rate for the time being civilian influence has become overshadowed by' the services, the extrem= {sig'of whom are now seated armiy'in the saddle. "As a result, loser relationship_ with ihe Axis fs to be expected, and very probably overt action by the Japanese for the furthertance of their' expansionist. policy. It can Safely "be said that the appointment of this ministry under' General. "Tejo contri-Butes, Very "definitely tothe worsening of the'situation in the Pacife, and, though It suggested that "Mr. Wakasugl, Japanese Ambassador at Large, has informed. Mr. Cordell Hunt that conversations for a. solu: tion of 'American-Japanese differences can bbe continued, there is no reason whatever 10 believe, that they will be any more success~ fal under the 'Pojo Cabinet than they were when Prince' Konoye was in power, 'Oh: Viousty: ifthe latter' was' unable to' make the "concessions "with "regard to the "Axis policy, which were necessary if the conversations were to bear any fruit, it is not {o'be expected that General Tejo will do's0, 'The reaction to the Cabinet change in both Great Butain and the United States is important. In the first place' this develop ment was not unexpected. The Konoye Government "from. the very outset Was more. than a. compromise, and an un~ popular one at that. Tt could' have come. to Ro agreement with the United States with fny certainty that it would be able to tala Whatever commitments were made, and was always the possibility that if "American Japanese relations had Been bettered some [succeeding Japanese' Cabinet, "would have {orn the. whole structure' down. Prince Konoye hai in fact nothing of permanence fo"olfer "the "Government of the United States, and the fear of the Japanese oxfremisis that he might have "compromised Japan by some temporary arrangement doubtedly ied to the downfall of his short-lived Government. "in both Britain, and the United 'States the fact that the new Cabinet ies dificult times for"the future has met. with the expected calmness, and the general' demand that the situation' shall met with firmness. and" determination. Neither of the democracies want war the Pacific, and will do nothing {0 spur Japan in that digestion, But, t€ the new ade ministration deetdes upon such action as will take war inevitable, the situation wil be thet and faced, 'The Japanese Government have three courses "of action open' to them. One the abandonment of the "Axis and the establishment of Better" relations with America and ultimately with Britain, That appears. by this latest change to have been thrown overboard. "The other two involve action against Siberia on the one hand, and "southward, expansion "on the. other: Both of them. have their" attractive. points Japanese eyes. Capture of the Siberian Maritime Province would remove the' con~ tinual aeroplane threat to Japan's industrial centres, and with her, backdoor thus' profected "a Japanese venture. southward could be undertaken with less sk than exists at the present moment. Whether Japan will move in the north first remains io be seen, but, geographically speaking, it is the most logical course fo take. It would seem, however, that with winter so near the Japanese nay' prefer: to postpone action inthe north Until next spring, or early summer. There is, of course, no certainty that the Japanese would prevail against the Russian 'Siberian mies." What happened. at Changkuofens and Nomonhan in recent years suggests that the Japanese would have all their work cut out Yo" secure a decision, and the Japane may "defer making any' move until" their forees. in" Manchoukuo have been greatly strengthened.
What would be the British and American attitude im the event of Japanese aggression nairist Siberia has not yet been made clear has been argued that the two democracies should make common cause with the Soviet for the purpose of guaranteeing' its eastern Possessions, and there is much to justify the Contention.' On the other hand there is no Goubt as to what. will happen should "the Japanese Cabinet decide to start immediate= iytabout_ prosecuting its southern expansion Policy., Such a_move will be. resisted, and {hat Well inevitably' mean war. it is quite clear "from the expressions in. the press. the two democracies. and the statements of their leading. statesmen that' the, policy appeasing "Japan "hae been velinqulahed, ere Will Be no repetition of what occurred wilh regard Yo Indo-China, and what Japan might have been able to do' with comparative immunity a Year or so ago cannot now be dine "eithoud meeting "the alemest possible resistance. It is to be hoped that even at {itis late hour counsels of prudence. will pre= vail at Tokyo, though the tone of the Japanese press, and the vulterances of some of the Government 'oMcials give no "promise that that hope' will be ful fled, but rather the contrary.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.