The war in Finland having been ended attention is naturally turned to the Balkans, which it has all along been expected would be the scene of the next developments. It was originally thought that Russia would stir up trouble by seeking to wrest Bessarabia from Rumania, but there is every reason to believe that German influence will at any rate for the time being divert Moscow from that intention. Nazi claims that the German position in the Balkans is being consolidated, and that sensational developments may be expected in the course of the next few days, are probably for home consumption, for developments with regard to Rumania have been carefully watched by the Allies for months past and little opportunity for surprise exists. It is quite apparent that Germany desires that Rumania shall not be embarrased in any way by Russian action, for, were Rumania forced to defend herself against Soviet encroachment, it would entail the mobilization of the whole of her natural resources in order to fight the war which would be thrust upon her, with the result that those supplies, upon which the Germans set such great store as aid towards offsetting the Allied blockade, would not be forthcoming. It is consequently not in the interests of the Reich for Russia to stir up trouble with Rumania. For two or three months past King Carol has been indulging in the dangerous game of flirting with der Fuehrer. A closer understanding with Yugoslavia had been attempted by the Rumanian monarch, who appears to have found the price somewhat too high. Any concessions which might be made to Hungary to keep that country satisfied would encourage Bul-gona and Russia to push forward their own demands, and King Carol discovered that, unless he could obtain powerful support, the dismemberment of his kingdom would be almost a foregone conclusion. The Rumanian monarch decided, therefore, to embark upon a policy designed to appease the Reich, hoping for its support and protection against Russia and Rumania's Balkan neighbours. The recent telegrams relating gentler treatment of members of the old, illegal Iron Guard, which King Carol formerly suppressed with downright ruthlessness is by no means new. It commenced over two months ago when King Carol ordered the release of 200 of their members who had been in jail.
Not content with freeing these terrorists in his endeavour to placate Herr Hitler, Carol went to the length of establishing control over the Rumanian oil companies, most of which have been established with foreign capital. The edict which did this has the effect of countering the decisions of the British, Belgian, French, Netherlands' and American companies not to sell their products to Germany, for, without expropriating these companies outright, the Government has been put in a position which enables it to force them to sell to Germany just as much as Germany desires. This edict was quickly followed by another giving the Government control over iron and steel production, including the purchase of scrap iron, the. purpose of such a move being obviously to force the iron companies to sell to Germany. In return for all this King Carol is reported to have received something in the nature of a promise that Germany would respect the Rumanian frontiers and would guarantee them against both Russia and Bulgaria. King Carol is fully aware exactly what such a promise is worth, but in this particular instance he is able to place some reliance upon it, because he has in his power weapons which makes it highly desirable for Herr Hitler to keep his word, at any rate until the end of the war. The control of oil and steel gives the Rumanian Government not only the power to force sales to Germany, but also to hold them up if necessary, and the fact that Rumania has something which Germany wants so badly, and will not get unless the Reich does the most unusual thing of honouring the Fuehrer's bond, ensures to some extent that Rumania is not so likely to make so bad a bargain by believing in the assurances of the Reich, as other nations, less strategically placed, have done. In this case the strength of the Rumanian position is that Germany cannot force her hand. Any attempt by might to compel Rumania to send supplies to Germany would immediately lead to the destruction of the oil-wells and the stoppage of the production of iron ore, so that in this policy which he has adopted King Carol has found much to strengthen his position, This being the case it seems that reports, to the effect that Herr von Ribbentrop's recent visit to Rome was for the purpose of assuring the Italian Government that there would be no Russian invasion of the Balkans, are in all probability correct. German interests so clearly require that Rumania should be allowed to remain at peace and produce goods for German consumption, that any other development, which precluded this, would in effect amount to a_ particularly serious reverse for the Reich. Here again is to be found another example of that diversity of interest which makes the Russo-German understanding the uneasy thing that it has always been. Whether Russia will be persuaded to keep out of Rumania for the time being remains to be seen. M. Stalin may not be quite so docile as to stand by and subordinate what he conceives to be Russian interests to the German desire to win the war against the Allies. It may very well be that even now that is the last thing he wishes. The only other development which appears to be likely in south-east Europe depends upon the endeavour of the Reich to bring about a better understanding between Italy and Russia. Obviously if Russia can be persuaded to keep its hands off Rumania and the Balkans in general, it may be possible to produce a greater degree of cordiality in Italo-Russian relations than at present exists, though it is open to very considerable doubt whether even the persuasiveness of Herr Hitler will be able to bring about a complete understanding between all the parties to the Anti-Comintern Pact, and Soviet Russia against which it was originally directed. In this connection it must be pointed out that there is no longer any material difference between the National Socialism of Germany and the Communism of Russia, They are now one and the same thing, and one main obstacle to a better understanding between -Signor Mussolini and M. Stalin is to be found in the fact that it is impossible for them to become intimate friends because of the stoutness with which the former adheres to his own political ideologies. As a make-shift this new German policy may serve its purpose for the time being, but, even if it attains its ends, it will have created a ramshackle structure, having about it all the defects which the legend "Made in Germany," has come to indicate.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.