The Prime Minister added that owing to a lack of information last Wednesday, he was obliged to con to an over-restrained Hon on. what, at the time I felt, 1 could make but ttle commentary, and, perhaps na~ turally, that somewhat cool, objective statement gave rise to misapprehension. Some thought that beat T spoke quietly, 1 did not feel strong. lyon the subject. T hope to correct that mistake tonight Mx. Chamberlain proceeded to deal with the criticism that the occupa tion. of Czechoslovakia was a direct consequence of his visit to Germany Inst autumn and, since the result of these events has been to tear up the Munich settlement, that it proved the whole circumstances of these visits were Wrong.
"It is said," he continued, "that as this was the personal policy of the Prime Minister, the blame for the fate of Czechoslovakia must rest on his shoulders.
Munich Prevented "That is an entirely unwarrantable conclusion. T went there, first and foremost, because, in what appeared to be almost a desperate situation, that seemed to offer the only chance of averting a European war.
"The first and. most immediate object of my visit was achieved. Peace in Europe was saved. If it had not been for these visits, hundreds of thousands of families would today be mourning for the flower of European manhood.
Really, I have no need to defend my visits to Germany, for what was the alternative? Nothing that we, France or Russia could have done could possibly have saved Czechoslovakia from invasion and destruction, Even if we had subsequently kone to war to punish Germany and, afler frightful losses inflicted on all panakers, we had been victorious, we could never have reconstructed Czechoslovakia as it was framed by the Versailles Treaty.
went to Munich to further the policy sometimes called "European appeasement.' If that policy were to succeed, it was essential that no obtain a general domination of Europe, but that each should be content to obtain reasonable facilities for developing ils own resources, securing its own international trade and improving the conditions of its own people. rr Miller's Assurances Mr. Chamberlain then lengthily referred {o Herr Hitler's assurances jin Munich, that the Sudetenlands were his last territorial ambitions in Europe, which he had confirmed in speech in Berlin.
"in view of these mated assur-considered myself justified in founding the hope that once the Czechoslovak question was seitied, as it seemed to be at Munich, it would be possible to carry further the policy of sppeasement.
"Nevertheless, 1 was not prepared to relax precautions until that policy had been established and accepted by others. Therefore, after the Munich conference, our defence programme Was actually accelerated and expanded In order to remedy certain weaknesses which became apparent during. the crisis.
Tam convinced that atter Munich 9 great majority of the British people shared my hope and ardently Gesired that the policy should be carried further. But today T share their disappointment and indignation that those hopes have been so wai tonly shattered.
"How can these events be recon-lied with the assurances I have read to you? Surely, as a joint signatory to the Munich' Agreement, 1 was entitled, If Herr Hitler thought that Ought to be undone, to the consulta tion which is provided for in the: Munich declaration?
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.