In an endeavour not to be unfair to Sir Stafford Cripps, whose interview on the impressions of his trip through Russia, Sinkiang, the unoccupied parts of China to Chungking and thence to Shanghai was published yesterday, it should be pointed out that, after all, they were only impressions uttered on the spur of the moment, and just as spontaneous as the replies of a witness under cross-examination. So much ground was covered in so small a space that his remarks had to a large extent to be epigrammatic, carrying with them all the faults of terseness. Nevertheless, he has made the statements reported, and they have to be considered in the light of all that is known in this part of the world. Despite all the abhorrence which the Left is supposed to have for the application of force in the settlement of international disputes, Sir Stafford expresses every sympathy with the Russians in their desire to establish new frontiers, although he could not agree with the stupid way in which they were attempting to make them. The Soviet, he contended, was concerned with the possibility of Finland being used as a base for some other Power in the event of the European war taking a certain turn. What other? The Allies? Obviously they desire no extension of their fronts other than is forced upon them, and to suggest that they would willingly go to war with Russia for the purpose of defeating Germany is to suggest that they would lightly increase the number of their enemies. It has to be remembered that there was no Allied threat to Russia so long as it kept out of Finland, and that country did not appeal for active assistance, and to suggest that any other explanation could meet the case is to endow the Soviet with a prescience which events in Finland have clearly shown them not to possess. That a rectification of Russo-Finnish frontiers might have formed some protection for Leningrad in the event of hostilities between Russia and Germany is entirely another matter, and if Sir Stafford is seeking to justify the Soviet on the score of fear of Germany, that is entirely different though even here it must be pointed out with all emphasis that at least on the face of things Germany and Russia are at present in the closest bonds of amity. The Soviet in their invasion of Finland embarked upon a programme of grab according to the best Nazi models and there pace Sir Stafford it has to be left.
The distinguished Leftist is on entirely different and even more unsafe ground when he describes the German-Russian alliance as due to the refusal of Great Britain and France to enter into an alliance with the Soviet. The fact of the matter is that the price,—a free hand in dealing with the Baltic States and their practical subjection was one which neither of the Allies were prepared to pay, while the Germans were. It was the price of dishonour, and Germany has paid it. It is scarcely believable that Sir Stafford really contends that the Allies, determined to do their utmost to protect the integrities of the smaller nations, should have sacrificed the Baltic States in seeking to preserve Poland and Czechoslovakia. To endeavour to excuse Russia by stating that in this matter the Soviet had done something stupid, thereby forfeiting a great deal of sympathy in the world, leads nowhere, and to aver that Great Britain and France erred in not purchasing Russian friendship at the price demanded is to progress just as far in the same direction. Russia was in the market to the highest bidder; the ideals for which the Allies stood prevented them from offering the price which Russia wanted. With regard to India, Sir Stafford is delightfully vague. "India," he declares, "is determined to secure independence." It can with truth be said that Britain is anxious to give it to her, but the constitution under independence which the Hindu Congress Party wants and that which the minorities—in gross aggregate superior in numbers to the Hindus desire are entirely different things. Sir Stafford does not say whether he favours acceding to Congress Party demands. It is to be hoped that he does not, for if he does, he either does not fully understand the immense difficulty of the Indian situation, or, for the moment, he was speaking outside his brief. Again the vast coverage of his interview and the almost epigrammatic quality of his replies must be borne in mind when considering all that he has said.
When he comes to China and the enormous questions which have arisen as a result of the Sino-Japanese hostilities he appears to be on no surer ground. After a somewhat comparatively leisurely progress until after leaving Chungking, Sir Stafford has made a stay of one day in Shanghai, and is from all reports not making a much longer one in Japan. With all the ability, and the good intentions in the world, it is suggested that it is not possible to form an unbiassed view of the situation in China based upon so one-sided a tour, and it is obvious that his obiter dicta can only be accepted for what they are worth, based upon so unbalanced an investigation of the situation. That he correctly conveys the optimism held in Chungking cannot for one moment be denied, but whether that optimism can be justified is something which he has had no opportunity of discovering for himself. The interview ends with a gibe at Mr. Chamberlain as neither the right person to conduct the war nor the man to make a right peace. What would Sir Stafford have had? Another Munich after the rape of Poland? Would he have had the disgraceful surrender to Russian demands which he apparently favours as a means of staving off war, and the ignominious yielding to the doctrine of force to which the. party which expelled him was at least opposed? Those are answers which Sir Stafford fails to give plainly in his interview, and in justice to him it is to be hoped he did not intend to infer. Sir Stafford, since his expulsion from the Labour Party, is a lone voice crying in the wilderness, but the question may be asked as to what sort of Government Britain would have had, had Labour regained power under his leadership. It is readily admitted that when the Opposition does secure office its views of responsibility very often change towards the most burning questions for which when in the seats across the House it had every solution pat, but if the views which he expressed on Tuesday represent his profound convictions, and views which he would not hesitate to put into action should he ever secure control of the Government, then the only satisfactory wish that can be expressed for him is that he will enjoy very many more years in which to exercise his profession in which he is undoubtedly so imposing an ornament.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.