March 18, Probably nothing was better calculated to arouse public opinion in Great Britain, and France than this Intest German adventure into Czechoslovakia, In Britain those who favoured Mr, Chamberlain's policy of Peasement, if not wholeheartedly at least as an experiment which might have been productive of success, and consequently well worth the while, have been rudely awakened to the grim realities of the situation. They realize that they have been deluded with false hopes, and their aggravation over that fact 5s. emphasized by the ability of those, favouring the more direct tactics of Mr. Anthony Eden and Mr. A. Duff-Cooper, to say "We told you so." There will also be the gravest possible dismay at the most striking evidence Produced since the conclusion of the Great War that international morality has been reduced to such an extent that it may be said no longer to exist, at least in some quarters. There are already suggestions that Mr, Neville Chamberlain may be shortly obliged to resign. It will be a pity if indeed that comes about, for whatever may be thought of his general policy, there cannot be the slightest doubt that his handling of the situation last September undoubtedly saved Europe from war, and that despite the contentions of those who believed that Germany was only bluffing, and that in the ultimate resort Herr Hitler would have held his hand. There is not the slightest avai able evidence to support that view. It is merely an opinion, held by a very large proportion of Britons, it is true, but still only a belief to act upon which at'such a juncture might have been productive of the gravest results. On the other hand his policy of appeasement has failed, failed so completely that there appears to be no real chance of its ever being resuscitated so long as the heads of aggressor nations follow the policies they' have outlined for themselves. It has failed' as completely vis-A-vis of Italy as it has of Germany. Since the conclusion of the J.1sjlo-Italian Pact the only gestures in support of. Mr. Chamberlain that Signor Mussolini has made were the token withdrawal of number of Italian troops from Spain: and temporary reduction of the Italian forces in Libya.
Germainy has contributed nothing towards that success of which Mr. Chamberlain was]
30 earnestly in search. Indeed by his latest action he has defeated him, and to a considerable extent discredited him in the eyes! of even his keenest supporters. It is clea therefore, that to cling tenaciously to a policy which the two Dictators by their actions, or support of each other's manoeuvres, have shown cannot possibly succeed would not be 'a mere imprudence, but, in the circum~ stances, a piece of egregious folly for which there could not be the shadow of an excuse. One of the greatest needs which Great Britain feels at the moment is for a government inspired by the doctrine of the completest realism, animated with a determination to deal with the situation as it is, and not as they would like it to be, and to make every preparation to meet any emergency which may be thrust upon it, It has been made perfectly plain that assurances are no longer worth the breath they are uttered in, nor pacts the] Paper upon which they are written. It is even clearer that the only diplomatic weapon left in the world, with comparatively few exceptions, is armed might, and if unhappily' that view has to be accepted, then the sooner' the British Cabinet is reconstructed to include those men, who have consistently re~ fused to be misled in the way Mr. Chamberlain has been, the better for the perpttuation of a peace which can now only be maintained by force. The fact has to be faced that the two totalitarian states in question have thrown aside the masks of racism, and the protection of minorities, and have revealed in all their nakedness the policies of] imperialistic extension completely regardless; of the principles to which they have been giving such glib lip-service. That is a fact which the remaining democracies of the! world, as well as Soviet Russia, have got to face, The issue is raised in terms which' permit of no misinterpretation; the only' wight is to be that of might, and there is. not a few of the smaller countries who may very soon be convinced of it.
The question must naturally arise as to how. far Mr. Chamberlain can adjust himself to the changed situation which has thus been brought about. He has shown during the past few months a firmness which has been altogether admirable, and it is possible that! he could still continue to lead a Cabinet including those other statesmen with whom was not formerly in complete agreement. Throughout his career Mr. Chamberlain has never shown any signs of an inflexible obstinacy, and it is even now possible since the impossibility of his ever achieving success: along the lines of general appeasement, that his ripeness of vision, and maturity of judgment might act as a very necessary brake! upon the activities of those younger men,_ who, while their inclusion in the Cabinet is: necessary for the purposes of bringing about complete national union in view of this latest menace, have been shown by their speeches: to be somewhat rasher than has the Prime Minister. The advent to power of such men as Mr. Winston Churchill, Mfr, Anthony Eden, and Mr. Duff-Cooper, without the restraining hand of such a personality as Mr. Chamber-Jain might not prove an unmixed blessing, and what is obviously necessary at the present moment is a well-balanced Cabinet in which the impetuosities of some of its members would be offset by the maturity of men such as he. Another argument supporting this contention is that it is undesirable at! such a juncture completely to swap horses. The construction of a Coalition Government might very well prove a task of considerable magnitude, for there are so many divergent ambitions to be satisfied. They might, at any rate for the time being be submerged in view of the threat to the democracies which these developments in Europe envisage. It is very probable they would be, but such a Government led by Mi. Chamberlain should commend itself to the country whole, while at the same time modifying the threat which the Dictators profess to see in the possibility of a return to office of such men as those named above.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.